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INTRODUCTION

The role that the jury' plays in the adjudicatory process has been

given much scholarly attention in recent years.2 Not only has the role
that the jury plays in adjudication come into question, but also the jury's

ability to function effectively in that role. For example, the civil jury has
been criticized for producing unwarranted delay and irrational outcomes
in civil trials that are detrimental to society.3 The ability of civil juries

1. In general, this Article does not distinguish between the role of the jury in civil cases and
the role of the jury in criminal cases. With respect to most of the issues that are addressed within
the following Parts, the distinction does not appear to be essential. Some commentators have noted
the similarity of the role of the jury in the civil and criminal contexts. See, e.g., Colleen P. Murphy,
Integrating the ConstitutionalAuthority of Civil and Criminal Juries,61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723,
729 (1993) (stating that "the history, text, and structure of relevant constitutional provisions suggest
that the authority of civil and criminal juries is more shared than divergent"). The Supreme Court,
to a certain extent, has also noted the similarity. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973)
(stating that "the purpose of the jury trial in criminal cases [is] to prevent government oppression
and, in criminal and civil cases, to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues" (citations
omitted)). However, particularly with respect to the constitutionality of the proposed reforms, the
distinction might be important. Therefore, where appropriate, this Article discusses the relevance of
the distinction to proposed reforms.
2. A number of commentators have been critical of the jury. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL (1973); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA
(Rita James Simon ed., 1975); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
4 (1966) (describing the jury as a "transient, ever-changing, ever-inexperienced group of amateurs");
Dale W. Broeder, The Functions ofthe Jury: Factsor Fictions?,21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386,424 (1954)
(questioning the ability of the jury to fulfill its factfinding role); Alfred C.Coxe, The Trials ofJury
Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 286, 289 (1901) (referring to the jury system as "out of touch"); Stephan
Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an UnappreciatedHistory, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
579, 581 (1993) (stating that "in the early twentieth century the jury was subjected to some of the
sharpest criticism in its long history"); cf.Hans Zeisel, The Debate over the Civil Jury in Historical
Perspective,1990 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 25, 31 (suggesting that we improve rather than criticize the jury
system).
However, the jury also has its defenders. For example, Professors Hans and Vidmar came
to the following conclusion after their recent study of the jury:
Our final judgment on the jury system is a positive one. Despite some flaws, it
serves the cause of justice very well. For over 700 years it has weathered criticism and
attack, always to survive and to be cherished by the peoples who own it. Adaptability has
been the key to its survival. It should remain open to experimentation and modification,
but those who would wish to curtail its powers or abolish it should bear the burden of
proof. Defenders of the jury clearly have the weight of the evidence on their side.
VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL ViDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 251 (1986); see also Douglas G. Smith,
Structural andFunctionalAspects of the Jury: ComparativeAnalysis and Proposalsfor Reform, 48
ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
3. See CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 222-33 (1962) (noting that jury
trials often take longer than bench trials); Ren~e B. Lettow, New Trialfor Verdict Against Law:
Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 505
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has been questioned primarily in the area of complex civil litigation,
where the jury has been characterized as an inferior and inefficient
decisionmaking institution.4 The incompetency of the civil jury has been
(1996) ("A series of startling jury verdicts (and a steady flow of less spectacular ones) has set
fermenting a debate about civil and criminal juries in America.'); David L. Shapiro & Daniel R.
Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Tial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 442, 457-58 (197 1) (arguing that civil jury trials place undue burdens on judicial administration, resulting in inflated awards). But see JOINER, supra, at 232-33 (reporting data that indicates that
jury trials do not delay the resolution of cases); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue:
Civil Juries and the Allocation of JudicialPower,56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 55 (1977) (arguing that jury
trials represent an efficient use of resources).
4. For example, in In re JapaneseElectronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069
(3d Cir. 1980), the court held that the jury may not have been capable of understanding the
extremely complex issues in the case. See id. at 1089-90; see also Leon Green, Jury Trial and Mr.
JusticeBlack 65 YALE L.J. 482, 483 (1956) (noting that as civil cases have become more complex,
conflicts have arisen in the jury system); Clyde Lowell Ball, Note, Constitutional Law-In re
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation-Denialof Jury Tial in Complex Litigation, 59
N.C. L. REV. 1263, 1266 (1981) (stating that "efforts have been made to eliminate jury trial in
extraordinarly [sic] complex antitrust, securities, and patent cases"); Comment, The Right to a Jury
Tial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898, 906-07 (1979) (arguing that complex
litigation detracts from the jury's ability to perform its core function). But see Higginbotham, supra
note 3, at 53 ("Apart from the occasional situation in which a judge possesses unique training ... the assumption that ajury collectively has less ability to comprehend complex material than
does a single judge is an unjustified conclusion."). Several commentators have addressed the role
of the jury in complex civil cases. See, e.g., Morris S. Arnold, A HistoricalInquiry into the Right
to Tial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 848 (1980) (arguing against
a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment jury trial right); Maxwell M. Blecher & Candace
E. Carlo, Toward More Effective Handlingof Complex Antitrust Cases, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 727,
752 (same); James S. Campbell & Nicholas Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply
to ProfessorArnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965, 965 (1980) (arguing for a complexity exception to the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial); Patrick Devlin, Jury Tial of Complex Cases: English
Practiceat the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 106-07 (1980) (same); Joel
B. Harris & Lenore Liberman, Can the Jury Survive the Complex Antitrust Case?, 24 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 611, 637 (1979) (suggesting that more research into jury behavior is needed before
improvements to the system can be made); Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:
Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 130-32 (1981) (same); Jeffrey Oakes, The Right
to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in Complex Litigation, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243, 300 (1980)
(arguing that "[a] jury cannot properly perform its function... in complex litigation"); Kathy E.
Davidson, Note, The Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation,20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 329,
355 (1978) (emphasizing the importance of a party's capacity to decline trial by jury); Douglas W.
Ell, Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury:ProtractedCommercialLitigation andthe Seventh
Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 798 (1978) (suggesting that the Due Process Clause should be
used as a standard for defining the right to a jury trial); Constance S. Huttner, Note, Unfitfor Jury
Determination:Complex Civil Litigationand the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury,20 B.C.
L. REV. 511, 538 (1979) (arguing against a complexity exception); Montgomery Kersten, Note,
Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 99, 120 (1979)
(suggesting that the Seventh Amendment provides safeguards guaranteeing a constitutionally fair trial
before a jury in complex cases); Note, The Casefor SpecialJuries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89
YALE LJ. 1155, 1157-60 (1980) (addressing the difficulties of trying complex cases in front of
juries). See generally William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially QualifledJuriesand
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argued to be so great that it might conceivably raise due process
5
concerns.

Similarly, the role of the jury in criminal cases has also been
questioned.' A jury of twelve peers of the vicinage is no longer
unanimously viewed as a "bulwark of liberty"7 against which ordinary
citizens might be protected from the unwarranted encroachments of the
government or from which might be expected the "common sense"
judgments embodying the practical wisdom of twelve ordinary members
of the community. Thus, in recent years, dissatisfaction with the
functioning of the jury in both civil and criminal trials has been of
increasing public and scholarly concern.
In response to these perceived deficiencies in current jury procedures, a number of commentators have argued for reforms that would

result in a more active jury.8 These commentators believe that allowing

ExpertNonjury Tribunals:Alternativesfor Coping with the Complexities ofModern Civil Litigation,
67 VA. L. REV.887 (1981) (analyzing alternatives to jury trials). As one commentator has noted,
"[t]he reoccurrence ofjury failure in complex and lengthy civil litigation cases and in other contexts,
such as understanding jury instructions, has created doubts about the efficacy of the jury as a
competent decisionmaking body." Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibilityof Jurors
in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 191 (1990).
5. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (stating in dicta that the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial in civil cases may depend in part on "the practical abilities... of
juries"); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980); Mark L.
Collins, Comment, The Fifth Amendment Right to Due ProcessPrevailsover the Seventh Amendment
Right to Jury Trial in Complex Litigation:In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation
(1980), 26 VILL. L. REV. 720, 730 (1980-81); James L. Flannery, Note, Complex Civil Litigation:
Reconciling the Demands ofDue Process with the Right to Trial by Jury, 42 U. PiTr. L. REv. 693,
694 (1981) (arguing that judicial overreaching should be avoided in deciding right to jury cases).
6. See, e.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, supranote 2, at 3-11 (discussing the debate over the jury);
Craig M. Bradley, Reforming the Criminal Trial, 68 IND. LJ. 659, 659 (1993) (describing the
modem criminal jury trial as "needlessly inefficient"); Friedland, supra note 4, at 190 ("Numerous
examples support the contention that a jury selected at random sometimes serves as an incompetent
decisionmaker."); Carolyn M. Howell, Comment, United States v. DeLorean: The Case of the
Confused Jury, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 97, 97 (1988) (describing how the jury evidently misconstrued the
court's instructions on hung juries in the DeLorean case, believing that it was required to acquit the
defendant if the jury did not unanimously agree on the conviction). Much like the civil jury trial, the
criminal jury trial has been criticized for its length and complexity. See Gordon Van Kessel,
Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 403, 408 (1992) ("In
the past few decades, criminal jury trials have become so lengthy and complex that we cannot, or
will not, provide them to the vast majority of defendants.").
7. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *342.
8. See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 68 (1988); IRWIN A. HORoWTZ &
THoMAs E. WVILLGING, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW: INTEGRATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 210-11
(1984); SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 131

(1988); Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 BYU L. REV.
601, 628-31; Friedland, supra note 4, at 192; Smith, supra note 2. See generally Leonard B. Sand
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the jury a more active role in the adjudicatory process may help to
improve jurors' ability to carry out their factfinding function. They also
believe that trial procedures that are currently employed handicap the
jury in its role as a finder of fact. Among the reforms advocated by such
scholars are the following: (1) allowing the knowledge and experience of
potential jurors to be a factor that works for instead of against their
being placed on the jury; (2) eliminating or cutting back on peremptory
challenges and extensive lawyer-conducted voir dire; (3) retaining the
rule of unanimity and the twelve member jury; (4) drafting jury
instructions in plain English and preinstructing the jury; (5) requiring the
judge to comment on the evidence and the credibility of witnesses; (6)
relaxing the rules of evidence to allow hearsay, character, and past
conviction evidence to be heard by the jury; (7) giving jurors the right
to communicate with each other, ask questions of witnesses as well as
the judge, and take notes during trial; (8) allowing for greater jury
participation in determination of sanction in criminal cases; and (9)
requiring the jury to give reasons for its verdict in a written decision.9
Many of these reforms have been adopted or are currently recommended
at the state level where the states seem to be fulfilling their role in our
federal system as "experimental laboratories."10
The purpose of this Article is to examine the evolution of the
institution of the jury from its origins in England through its transportation to American soil and to compare and contrast the various historical
models of the jury with the modem American jury. Although much has
been written concerning the historical development of the English jury,
surprisingly little has been written about the historical development of the

& Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the
Second Circuit,60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423 (1985) (observing and addressing certain innovative jury
procedures); Michael A. McLaughlin, Note, Questions to Witnesses and Notetaking by the Jury as
Aids in UnderstandingComplex Litigation, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 687 (1983) (analyzing the extent
to which increased juror participation has helped or hindered complex litigation).
There have been a number of recent studies concerning the procedures governing the jury's
role during the trial. See, e.g., AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, TOWARD MORE ACTIVE JURIES:
TAKING NOTES AND ASKING QUESTIONS (1991); ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM (1984); MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, RAND: THE INSTITUTE FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE (1987); Jury Comprehension in Complex

Cases, 1989 A.B.A. LITIG. SEC. REP. [hereinafter Complex Cases];Symposium, The Role ofthe Jury
in Civil Dispute Resolution, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1.
9. See infra Part IV (discussing the constitutionality and historical context of these reforms).
10. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM 85-86 (1995) (discussing Justice Brandeis's normative

argument concerning experimentation at the state level in favor of a federal system).
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American jury." In particular, consideration of historical practices in
America may serve as a useful guide to future reform of the jury system.
However, it may also serve as a guide in outlining the constitutional
constraints that have been imposed on reform of jury procedures in the
United States. The conclusion of this Article is that several modifications
could be made in the structure and function of the American jury in both
civil and criminal trials in order to enhance the jury's ability to discover
the truth and deliver justice without running afoul of constitutional
constraints that might be imposed on jury procedures.

2

Such modifica-

tions of the role of the jury would not only produce greater justice, but
would also be consistent with the traditional functions that juries have
exercised at one time or another in the English and American legal
systems.

Despite the fact that reform of jury procedures may result in
beneficial improvements in jury performance, significant barriers to such
reform remain. 3 As this Article demonstrates, most of the procedural
11. See, e.g., SHANNON C. STiMsON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLOAMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 34 (1990); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew
G. Deiss, A BriefHistoryof the CriminalJury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 867-68
(1994) (noting that "the history of the criminal jury in the United States during the two hundred
years following the enactment of the Bill of Rights has been the subject of astonishing scholarly
neglect"); Harold M. Hyman & Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in
THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA, supranote 2, at 23, 24 [hereinafter Hyman & Tarrant] (concluding
that there is a "very thin body of American legal history concerning juries").
12. As one early twentieth-century commentator noted, "[t]he question of the constitutionality
of any particular modification of the law as to trial by jury resolves itself into a question of what
requirements are fundamental and what are unessential, a question which is necessarily, in the last
analysis, one of degree." Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure,
31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 671 (1918). Similarly, another commentator writing soon after the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment stated that
[t]he right [to trial by jury] may be regulated by the legislature in certain ways provided
its fundamental requisites are not impaired or destroyed; that is, provided its number and
unanimity, and we should say its impartiality, are not violated. These are necessary for
its integrity; impliedly if not expressly fixed by the Constitution.
JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY § 106, at 149 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986)
(1876).
13. Professor Van Kessel has identified the following barriers to reform in the area of criminal
procedure:
(1) A legal system of fixed rules made impervious to significant modification by Supreme
Court decisions constitutionalizing or otherwise federalizing the rules of criminal
procedure, (2) professional inertia on the part of many lawyers and judges who believe
their interests lie in maintaining the status quo, and (3) our "national character" which
distrusts centralized authority in favor of the individual.
Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 487. In addition, other commentators have noted that there are a variety
of special interests that have a vested interest in blocking reform of the judicial role in the trial
process. See, e.g., John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil
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innovations suggested by commentators to remedy these problems are not
constitutionally problematic and are already provided for within the
current legal framework.' 4 Furthermore, many of the procedures enjoy
a substantial historical pedigree, having been employed at one time or
another in the United States. However, inertia on the part of judges and
lawyers may account to a great extent for the failure of the legal system
to experiment with, and ultimately adopt, these procedures. Many of
these reforms may serve to diminish the power of lawyers and judges in
the adjudicatory process. However, if such procedures are sanctioned by
legislatures, and if lawyers and judges are given guidelines to administer
these procedures, it is likely that their use will become more widespread.

Procedure,75 IOWA L. REV. 987,994 (1990) (concluding that "reformers who contemplate changing
our system to look like the German system must consider the daunting list of special interests with
a clear stake in the way the current American legal culture defines the ideal roles for judges and for
attorneys'). Similarly, there are vested special interest groups that may oppose any change in the role
of the jury in the trial procedures. Many of these special interest groups may be the same as those
opposed to reform of the judge's role in the trial process. See id. at 994-95.
14. Several commentators, however, have noted that there may be constitutional objections to
reform of the jury system stemming from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Graham
Hughes, Pleas Without Bargains,33 RuTGERS L. REv. 753, 756 (1981); Van Kessel, supra note 6,
at 459 (arguing that the Supreme Court is unlikely to approve a "Continental-style mixed court in
which professional judges sit alongside lay jurors and participate with an equal vote in deliberations"). However, other commentators have noted that many of these objections should carry little
weight:
In light of Duncan and other decisions "incorporating" provisions of the Bill of Rights
within the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, it commonly is assumed that a
revision of American trial procedures to embody the dominant features of Continental
justice would require "either constitutional amendment or radical reinterpretation of the
Bill of Rights by the Supreme Court." In fact, however, neither constitutional amendment
nor a judicial reinterpretation of the federal Constitution would be necessary.
It would be strange and unfortunate if the federal Constitution were read to
preclude states from seeking workable alternatives to our existing regime of criminal
justice--a regime so costly and so far beyond the states' perceived capacities that the
Supreme Court and other observers regard the avoidance of its procedures through plea
bargaining as a necessity.
Albert IV. Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant'sRight to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea
BargainingSystem, 50 U. Cmt. L. REV. 931, 995, 996-97 (1983) (footnote omitted). In Duncan v.
Louisiana,391 U.S. 145 (1968), Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, noted that "the Court has
chosen to impose upon every State one means of trying criminal cases; it is a good means, but it is
not the only fair means, and it is not demonstrably better than the alternatives States might devise."
Id. at 193. Justice White noted the following:
A criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is easy to imagine.
It would make use of alternative guarantees and protections which would serve the
purposes that the jury serves in the English and American systems. Yet no American
State has undertaken to construct such a system.
Id. at 150 n.14.
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Furthermore, if, as is the goal of this Article, it is demonstrated that these
reforms would be consistent with historical jury practices in England and
America, then it may be more likely that members of the legal profession
would feel more comfortable and confident with the adoption of such
procedures.
Although the right to a trial by jury in both civil and criminal cases
has been deemed one of the most fundamental of rights, essential to civil
liberty in the United States since the colonial era, the way in which this
fundamental right has been implemented in practice has never been
rigidly dictated.15 In particular, the federal system has allowed for a
great deal of variation in jury procedures employed among the states.
There has also been a temporal variation as societal perceptions of the
purposes of adjudication have shifted. Therefore, incorporation of reforms
that may lead to greater justice in both civil and criminal trials and which
are also consistent with traditional jury practices in America, as well as
in England, are not likely to violate the fundamental right to trial by jury

or traditional notions of due process. 6 The relevant time periods for
determining the popular understandings of these concepts are, for the
federal system, the Founding era, and for the states, the period surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Supreme
Court has construed as making applicable to the states due process
guarantees and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury.
Consequently, this Article examines practices from colonial times through

15. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Backgroundofthe Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv.
289, 289 (1966) (arguing that the Seventh Amendment did not codify "a rigid form ofjury practice"
in civil cases). "A study of the decided cases in the thirteen original states shows that... the power
of the civil jury and the extent of judicial control over its verdicts varied enormously and
unsystematically from state to state." Id. at 299; see also Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 11, at 25
(noting that "[g]reat jury practice diversity grew not only between the colonies and between a colony
and England, but also within a colony"); Lettow, supra note 3, at 505 ("Our jury system is not
carved in stone: it has evolved considerably over the centuries, and will continue to develop"). Even
today, there is great variation in many of the procedures relating to the jury, due in large measure
to the fact that the United States is a federal system. See Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 11, at 23
(noting that in 1961, "92 federal courts employed 92 differing methods for selecting jurors').
16. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that due process is a flexible concept:
It is axiomatic that due process "is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." The function of legal process, as that
concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfimding, is to minimize
the risk of erroneous decisions. Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the
term must apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the
quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to
serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error.
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979)
(citations omitted).
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the end of the nineteenth century.
Part II discusses the origins and evolution of the English jury
system. Several features of the early English jury differ significantly from
the modem American jury. In general, jury selection was more random
(except when special abilities or experience of jurors were considered)
and less lawyer-dominated, jurors were more experienced, judges
exercised greater control over the jury, and the role of the jury in the
adjudicatory process was greater than that of the modem American jury.
Early on, the judiciary exercised greater powers over the jury--both
coercive and persuasive. However, over time, the judge's ability to
coerce the jury to reach a decision in line with his own view of the case
was diminished, while his ability to persuade the jury through commenting on the evidence and credibility of witnesses was retained. Similarly,
the early jury played a more active role in the adjudicatory process by
basing its decisions in part on personal knowledge of the issues to be
tried and by questioning witnesses. In contrast, over time, the rules
governing what evidence could be considered by the jury became more
restrictive. The rules of evidence gradually developed to constitute a
significant control on the functioning of the jury. Finally, although the
jury did not always directly participate in sentencing in criminal cases,
it indirectly possessed the power to determine sentences through its
factfinding role. The facts found by the jury would determine the crime
for which the accused was convicted, which in turn would determine the
sentence served by the defendant.
Part I examines the structure and function of the jury in early
America. Not surprisingly, there are several similarities between the early
American jury and the early English jury. As in the early English jury
system, early American jury selection was more random (except when
experience or special abilities of jurors were considered in juror
selection) and less lawyer-dominated, jurors were more experienced, the
judge exercised greater persuasive control over the jury, and the role of
the jury in the adjudicatory process was greater than that of the modem
American jury. As in England, over time, the rules governing what
evidence could be considered by the jury became more restrictive. A
final similarity between early English and American juries is that both
apparently possessed some measure of indirect power to determine the
sentence in criminal cases through their factfinding role. However, the
early American jury seemed to have exercised greater power than its
English counterpart, resulting from its authority in many cases to judge
issues of law as well as issues of fact.
Finally, Part IV considers the potential constitutional objections to
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reforms of jury procedures currently under consideration by the states
and the federal government. This Part contrasts the English jury system
and the early American jury system with the modem American jury
system. The first area that is discussed is the structure and composition
of the jury. The modem jury is selected in such a way that results in a
jury that is less experienced with trial procedures and less knowledgeable
concerning the issues to be adjudicated than its counterpart in early
English or American juries. Extensive voir dire and the use of peremptory challenges are practices in modem jury trials that are utilized in a
strategic manner by lawyers and which lead to the placement of less
qualified individuals on the jury. Furthermore, there is a trend toward
allowing juries of less than twelve persons to sit at trial and abandoning
the requirement of unanimity in verdict that were traditionally essential
features of jury practice. These trends are disturbing in that they arguably
weaken the jury in its ability to act as an accurate finder of fact.
The second area that is explored encompasses the mechanisms of
judicial control over the jury utilized in modem trial practice. First, there
is a desperate need for reform in the way in which the judge and the jury
interact. Several commentators have noted that modem jury instructions
have become so complex and written in such legalese that they are virtually incomprehensible to the average juror.17 Because of this trend
toward more complex and obscurely-written jury instructions, the jury is
unable to exercise its role in applying the law to the facts in the case,
because it is unable to understand the legal principles that it is charged
with applying. One valuable reform would be to allow the jury to be instructed not only at the end of the trial, but also at the beginning and
perhaps at various times during the trial in order to keep before it the
legal principles that it is expected to apply in rendering its verdict at the
end of the trial. Such instructions can only help to facilitate the ability
of the jury to fulfill its role in applying the law to the facts. Second,
unlike the practice in early English and American trials, judges in
modem American jury trials often do not comment on the evidence or
the credibility of witnesses. This feature of modem jury practice has
arguably deprived the jury of a valuable source of guidance. Third, the
complex rules of evidence that originated in the nineteenth century and
which serve to exclude from the jury's consideration much that is
relevant to the issues to be adjudicated, have arguably deprived the jury
of some of the power that it traditionally exercised. Judges are able to

17. See infra notes 416-19 and accompanying text.
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keep from the jury evidence that might change the outcome of the
adjudicatory process had it been considered. Finally, several other
mechanisms of judicial control over the jury that are employed most
often in the civil context, such as special verdicts and special interrogatories, summary judgment, the directed verdict, and the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, are considered in their relation to the proper
scope of the judge's power to constrain the jury in its factfinding role.
The final area that is explored is the role of the jury in the
adjudicative process. The role of the jury in the modem trial is generally
that of a passive observer rather than an active inquirer."8 Arguably, this
characteristic of the modem trial, which is due in large part to procedural
rules that could easily be changed, has hampered the jury in its ability to
act as an accurate finder of fact. The ability of the jury to fulfill its
designated role could be improved if jurors were allowed to question
witnesses, question the judge concerning uncertainties with respect to
principles of law, communicate among themselves during the trial prior
to deliberations, and take notes. Many of these procedural reforms have
been advocated by other commentators as well as by lawyers and
judges." However, by comparing early English and early American jury
trials with the modem American jury trial, one notices that many of these
"innovations" appear to have been employed traditionally. Finally, the
jury should be involved to some extent in sentencing in the criminal
context. Historically, the jury exercised such a function indirectly, if not
directly, and artificially decoupling a determination of guilt from the
determination of sanction impermissibly restricts the scope of the jury's
power.
The modem American jury has strayed from its historical antecedents found in early English and American juries. The evolution of the
modem American jury has had an adverse impact on its ability to
discover the truth and arrive at just outcomes. By examining early
English and American practices, this Article demonstrates that many of
the reforms of jury procedure currently proposed are consistent with
historical jury practices in both England and America, as well as any
potential constitutional constraints placed on reform of the jury system.
As a result, both courts and policymakers should feel more comfortable
implementing such reforms when appropriate to improve the functioning

18. See infra notes 498-503 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text.
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of the jury as an institution as well as to produce more just outcomes in
adjudication.
11.

THE ENGLISH JURY SYSTEM

Since the modem American jury finds its roots in the early English
jury, it is useful to study this institution in order to determine how the
jury has evolved in America and perhaps discover where this process of
evolution has produced undesirable consequences. In undertaking this
historical inquiry, one discovers that the original version of the English
jury differed dramatically from the modem American jury in terms of the
structure and composition of the jury, the nature of judicial control
exercised over the jury, and the jury's role in the adjudicatory process.
Early English juries were characterized by the more active role they
played in the adjudicatory process. Early English jurors possessed greater
trial experience and specific knowledge of issues central to the case,
which enabled them to undertake a more active role. As a result of their
greater trial experience and familiarity with the issues to be tried, jurors
were in a better position to ask questions and to participate more actively
in the trial. Accompanying this more active role was a correspondingly
greater degree of judicial control over the jury, which was increasingly
less coercive with the passage of time. However, the English judge to
this day retains a great deal of persuasive control over the jury, which he
may exercise in order to provide the jurors with insight that they might
not ordinarily possess, being primarily one-time participants in the
adjudicatory process.
This Part is divided into four subparts. Subpart II.A discusses the
origins of the early English jury. The origins of the jury as a
decisionmaking body may be traced to the Norman inquisition. This is
noteworthy since it may explain the many inquisitorial features of the
early English jury. Subpart IIB examines the structure and composition
of the early English jury. Juries were originally composed of individuals
who were expected to possess knowledge relevant to the case to be tried,
acting much as witnesses. Furthermore, voir dire and the use of
peremptory challenges were greatly curtailed during the early history of
the jury. Subpart ll.C chronicles the evolution of mechanisms of judicial
control over the English jury. The judge's power to coerce the jury
declined over time, while his power to persuade the jury remained
constant. Over the years, and particularly during the nineteenth century,
rules of evidence became an additional mechanism through which the
judge could exercise control over the jury's decisionmaking power.
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Finally, Subpart II.D discusses the generally active role of the early jury
and the more informal nature of early jury trials.
A.

Origins of the English Jury

A number of scholars have addressed the history of the institution
of the jury in England.20 Despite the great attention given to this
subject, the origins of the jury have been much disputed. 21 However,
one point of agreement is that this venerable institution, guaranteed as a
constitutional right under the Magna Charta, was well-established prior
to 1215.2 The jury, as a factfinding body in England, has a long-estab-

lished pedigree and played a significant role in early English trials-significant enough that it was worthy of constitutional protection.
This original inquisitorial system evolved into a "bulwark of liberty" by
the time of the reign of the Stuart Kings. 3
The jury's historical antecedents may be traced to a variety of
sources. It has been argued that the jury found its roots in ancient Greece
and the laws of Solon;24 the system of Judices found in the twelve

20. See, e.g., MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994); THOMAS ANDREW
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL

JURY 1200-1800 (1985); R. H. HELMHOLZ & THOMAS A. GREEN, JURIES, LIBEL, & JUSTICE: THE
ROLE OF ENGLISH JURIES IN SEVENTEENTH- AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY TRIALS FOR LIBEL AND
SLANDER (1984); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1968); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE

AT THE COMMON LAW 47-182 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898); TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE:
THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, 1200-1800 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds.,
1988); Thomas A. Green, The English Criminal Trial Jury and the Law-Finding Traditions on the
Eve of the French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY: 1700-1900, at
41 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987); Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit:
Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 497 (1990); John H.
Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1978). However, as
William Forsyth noted, "[flew subjects have exercised the ingenuity and baffled the research of the
historian more than the origin of the jury." WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 2
(James Appleton Morgan ed., 2d ed. Burt Franklin 1971) (1878).
21. One commentator has concluded that "it behooves anyone to be exceedingly wary about
asserting that this or that is the sine qua non regarding the actual origin of... trial by jury." Robert
H. White, Origin and Development of Trial by Jury, 29 TENN. L. REV. 8, 14-15 (1961).
22. The Magna Charta declared that no freeman would be disseized, dispossessed, or
imprisoned except by judgment of his peers or by the "laws of the land." RICHARD THOMPSON, AN
HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE MAGNA CHARTA OF KING JOHN 85 (Gryphon Editions, Ltd. 1982)
(1829).
23. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 580.
24. See, e.g., MORRIS J. BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT: THE JURY SYSTEM 2-3 (1968); RENt A.
WORMSER, THE LAW: THE STORIES OF LAWMAKERS, AND THE LAW WE HAVE LIVED BY, FROM THE
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 52-58 (1949).
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tables of Roman law imported during the Roman Conquest of England;' the Anglo-Saxon practices under Alfred the Great (871-899),
Aethelred I (865-871), Aethelred the Unready (978-1016), Edgar the
Peaceful (959-975) and Edward the Confessor (1042-1066);26 and
finally, to the Frankish inquisition brought from Normandy by William
the Conqueror in 1066.27 However, the general consensus is that,
although there existed important Anglo-Saxon precursors of the English
jury prior to the Norman Conquest, the model of the English jury was
founded upon the Norman inquisition.28
The inquisition was originally a process used to obtain information
concerning royal matters, usually involving the king's real property
rights.2 9 Individuals who were knowledgeable concerning the disputed
matter were gathered from the immediate area in order to convey what
they knew to the agent of the king.3 ° Members of the jury testified
concerning such matters as property arrangements, local customs, and
taxable resources in their area. Thus, jurors originally functioned more
as witnesses than as triers of fact.3 It was only later that witnesses were

25. See, e.g., MAXmIUS A. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 2946 (Rochester, The Lawyers' Coop. 1894).
26. See Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The ConstitutionalRight to a Jury of Tvelve in Civil
Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,5-6 (1993); see also JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES
118-20 (1960) (noting that according to one account, "the jury was imported from Normandy by the
Norman conquerors"); LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 2729 (1973) (stating that "[tihe English claim to have originated the jury is founded on the legislation
of such rulers as Aethelred 1 (865-871 A.D.), Alfred the Great (871-899) and Aethelred II, the
Unready (978-1013)").
27. See, e.g., FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 6 (Greenwood Press 1969) (1951); 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 312 (7th ed. 1956); EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: FROM THE
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1911, at 47-48 (1912); THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 111 (Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929); 1
POLLOCK & MAIrLAND, supra note 20, at 140-42; PROFFATr, supra note 12, §§ 1-20 (discussing
primitive modes of trial as well as trial in the Anglo-Saxon period); THAYER, supra note 20, at 48;
J.E.R. Stephens, The Growth of Trial by Jury in England, 10 HARV. L. REv. 150, 151 (1896).
28. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 582.
29. See PLUCKNETT, supranote 27, at lo9; POTTER's HISTORICAL INTRODUCrION TO ENGLISH
LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 241 (A.K.R. Kiralfy ed., 4th ed. 1962) (1932) [hereinafter POTTER'S];
MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 205 (1936); Chas. T. Coleman,
Origin and Development of Trial by Jury, 6 VA. L. REV. 77, 79 (1919); Harold C. Warner, The
Development of Trial by Jury, 26 TENN. L. REV. 459, 463 (1959).
30. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
31. See GREEN, supra note 20, at 105 (concluding that juries remained self-informing until the
mid-fifteenth century); 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 317; PROFFATT, supra note 12, § 29, at
43, § 32, at 46 (noting that jurors remained self-informing until the time of Edward I); John Marshall
Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witnessto Judgeof Proofs: The Transformation ofthe English Civil Juror,
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called to testify before the jury.32 Thus, individuals were sought out

32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 201 (1988) ("Throughout at least the first five centuries of the regular
use of the jury in England, jurors were drawn from the neighborhood in which an action arose, and
were permitted and indeed expected to consider their personal knowledge of the facts in dispute in
reaching a verdict."); John A. Phillips & Thomas C. Thompson, Jurors v. Judges in Later Stuart
England: The Penn/Mead Trial and Bushell's Case, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 189, 220 n.167 (1986)
(stating that juries evolved from "active knowers of local events to passive receivers of evidence
made available to them only in court' (quoting John M. Murrin, Magistrates, Sinners, and a
Precarious Liberty: Trial by Jury in Seventeenth-Century New England, in SAINTS AND
REVOLUTIONARIES: ESSAYS ON EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 152, 155 (David D. Hall et al. eds.,
1984))).
The notion of jurors acting as witnesses may have given rise to the vicinage requirement
imposed on trial by jury. Jurors from the area where the incidents occurred were likely to be more
knowledgeable juror/witnesses. See Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1012 (C.P. 1670) (stating
that the jury "[b]eing retum'd of the vicinage, whence the cause of action ariseth, the law supposeth
them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in issue (and so they must) though no
evidence were given on either side in Court"); 3 EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 368-69 (2d Am. ed. 1836) ("[E]very trial shall be out of that town, parish, or hamlet, or
place known out of the town, &c., within the record, within which the matter of fact issuable is
alleged, which is most certain and nearest thereunto, the inhabitants whereof may have the better
... knowledge of the fact.").
Professor Dawson has disputed this witness analogy on the grounds that the jury was
required to enter a collective verdict instead of giving its views of the evidence. See DAWSON, supra
note 26, at 123-25. Professor Landsman has attributed the decline of the juror as witness, in part,
to the method of presentation of evidence:
Perhaps as important as the decline of the jury's witnessing role was the rise of
in-court testimony as the basis for decision. While it may be impossible to determine the
precise moment that courtroom procedure shifted to testimonial presentations in open
court, such presentations clearly came to dominate over the course of the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries.
Landsman, supra note 2, at 587.
32. See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD AND FOURTH PARTS OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND pt. 3, at 163 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979) (1644) (explaining that early in the seventeenth century juries were commonly led by the testimony of witnesses examined in court); THAYER,
supranote 20, at 137 (stating that "[t]he contrast between the functions of these two classes [jurors
and witnesses] became always greater and more marked"); see also FORSYTH, supra note 20, at 128
(concluding that by the fourteenth century jurors and witnesses appeared as distinct groups in the
trial process, but that witnesses and jurors may have come together in reaching a verdict).
Eventually, the expectation that jurors would rely on personal knowledge of the dispute to
be tried was "gradually exploded." Blackstone, writing in 1768, stated that "the practice ... now
universally obtains[] that if a juror knows any thing of the matter in issue, he may be sworn as a
witness, and give his evidence publicly in court." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *375. The
rationale for the abandonment of reliance on personal knowledge was expressed by one
commentator, writing in 1849, as follows:
Evidence, in order to be receivable, should come through proper instruments, and be in
general original and proximate. With respect to the first of these; except in a few matters
deemed too notorious to require proof, the judge and jury must not decide on their own
personal knowledge, and should be, as it were, in a state of legal ignorance as to all
things respecting the question in dispute before them, except such as are established by
legal evidence, or legitimate inference from it... It is obvious that if they were allowed
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rather than rejected for jury duty if they possessed information that was
relevant to the issues to be tried. Eventually, this prerogative of the king

was extended to the general public under the reign of Henry II, resulting
in its use in the resolution of private disputes.33 This procedure of
dispute resolution was eventually available upon demand as a matter of

right,34 becoming widespread and popular for a variety of reasons.35
The most commonly cited explanations for the popularity of the jury are:

(1) the unpopularity of alternative modes of trial such as ordeal, battle,
and wager of law; 36 (2) the action of Pope Innocent I in 1215, forbidding the clergy to perform religious ceremonies connected with the
ordeal; 37 and (3) the provision in the Magna Charta abolishing large fees
that previously had been exacted for granting the inquisition. 3' However, a final possible reason for the growth of this procedure is the
to decide on impressions, or information acquired elsewhere, not only would it be
impossible for a superior tribunal, the parties, or the public, to know on what ground the
decision proceeded, but it might be founded on common rumour or other forms of
evidence, the very worst instead of the best.
W. M. BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE AS TO PROOFS IN
COURTS OF COMMON LAw *94-95 (1849) (footnotes omitted).
33. See PLUCKNET, supra note 27, at 110-11 (noting that trial by jury eventually became the
standard for all important civil litigation); I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 144, 149
(explaining that private disputes resolved in this manner often involved land).
34. See James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development (pt. 1), 5 HARV. L. REV. 249, 256
(1892).
35. See I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 151. Glanvill, an early treatise writer,
summarized the reasons for the early popularity of the jury as follows:
The Grand Assize is a royal favor, granted to the people by the goodness of the king,
with the advice of the nobles. It so well cares for the life and condition of men that every
one may keep his rightful freehold and yet avoid the doubtful chance of the duel, and
escape that last penalty, an unexpected and untimely death, or, at least, the shame of
enduring infamy in uttering the hateful and shameful word ["Craven"] which comes from
the mouth of the conquered party with so much disgrace, as the consequence of his
defeat. This institution springs from the greatest equity. Justice, which, after delays many
and long, is scarcely ever found in the duel, is more easily and quickly reached by this
proceeding. The assize does not allow so many essoins as the duel; thus labor is saved
and the expenses of the poor reduced. Moreover, by as much as the testimony of several
credible witnesses outweighs in courts that of a single one, by so much is this process
more equitable than the duel. For while the duel goes upon the testimony of one sworn
person, this institution requires the oaths of at least twelve lawful men.
THAYER, supra note 20, at 42 n.l (translating Glanvill).
36. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *33149; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 20,
at 618; James B. Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial, 5 HAR . L. REV. 45, 45 (1891) (discussing
judicial duel or battle).
37. See HELLER, supra note 27, at 5 (stating that "[t]he elimination of the religious sanction
attached to ordeals deprived that method of proof of the divine aspects with which it had been
associated, and practically abolished it as a trial procedure").
38. See Thayer, supra note 34, at 264.
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economic benefits it offered to the Crown. 9 The members of the jury
were not paid by the Crown, thus providing a mechanism of dispute
resolution that was relatively costless (at least to the government). Thus,
the jury system was originally seen as a more efficient mechanism of
dispute resolution than the alternatives that were available at the time of
its early development. It was seen as reducing both the delay and
expense in terms of life and labor necessary under alternative methods
of dispute resolution. Furthermore, it was described as being more
"equitable." Evidently, this was a reference to the element of arbitrariness
that existed in the alternatives to the jury available during this early
period. For example, a decision by twelve ordinary members of the
community was likely to be less arbitrary than the outcome of a duel.
B. Internal Structure and Composition of the Jury
Early English jury trials were less adversarial than modem American
jury trials. For example, the peripheral function of lawyers40 and the
active role played by the accused in early English criminal trials4 are
evidence of this less adversarial character. A number of commentators,
most significantly Professors Langbein4 2 and Landsman, 3 have pointed
out that early English trials were less lawyer-dominated and less
adversarial than their modem counterparts, and have argued that the
excessive delay and undesirable strategic behavior on the part of lawyers
is a direct result of the more adversarial character of modem trials.
Furthermore, most aspects of jury practice were not rigidly
established in England prior to the foundation of the American colonies.
Even though the jury trial as an institution had received constitutional
protection under the Magna Charta, there were significant changes injury

39. See DAWSON, supra note 26, at 121.
40. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 315. Professor Langbein noted the following:
In the Old Bailey, as on the Continent today, lawyers for the prosecution and

defense were peripheral forensic figures, if present at all. To the extent that evidence was
not adduced spontaneously in the altercation of accusor and accused, it was the trial judge
who examined the witnesses and the accused, and it was he who, like the modem
Continental presiding judge, dominated the proceedings.

Id.
41. Langbein noted of the proceedings in the Old Bailey that "[t]he accused took the active
role in his own defense, speaking directly and continuously to the court as he does today in the
European systems. The privilege against self-incrimination was not yet working to silence the
accused and distance him from the conduct of his own defense." Id.
42. See id. (discussing the character of early English criminal trials in the Old Bailey).

43. See Landsman, supra note 20, at 498-520.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:377

trial procedures over time. However, despite this flexibility, a few
particular and important aspects of jury practice seem to have been
firmly rooted in tradition. Among these aspects of the jury that remained
constant over time were: (1) a jury composed of twelve members of the
community; (2) a requirement of unanimity in the verdict; (3) fairly
random selection of jurors based only on their knowledge concerning the
issues to be tried; (4) a concomitant reduction in the use of peremptory
challenges and extensive voir dire; (5) selection of jurors who possessed
greater trial experience where appropriate; and (6) relatively short trials." Many of these aspects of trial procedures were arguably viewed
as being essential or inherent in trial by jury, particularly the requirements that the verdict be unanimous and that the jury be composed of
twelve jurors.
1. Jury Size
Juries were traditionally composed of twelve members. Although the
number of jurors varied within the Frankish Empire, particularly among
the Frankish Normans, the number in England appears to have been fixed
at twelve since the reign of Henry 11 (1154-1189).45 Although parties
might agree to impanel a jury of less than twelve,46 it seems that the
practice of seating no less than twelve jurors was available as of right to
the parties and therefore inherent in the notion of trial by jury. Requiring
the jury to be composed of twelve jurors served as a bright, if not
arbitrary, line that would prevent reduction of the size of the jury. As
noted above 47 one of the advantages that led to the popularity of the
jury in its early years was the reduction in arbitrariness occasioned by
requiring decisionmaking to be made by a body composed of several
members of the community. Maintaining the size of the jury at twelve
members contributed to a reduction in arbitrariness.

44. See infra notes 45-93 and accompanying text.
45. See Arnold, supranote 26, at 7; see also Scott, supranote 12, at 672 (noting that although
originally the Magna Charta did not mention the number of members of the jury, "by the middle of
the fourteenth century the requirement of twelve had probably become definitely fixed'. But see
Stephens, supra note 27, at 157 (stating that "[a]Ithough twelve was the most usual number of the
jurors of assise for some years, it was not the unvarying one. When the institution was in its infancy,
the number appears to have fluctuated according to convenience or local custom.").

46. There are a number of reported cases wherein the parties agreed to fewer than twelve
jurors. See THAYER, supra note 20, at 88-90.

47. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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2. Rule of Unanimity
A second practice that seems to have been established as being
inherent in the meaning of "trial by jury" was the requirement of
unanimity of the jury verdict.4" Although a unanimous verdict was not
always required, in 1367, during the rule of Edward 11 (1327-1377),
such a rule was established and, absent consent of the parties, became the
norm during the reign of Edward IV (1461-1483). 49 This practice may
have contributed to the demise of the juror as witness, since jurors would
be required to enter a collective verdict rather than merely register their
individual views concerning the evidence presented at trial.5 Furthermore, it undoubtedly served to increase the "black box" nature of jury
decisionmaking, since the only output of the jury's deliberations would
be a single collective decision." The process by which the individual
members of the jury produced the verdict remained hidden from public
view. Finally, the rule of unanimity arguably affected the dynamics
through which the jury reached its decision. Requiring unanimity in the
jury verdict made it more difficult to reach decisions, and increased the
voice of minority members of the community.
3. Method of Selecting Jurors
A third interesting feature of English jury practice that remained
fairly constant in the early years of the jury's existence was the method
employed in selecting jurors. Besides being selected for knowledge
concerning the issues involved in the case, jurors were also selected for
their dedication to the Crown and "reputed honesty." 2 Selection of
jurors was relatively random in the sense that peremptory challenges
were exercised less frequently by lawyers to select individual jurors they
thought might be predisposed to find in their favor, and consequently,

48. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 408 (1972) (plurality opinion) (stating that
unanimity "had become an accepted feature of the common-law jury by the 18th century'); Scott,
supra note 12, at 673-74 ("By the middle of the fourteenth century the requirement of unanimity
seems to have become definitely established.").
49. See THAYER, supra note 20, at 86-90.
50. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 585-86.
51. Professor Dawson has argued that the rule of unanimity was adopted by English judges
in order to "divest[ ]themselves of any duty to assemble or appraise the evidence. The fact-finding
function was imposed instead on groups of laymen, whose ignorance was disguised by a group
verdict and whose sources of knowledge the judges refused to examine." DAWSON, supra note 26,

at 126.
52. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 13 (1977).
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voir dire was much less extensive. 3
However, selection of jurors was not always particularly random in
a different sense. Jurors were originally selected for their specific
knowledge concerning the issues to be tried. Furthermore, special juries
were often impaneled to hear cases where the expertise of the jurors
might better enable them to perform their function as finders of fact.
Therefore, in cases where the principle of random selection of jurors was
skirted, it was in order to better fulfill certain needs in achieving a just
outcome in adjudication. 4
a. Experience and Qualifications of the Jury
An important characteristic of early English juries was the relatively
significant trial experience often possessed by the members of the jury.
Professor Langbein has analyzed the proceedings of criminal trials in the
Old Bailey from the mid-1670s to the mid-1730s in an illuminating
article.5 Langbein concluded that early English jurors were often more
experienced than their modem counterparts for two reasons: (1) they
often had had previous jury experience and (2) juries were impaneled to
hear multiple cases. 6 Thus, early English jurors were probably more
familiar with trial procedures than their modem American counterparts.
This greater trial experience facilitated a more active role for the jury in
the trial process since members of the jury who were familiar with trial
procedures may have felt more comfortable in the trial setting.
Furthermore, the relatively great experience of early English jurors
also contributed to the speed of early English jury trials, since there was
less of a concern with keeping information from an inexperienced jury
through complex rules of evidence. Jurors were likely to be more
sophisticated concerning the types of evidence offered at trial and the
weight that such evidence should be accorded. By obviating the need for
constant objections by lawyers concerning evidentiary points, much time
was saved during trial and, for all intents and purposes, the goal of
53. See id. at 15-16.
54. See id. at 16-19.
55. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 263.
56. See id. at 276 ("Not only did a single Old Bailey jury commonly try dozens of cases at
a single sessions, but most of the dozen jurors who sat at any one session were veterans of other
sessions.'); see also Roger D. Groot, The Jury in Private Criminal ProsecutionsBefore 1215, 27
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 113, 129 (1983) (stating that the "hundred jurors almost certainly served

repetitively, and so were accustomed to adjudicating guilt or innocence"); John H.Langbein, Shaping
the Eighteenth-CenturyCriminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CM. L. REv. 1, 118
(1983) (discussing a scenario involving repetitive use of the same jury).
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accurate factfinding by the jury was furthered.
Not only might jurors be selected for previous trial experience, but
they might also be expected to possess specific knowledge concerning
the dispute in the case. In this respect, the earliest jurors were more like
witnesses than modern jurors. Originally, this aspect ofjury selection was
manifested in the requirement that jurors be selected from the vicinity
where the dispute arose. 57 In fact, it was evidently a practice at one time
to have mixed juries composed of jurors and witnesses. For example,
Chief Justice Thorpe stated in a case in 1349:
"[W]itnesses ... should say nothing but what they know as certain,

i.e., what they see and hear. If a witness is returned on the jury, he
shall be ousted. A challenge good as against a juryman is not good
against a witness. If the witnesses and the jury cannot agree upon one
verdict, that of the jury shall be taken, and the defeated party may have
the attaint against the jury. . .. "58
This practice apparently ended by the mid-1500s5 9 Thus, the general
principle of random selection of jurors was skirted where resolution of
the particular case called for familiarity with specific facts.
Finally, there is some evidence that the general intelligence of
potential jurors was also considered when impaneling a jury.6" Even if
such a concern for intelligence or potential for understanding the issues
to be tried was not explicitly recognized under the law, property
qualifications for jurors may have implicitly served to ensure that the
better-educated members of society served on juries.6 Property qualifi57. See James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 164
(1983) (explaining that jurors were presumed to have knowledge of the facts in the case to be tried
because they were selected from the area where the dispute occurred). These requirements were laid
out in early statutes that required jurors who were "next Neighbours," Arniculisuper Cartas(Articles
upon the Charters), 28 Edw. I, ch. 9 (1300), or had "best Knowledge of the Truth, and be nearest."
Statute of 42 Edw. III, ch. 11 (1368) (Eng.).
58. THAYER, supra note 20, at 100-01; see also PROFFATT, supra note 12, § 32, at 47-49
(discussing attaint).
59. See THAYER, supra note 20, at 102.

60. See Oldham, supra note 57, at 140-41 ("Several identifiable themes recur in the statutes
and rules of court establishing qualifications for jurors. First, the statutes and rules sought to ensure
that persons of understanding and intelligence served on juries, even though the level of concern
varied according to the nature and importance of the litigation.").
61. See 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW *502-03 (London
1816); 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND § 234,
at 155-57 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979) (1628); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS

OF THE CROWN 415 (New York, Amo Press 1972) (1724); Oldham, supra note 57, at 144-45
(observing that "[t]hrough the reign of Elizabeth, Parliament sought to ensure that jurors were drawn
from the vicinity of the trial and that jurors were men of property"). "If statutory property
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cations in England served to disqualify three-quarters of the adult male

population from jury service. 2 Thus, such qualifications significantly
impacted who was allowed to serve on juries. The purported rationale for
property qualifications may have been to avoid corruption through

bribery of members of the jury.6 3 However, a salutary side effect of this
practice may have been the increased ability of the jury to understand

both the issues argued at trial and their role in the adjudicatory process.
The impaneling of members of higher classes is an indication that64jurors
on average were among the better-educated members of society.
b. Voir Dire and Peremptory Challenges
In general, selection of jurors was fairly random in early English
jury trials. One salient feature of the early process of jury selection was
the absence of attorney-conducted voir dire of prospective jurors, 6 and
the fact that peremptory challenges were rarely utilized. 6 Furthermore,

qualifications did not produce able jurymen, other methods were available. Apart from peremptory
challenges and the struck jury procedure, there is a long history of attempted control over jury
quality by the king, the court, and the parties." Id. at 150-51 (footnotes omitted).
62. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 11, at 877.
63. One commentator has suggested the following:
According to medieval thinking, the likelihood of corruption varied in inverse
proportion to wealth, and so the root cause of perjury in jurors was considered to be the
impanelling of men of insufficient substance.... A typical fifteenth-century reaction to
the prevalence of corruption was to make the qualification even more exclusive.
2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 107 (J. H. Baker ed., 1978). But see Oldham, supranote 57,
at 146-47 (concluding that the freehold requirements were "if not a complete failure as a method to
ensure honest and intelligent jurymen, of very limited value").
64. See I COKE, supra note 61, § 234, at 155.
The medieval concern about the service of knights on juries occurred in unexceptional
cases. Later, in exceptional cases of importance to the govemment, it became
commonplace to impanel "special" trial juries of'"men of quality and substance."... In
scores of such cases, including some of the most notorious trials in English history, juries
consisted of knights, esquires, or gentlemen.
Oldham, supra note 57, at 153-54.
65. See John H. Langbein, Mixed CourtandJury Court: Could the ContinentalAlternativeFill
the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 217.
66. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cam. L. REv. 153, 165 (1989); see also 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *353 (arguing that the assize system discouraged challenges); J. S.
COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASSIZES 1558-1714, at 120 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1972) (arguing
that judicial officers discouraged defendants from using challenges).
However, it appears that challenges for cause were allowed from an early time. "[T]he
challenge[ has always been permissible if made for cause based upon sufficient evidence. Early
writers mention challenges and there are a number of early cases in which they were sustained."
Roger D. Moore, Voir DireExamination ofJurors:1. The EnglishPractice, 16 GEo. L.J. 438, 439-
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peremptories were never allowed in civil cases. 67 Therefore, lawyers
were unable to utilize peremptory challenges to select jurors they thought
might be predisposed to decide the case in their favor. Blackstone gave
two justifications for the existence of the little-used peremptory challenge:
[I]n criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is, infavorem vitae,
allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge
to a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all; which
is called aperemptorychallenge: a provision full of that tenderness and
humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous.
This is grounded on two reasons. 1. As every one must be sensible,
what sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another; and how
necessary it is, that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have
a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert
him; the law wills not that he should be tried by any one man against
whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to assign
a reason for such his dislike. 2. Because, upon challenges for cause
shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient to set aside the juror,
perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke
a resentment; to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner
is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.68
Thus, the peremptory challenge was openly acknowledged to be a
mechanism whereby the accused could exercise his prejudice and strike
jurors he did not like or avoid the problem ofjuror resentment following
a failed challenge for cause.69 Furthermore, peremptory challenges were
allowed only in the most serious cases--criminal (and perhaps only
capital) cases. Thus, their availability was not as widespread as it is in
modem American trials.
Modem English jury selection is similarly, if not more, random in
this respect. Unlike American law, English law does not permit litigants

40 (1928) (footnotes omitted).
67. The peremptory challenge "has an ancient lineage in felony prosecutions from the time of
the settled common law, but has never been allowed by either force of practice or statute, in English
civil procedure." Moore, supra note 66, at 445 (footnote omitted).
68. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *346-47.

69. Furthermore, examination ofpotential jurors through voir dire could only be made pursuant
to a previous challenge of the juror. Otherwise, no questioning of the potential jurors was allowed.
See William H. Levit et al., Expediting Voir Dire: An EmpiricalStudy, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 916, 922
(1971); Moore, supra note 66, at 445.
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to question prospective jurors.7" Furthermore, in 1988, England abolished peremptory challenges altogether.7 Therefore, both historically

and in modem practice, the peremptory challenge and extensive voir dire
have been limited as tools by which lawyers might attempt to affect the

composition of the jury in such a way that it is more favorable to their
side.
c.

Special Juries

Despite the fact that jury selection was relatively random, the
principle of random selection of jurors was abandoned to a certain extent
in early English cases in order to select jurors that might better fulfill
their roles as factfinders. "Special" juries of more experienced or betterqualified individuals were often impaneled to try a variety of cases.72
This practice was evidently well-ingrained in early English jury
practices.7 3 One commentator has concluded that the phrase "special

70. See Graham Hughes, English CriminalJustice: Is It Better than Ours?, 26 ARIZ. L. REV.
507, 592 (1984).
71. See Samuel J. Cohen, The Regulation of Peremptory Challenges in the UnitedStates and
England,6 B.U. INT'L L.L 287, 306-08 (1988).
72. See 1 JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH IN
PERSONAL ACTIONS, AND EJECTMENT 180-91, 203-05 (2d ed. London 1826); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 7, at *357-58 (stating that "[s]pecial juries were originally introduced in trials at bar, when the
causes were of too great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freeholders; or where the sheriff was
suspected of partiality, though not upon such apparent cause, as to warrant an exception to him");
FORSYTH, supra note 20, at 173-75; JOHN IMPEY, THE NEW INSTRUCTOR CLERICALIS 314-15
(London, 2d ed. 1786); JAMES KENNEDY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF JURIES 80-89
(London, 1826); R. PHILLIPS, ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JURIES, AND ON THE CRIMINAL LAWS
OF ENGLAND 28-38, 66-68 (London, 1811); ROBERT RICHARDSON, ATrORNEY'S PRACTICE IN THE
COURT OF KING'S BENCH 261-65 (Dublin, 7th ed. 1792); THAYER, supranote 20, at 94-97, 419 n.l;
THE COMPLETE JURYMAN: OR, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAWS RELATING TO JURORS 69-72, 92-93,
126-28 (Dublin 1774); 2 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH, AND
COMMON PLEAS, IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, AND EJECTMENT 787-94 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small
3d Am. ed. 1840).
73. See PROFFATT, supra note 12, § 71, at 105 (stating that the special jury was known for a
very long time in English law).
[A]s among eligible persons, there seems always to have existed the power of selecting
those especially qualified for a given service.... What we call the "special jury" seems
always to have been used. It was a natural result of the principle that those were to be
summoned who could best tell the fact, the veritatem rel.
THAYER, supra note 20, at 94; see also Oldham, supra note 57, at 137 (concluding that "[dluring
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the special jury emerged in English common and statutory
law as a familiar feature of the civil trial"). The use of special juries increased steadily from the
1730s until the early nineteenth century. See id. at 140 n.13; see also THE CASE OF LIBEL, THE KING
V. JOHN LAMBERT AND OTHERS, PRINTER AND PROPRIETORS OF THE MORNING CHRONICLE 16
(London, 2d ed. 1794) (stating that "[s]pecial juries do not exist... by the authority of a modem
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jury" applies to three different types of jury practices: (1) impaneling a
jury composed of members of a higher class;74 (2) a special procedure
allowing parties to strike names from an unusually large panel of prospective jurors;7" and (3) impaneling a jury of experts.76 Special juries
were impaneled in many different kinds of cases where special knowledge or expertise of the jurors might facilitate the ability of jurors to act
as finders of fact. For example, special juries composed of landowners
77
were convened to hear more complex cases involving property.
Similarly, merchants might be pressed into service to try an issue
between merchants involving merchants' affairs.78 The fact that the jury
was composed of merchants meant not only that the jurors had experience with the issues to be tried, but also may have ensured that the jurors
were of a higher quality.79 The historical evidence therefore indicates

statute; on the contrary, they are as ancient as the law itself, and were always struck, as they are at
this day, by direction of the Court, when trials were had at the bar and not at nisi prius").
74. See Oldham, supra note 57, at 139.
75. A commonly-cited passage from Blackstone's Commentariesdescribes both the special jury
composed of more experienced jurors as well as the special "struck jury" procedure:
Special juries were originally introduced in trials at bar, when the causes were of too
great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freeholders; or where the sheriff was suspected
of partiality, though not upon such apparent cause, as to warrant an exception to him. He
is in such cases, upon motion in court and a rule granted thereupon, to attend the
prothonotary or other proper officer with his freeholder's book; and the officer is to take
indifferently forty eight of the principal freeholders in the presence of the attomies on
both sides; who are each of them to strike off twelve, and the remaining twenty four are
returned upon the panel.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *357-58; see also Oldham, supranote 57, at 190 (stating that "[b]y
1700 the struck jury procedure had become a much more regular feature of court practice," and
noting that the first statutory reference to the special jury occurred in 1696 (citing An Act for the
Ease of Jurors and Better Regulating of Juries, 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 32, § 8 (1695-96) (Eng.))).
76. See Oldham, supranote 57, at 139 (citing as examples grand juries and petit juries in cases
involving issues such as high treason and seditious libel, which were often composed of members
of higher classes, juries composed of cooks or fishmongers, and all-female juries impaneled to
determine whether a female defendant in a criminal case was pregnant). Other modem commentators
have also discussed the special jury. See, e.g., Richard C. Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon"
Jury, 35 IOWA L. REv. 409 (1950); Devlin, supra note 4, at 80-83; Jeannette E. Thatcher, Why Not
Use the Special Jury?, 31 MINN. L. REV. 232 (1947).
77. See Thayer, supra note 34, at 300-02.
78. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 623-24 n.3 (noting that the Carta Mercatoria
of Edward I (1303) provided that foreign merchants were entitled to have six foreign merchants on
their juries); see also WILLIAM MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW
MERCHANT 73 (1904); 1 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT: A.D. 1270-1638, at 17
(Charles Gross ed., 1908) (noting that findings were made by a 'Jury of merchants"); Oldham, supra
note 57, at 164 ("During the late eighteenth century... special juries of merchants well-versed in
mercantile customs helped Lord Mansfield articulate and order principles of commercial law.").
79. See Oldham, supra note 57, at 173 (stating that "merchant status" may have "ensured
quality rather than expertise" in some cases).
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that in many cases, jurors who were selected had special knowledge that

was 80useful in resolving factual disputes that might arise during the
trial.
d. Trial de Medietate Linguae
Another way in which the principle of random selection of jurors

was often abandoned was the trial de medietate linguae.8 1 Under this
procedure, foreigners or aliens were given the option to have a jury
partially composed of members from their native country.82 The
rationale for this procedure appears to have been to ensure the fairness
of the trial.8 3 Thus, not only was increased juror proficiency viewed as
a sufficient reason to deviate from the general rule of random selection

of jurors, but it also appears that fairness concerns could serve as a
sufficient reason for such deviation in limited contexts.

80. Another area in which individuals were selected for their particular expertise involved
criminal trials where the defendant was a woman who claimed that she was pregnant in order to
delay her trial. In such cases, special juries composed of married or widowed women who
experienced childbirth were impaneled to determine whether or not the defendant was indeed
pregnant. See id. at 171.
81. See ALICE BEARDWOOD, ALIEN MERCHANTS IN ENGLAND 1350-1377: THEIR LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC POSITION 3 (1931) (noting that alien merchants were entitled to a trial by a jury
composed half of jurors from their own country); CONSTABLE, supra note 20, at 112-27; Lewis H.
LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841, 848-50 (1976).
82. See Oldham, supra note 57, at 167 (discussing trials of aliens and clerks); Deborah A.
Ramirez, A BriefHistorical Overview of the Use of the Mixed Jury, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1213,
1221-22 (1994) [hereinafter Ramirez, An Overview of the Mixed Jury] (discussing the disappearance
of the jury de medietate linguaein American law after 1936); Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury
and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposalfor
Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 781 (1994) [hereinafter Ramirez, The Mixed Jury] ("From 1190 until
1870, English law provided a ... mixed jury, or a jury de medietate linguae."). The common law
right to a trial de medietate linguae for alien merchants was codified in the Statute of the Staples,
1353, 27 Edw. 3, ch. 8 (Eng.), and was expanded to cover all aliens in a subsequent statute. See
Statute of 1354, 28 Edw. 3, ch. 13 (Eng.). This right was not abolished until 1870. See The
Naturalization Act of 1870, 33 Vict., ch. 14, § 5 (Eng.).
83. See THAYER, supra note 20, at 94 n.4 (stating that "the jury of the 'halftongue,' de
medietate linguae, was founded on considerations of policy and fair dealing, rather than a wish to
provide a well-informed jury"). In particular, there was a concern that jurors should speak the same
language as the party who was an alien. 2 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT: A.D.
1239-1633, at xx (Hubert Hall ed., 1930) ("[l]t was clearly essential (ifjustice was not to become
a farce) that not only half the jurors, but also some at least of the auditors... and of the
arbitrators... should speak the language that was before them in a written form.").
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4. Trial Length
A fourth and final defining characteristic of early English jury trials
is the extreme rapidity with which cases were decided. J. S. Cockburn,
for example, characterized criminal trials in Tudor and Stuart England as
being "nasty, brutish, and essentially short"' with as many as twenty-

five cases heard by a single judge and jury within a twelve-hour
period."5 Similarly, Professor Langbein notes that in the Old Bailey,
criminal cases moved with "extraordinary rapidity. 8 6 This was in part
a result of the effective lack of voir dire and the fact that the prosecution
and defense in criminal trials often took the jury as it was. 87 As noted
above, 8 although jurors could be challenged, the challenge was rarely
employed in ordinary jury practice. 9 Therefore, unlike modem Ameri-

can trials, jury selection did not consume a significant portion of trial
time. Other factors that contributed to the speed of these trials were that

(1) witnesses' recollections were fresh; (2) pretrial procedure contributed
to efficient courtroom prosecution by generating a significant amount of
pretrial confessions and bringing the best witnesses into court and
weeding out the rest; (3) no lawyers appeared for the prosecution or
defense; (4) the accused party spoke in his own defense; (5) judges were

84. COCKBURN, supranote 66, at 109. It appears that to this day the English rely less on plea
bargaining than their American counterparts, although practices analogous to plea bargaining do
occur. See Alschuler, supranote 14, at 973-75 (noting that approximately forty percent of defendants
charged in Crown Courts receive jury trials).
Apparently, American trials were also relatively short even during the latter part of the
nineteenth century. For example, Professor Friedman has reported that during the 1890s, a single
American felony court could conduct a half-dozen jury trials in a single day. See Lawrence M.
Friedman, PleaBargainingin HistoricalPerspective, 13 LAw & SOC'y REv. 247, 257 n.16 (1979).
85. See COCKBURN, supra note 66, at 137.
86. Langbein, supra note 20, at 277; see also Langbein, supra note 56, at 115. Langbein
examined the notes of Sir Dudley Ryder and concluded as follows:
Nothing distances the trial procedure of the Ryder years from its modem counterpart so
much as its dispatch. The sheer volume of cases is stunning. Ryder saw more felony jury
trials in a day or two than a modem English or American judge would expect to see in
a year.
Id.; see also F.D. Mackinnon, The Law and the Lawyers, in 2 JOHNSON'S ENGLAND 287, 307 (A.
S. Turberville ed., 1933) (noting that until a 1794 case, trials for serious crimes never "lasted more
than one day, and [in that case] the Court seriously considered whether it had any power to

adjourn").
87. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 279.
88. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
89. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 275-76.
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more active in examining witnesses and defendants;9" and (6) judicial
instruction was perfunctory due to the trial experience possessed by
jurors.9 1 Thus, early English trials seem to have borne little resemblance

to lengthy modem American trials.
Several benefits were realized from the relatively short length of
early English trials. The most obvious benefits were reductions in court
congestion and the resources necessary to try cases. However, the

relatively short length of trials also made it feasible to impanel jurors for
multiple trials, enabling them to gain experience in trial procedures and
thus arguably increase their competence and ability to participate more
actively in the trial. Finally, because of the rapid nature of the trial,
courts refrained from inducing waiver of the jury and actually encouraged criminal defendants to accept jury trial.92 Criminal defendants were
not induced to enter guilty pleas to reduced charges, but rather were
encouraged to plead not guilty and stand trial.93 Therefore, the reduced
length of early English jury trials in many ways resulted in reduced stress
placed on a system that was essential in maintaining the peace within
society through formally resolving disputes either between private
individuals or between the individual and the state.
C. Judicial Control of the Jury
Judicial control over the early English jury was originally very
great. As one commentator has described it: "[T]he judge was the
primary enquirer. He did most of the questioning, felt free to discuss the
90. See COCKBURN, supranote 66, at 109 (describing vigorous questioning byjudges); GREEN,
supra note 20, at 138 (describing how "[firom medieval times the bench played a leading role in the
questioning of defendants"); GEORGE W. KEETON, LORD CHANCELLOR JEFFREYS AND THE STUART

CAUSE 21-22 (1965) (discussing the importance of witness examination by judges).
91. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 280-84.
92. See id.
at 278.
93. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, 79 COLrM. L. REV. 1, 7-12
(1979) (arguing that for many centuries, Anglo-American courts did not encourage guilty pleas, but
rather actively discouraged them). Even during the American colonial period, guilty pleas accounted
for only a small minority of criminal convictions. See id. at 8-9, 17-18. The practice of plea
bargaining evidently did not emerge until the period following the Civil War and was accompanied
by condemnation by appellate courts. See Alschuler, supra note 14, at 970-71; see also Griffin v.
State, 77 S.E. 1080, 1084 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913) ("The law ...does not encourage confessions of
guilt, either in or out of court.'); O'Hara v. People, 3 N.W. 161, 162 (Mich. 1879) ("No sort of
pressure can be permitted to bring the party to forego any right or advantage, however slight. The
law will not suffer the least weight to be put in the scale against him ....
"); Deloach v. State, 27
So. 618, 618 (Miss. 1900) ("All courts should so administer the law... as to secure a hearing upon
the merits, if possible.'); Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 357 (1877) ("[L]itigation is... the
safest test of justice.").
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merits of the case, and even went so far as to compel jurors to reconsider
decisions with which he did not agree."94 The greater level of control
exercised by early English judges over the jury counterbalanced the more
active role that the jury played in the adjudicatory process. 9 Both the
judge and the jury took a more active role in the adjudicatory process at
the expense of the lawyers, resulting in less adversarial trials.96 Over
time, judicial control increasingly became less coercive. Originally, jurors
were expected to arrive at a verdict independently, without instruction
from the judge, and might be subject to deprivation of food or water
until they did so. 97 Thus, judges originally had a large measure of
coercive power over the jury in addition to their power to persuade the
jury of the correct outcome. This practice evolved into a process whereby
judges could charge the jury and make them reconsider their verdict by
fining the jury or threatening them with attaint in order to induce a
resolution.9 8 Through a writ of attaint, a second jury was impaneled to
review the verdict of the first jury for corruptness or false-swearing. 99
If the second jury determined that the first jury had perjured itself, severe
penalties might be imposed against members of the first jury. As William
Forsyth noted in his nineteenth-century treatise on the jury, "[o]riginally
a wrong verdict almost necessarily implied perjury in the jurors. They
were witnesses who deposed to facts within their own knowledge, about
which there could hardly be the possibility of error."10 Thus, the

94. Landsman, supra note 20, at 505-06. The role of the judge in questioning witnesses was
one of the primary indicia of the more inquisitorial nature of early English trials. "Judicial
interrogation of witnesses was a prominent feature of criminal courtroom procedure in Tudor and
Stuart times. Such questioning tended to concentrate power in the court's hands, and made it possible

for English judges to act like inquisitors." Id. at 513.
95. See infra Part IV.

96. According to Professor Landsman:
The judge and jury were active examiners who felt themselves responsible for the
development of the case. Counsel was virtually never present. Such proofs as were
adduced were generally the fruits of the judge's questioning or the altercation rather than
the parties' efforts. There were few rules to constrain the proceedings and there was
virtually no recourse to appellate review.
Landsman, supra note 20, at 506.
97. See JOINER, supra note 3, at 156; Thayer, supra note 34, at 364-83; see also Saul M.
Kassin, The American Jury: Handicappedin the PursuitofJustice, 51 OHO ST. L.. 687, 709 (1990)
(claiming that similar tactics were used by American judges who "used to urge deadlocked juries
to resolve their disagreements through such coercive measures as the denial of food and drink,
excessive deliberation hours, and the threat of confinement").
98. See Thayer, supra note 34, at 364-77.

99. See id. at 370-74.
100. FORSYTH, supra note 20, at 152; see also 1 HOLDSVORTH, supra note 27, at 333-34
(discussing the use of jurors who had first-hand knowledge of the issue, such as "a jury of cooks
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procedure of attaint posed a very real threat that could be used by the
judge coercively against the jury.
1. Judicial Coercion of Juries: Bushell ' Case
Although in the sixteenth century the courts in England possessed
the power to set aside verdicts and punish jurors at will,'O this practice
was curtailed in 1670 with the famous Bushell's Case."2 The case
grew out of the trial of William Penn, the future founder of Pennsylvania, who was accused of unlawful assembly, but was acquitted by a jury
despite evidence that indicated his guilt. A fine was imposed upon the
jurors for disregarding the overwhelming evidence pointing toward
conviction. As a result, Edward Bushell, a member of the jury who
refused to pay the fine, was sent to prison. Chief Justice Vaughan stated
in Bushell 's Case that judges could not punish or threaten to punish
jurors for their verdicts.'0 3 He reasoned that the jury must remain free
from such oppressive judicial control because it was liable for attaint,
whereby a second jury could convict and punish the first jury for
rendering a false verdict."° This case established the independence of
the English jury and cemented its position as a guarantor of liberty in the
face of state oppression. After Bushell 's Case, judges could no longer
punish the jury for its verdict, but could set aside verdicts and grant new
trials based upon procedural or evidentiary error.' °
2. Judicial Commentary on the Evidence
Although the English judge could not coerce a verdict after
Bushell ' Case, he retained significant power to persuade the jury. Professor Langbein has concluded that during this period, the judge
"dominated jury trial" since the judge often served as "examiner-in-chief"
due to the absence of lawyers. 6 Judges could therefore guide the
production of the evidence that the jury would consider in rendering its
verdict. Judges also possessed the power to comment upon evidence and

as to the quality of food sold"); 2 POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 628 ("We may say, if
we will, that the old jurors were witnesses; but even in the early years of the thirteenth century they
were not, and were hardly supposed to be, eye-witnesses.').
101. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 131-33; Arnold, supra note 26, at 9.
102. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).

103. See id. at 1011.
104. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 134.
105. See Thayer, supra note 34, at 384-88.

106. Langbein, supra note 20, at 285; see also Langbein, supra note 56, at 22-23 (noting the
power of judicial commentary on the evidence documented in the notes of Sir Dudley Ryder),
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to express an opinion concerning the credibility of witnesses.10 7 They
could therefore directly persuade jurors concerning the merits of the
evidence and testimony presented at trial. These two powers of questioning witnesses and commenting on the evidence are interrelated, and it
may be the case that the judicial comment power derived from the ability
of the judges to examine witnesses."'
The utility of judicial commentary was said to be found in the
greater experience of the judge in observing the testimony of witnesses
and weighing the evidence before him. According to one early commentator, the judge was able "in matters of fact to give [to the jury] great
light and assistance by his weighing the evidence before them, and by
shewing them his opinion even in a matter of fact."'0 9 Thus, the use of
this persuasive power of the judge over members of the jury was justified
on the grounds that it might lead to more accurate factfinding by the
jury. The judge represented a valuable source of information since he had
experience listening to testimony and receiving evidence in many
different cases, whereas the experience of the members of the jury was
more limited." 0 Although early English jurors may not have been onetime participants in the system (like modem jurors), and may have had
prior trial experience, they certainly were not as experienced as the trial
judge.
Another characteristic of early judicial commentary on the evidence
was that it was relatively informal. The interaction between the judge and
jury during this period might have been as informal as to be described
as "plain chatter.""' There was less concern that the judge would

107. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *375; 1 MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 291 (4th ed. 1792). According to one commentator:
At common law it was clearly proper for the judge not merely to state the law and to
sum up the evidence, but also to express an opinion on the questions of fact in issue as
long as he leaves to the jury the ultimate determination of the issue, and makes it clear
that it is not bound to adopt his opinion as its own.
Scott, supra note 12, at 680. Professor John Langbein argues that some of the comments rendered
by judges show that they did not regard juries as autonomous factfinders. See Langbein, supra note
20, at 285-86.
108. See GREEN, supra note 20, at 236-64.
109. HALE, supranote 107, at 291; see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *375 (discussing
the judge's role in summing up and explaining the evidence to the jury).
110. Even though the experience of English jurors was greater than that of the modem
American juror, the juror's experience was still inferior to that of the trial judge. See supranotes 5564 and accompanying text. Thus, it would seem that the rationale behind the judicial comment power
is even more persuasive today, where jurors are often relatively inexperienced in trial procedures.
S1I1. Langbein, supra note 20, at 288. Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565, similarly described
criminal trials as "altercation[s]." THO AS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM: A DISCOURSE ON THE
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impermissibly influence the jury in its decisionmaking. Perhaps this
stemmed from the fact that the judge had originally possessed the power
to coerce the jury into making a determination that was in line with the
judge's own views concerning the case. Therefore, the lesser power of
using persuasion to influence the jury could not by comparison be
problematic.
This traditional common-law power of judges to comment on the
evidence has survived in England to this day. English judges are not only
permitted, but are obligated, to provide the jury with
a succinct but accurate summary of the issues of fact as to which a
decision is required, a correct but concise summary of the evidence and
arguments on both sides, and a correct statement of the inferences
which the jury are [sic] entitled to draw from their particular conclusions about the primary facts."'
According to one modem commentator,
a judge is permitted to express his opinion freely and, if he wishes,
strongly. The only limitation placed upon him is that he must not put
any point unfairly and must make it clear to the jury, either expressly
or by implication, that on the issues of fact which are left to them they
are free to give his opinion what weight they choose."'
Thus, at least in English practice, the utility of allowing the judge to
provide the jury with his insights into the evidence has been recognized
from the beginning of the institution of the jury and has remained to this
day an essential feature of English practice.

COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND 100 (Leonard Alston ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1906) (1583).

Smith described the typical criminal trial as follows:
The Judge first after they be swome, asketh first the partie robbed, if he knowe the
prisoner, and biddeth him looke upon him: he saith yea, the prisoner sometime saith nay.
The partie pursuivaunt giveth good ensignes verbigratia,I knowe thee well ynough, thou
robbedst me in such a place, thou beatest mee, thou tookest my horse from mee, and my
purse, thou hadst then such a coate and such a man in thy companie: the theefe will say
no, and so they stand a while in altercation, then he telleth al that he can say: after him
likewise all those who were at the apprehension of the prisoner, or who can give any
indices or tokens which we call in our language evidence against the malefactor. When
the Judge hath heard them say inough, he asketh if they can say any more: if they say
no, then he tumeth his speeche to the enquest.
Id. at 99-100.
112. Regina v. Lawrence, 73 Crim. App. 1, 5 (1981) (Lord Hailsham). It has been argued that
the summary and comment powers of the English judge provide the opportunity to "rescu[e] the case
from the false glosses of powerful advocates." David Wolchover, Should Judges Sum Up on the
Facts?, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 781, 788.
113. PATRICK DEvLIN, TRIAL BY JuRY 118 (rev. ed. 1966).
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However, there are several potential drawbacks in allowing the
judge to comment on the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses in
the trial. The process of judicial summation and commentary on the
evidence may increase the length of trials as well as the workload of the
judge." 4 The process of commenting on the evidence occupies a
substantial portion of the English trial and may be subject to lawyer
objections."' Therefore, it might seem inevitable that the process of
judicial commentary on the evidence would result in longer trials.
However, it might also force the judge to better prepare for the case and
therefore streamline other phases of the trial. A better-prepared judge is
more likely to efficiently preside over the trial at other times.
Furthermore, it has been argued that the judicial summation is
analogous to the American practice of allowing the prosecutor to answer
the defense's closing argument and therefore would be redundant in the
context of the American criminal trial.116 However, the viewpoint of
the prosecutor cannot be substituted for the relatively unbiased viewpoint
of the presiding judge. Allowing judicial commentary on the evidence
arguably counteracts the gamesmanship and strategic behavior of the
lawyers in the trial, and may therefore lead to a more just adjudication.
3. Other Mechanisms of Judicial Control
The early English judge possessed other mechanisms by which he
could control the outcome of the case. For example, in a criminal case,
the judge could provisionally terminate the case short of a verdict since
jeopardy did not attach until the verdict was entered." 7 By this mechanism, the judge could withdraw a case from the jury if he thought that
the jury might reach a result with which he disagreed.1l 8
The judge could require the jury to find a special verdict." 9
Evidently, it was not uncommon for the judge to require the jury to
return a special verdict. 2 Through this mechanism, the jury stated the

114. See Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 524.
115. See id.

116. See id.
117. See Langbein, supranote 20, at 287-88.

118. Seeid. at 288.
119. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supranote 7, at *377-78 (stating that the jury could employ a special
verdict to "state the naked facts, as they find them to be proved, and pray the advice of the court

thereon" or "find a verdict generally for the plaintiff, but subject nevertheless to the opinion of the
judge or the court above").

120. See Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (stating that at
common law "it was not infrequent to ask from the jury a special rather than a general verdict").
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facts as it found them, and the judge decided whether liability attached."' This procedural mechanism may have been somewhat
advantageous to the members of the jury because it afforded them some
protection from a determination of attaint by a second jury. 22 However, this method ofjudicial control was controversial toward the end of the
eighteenth century."2
A third mechanism of judicial control possessed by judges in
criminal cases was the ability to recommend a royal pardon in the event
that the jury convicted an individual whom the judge thought was
innocent.124 This mechanism seems analogous to the ability of a judge
to direct a verdict of innocence. However, it presumably depended on the
discretion of the Crown for its execution.
1 25
Finally, in a criminal case, the judge could reject the verdict.
Judges could discover the reasons for a proffered jury verdict because "in
many cases the jury either volunteered the information or supplied it
under questioning by the judge." 126 After the jury had rendered its
verdict, "[i]t was open to the judge to reject a proffered verdict, probe its
basis, argue with the jury, give further instruction, and require redeliberation."' 27 Professor Langbein has concluded that "[t]he tradition that the
jury would lightly disclose the reasoning for a verdict became especially
important... because it enabled the court to probe the basis of the
proffered verdict, hence to identify the jury's 'mistake' and to correct
it.'' 128 Therefore, the English judge retained procedural as well as
persuasive power over the jury, which he might wield to influence the
outcome of the case.

121. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 295-96.
122. See Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Eficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation
Process-The Casefor the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 51-53 (1990); Pamela J.Stephens,
Controlling the Civil Jury: Towards a Functional Model of Justification, 76 KY. L.J. 81, 95-96

(1987-88).
123. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 296.

124. See id. at 296-97. Langbein concludes: "The jury was not likely to insist on its view when
the judge had a trump that would render the effort futile. So effective was this judicial remedy that
it seems to have virtually eliminated the conviction-against-direction as a sphere of conflict between
judge and jury." Id. at 297.
125. See id. at 291.
126. Id. at 289. According to Professor Langbein, "[t]he reports often ascribe a highly specific
reason or set of reasons for the jury's decision, which makes it appear quite unlikely that the source
was other than the jury itself." Id. at 290.
127. Id. at 291; see also Langbein, supra note 56, at 119 (describing this notable procedural
mechanism for judicial control over the jury in criminal cases).
128. Langbein, supra note 20, at 294-95.
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4. Minimal Rules of Evidence
A final important characteristic of early English jury trials was the
absence of extensive rules of evidence that could be used by judges to
filter evidence from the jury.129 Both hearsay and past conviction
evidence were used in criminal trials "well into the eighteenth century."'3 In practice, judges might have pointed out the hearsay character
of evidence to the jury, allowing its admission, but letting the jury accord
it the weight they deemed appropriate. 31 As noted above, 132 the lack
of complex evidentiary rules not only increased the power of the jury to
accurately carry out its factfinding duty, but was also a primary factor
leading to the relatively short length of early English jury trials. There
was no need to consume time debating evidentiary points, and the skill
of the lawyers in arguing these points bould not act as a factor determining the outcome of the trial.

This lack of excessively complex rules of evidence and exclusionary
rules has remained a feature of modem English practice. In modem
33
English jury trials, illegally obtained evidence is generally admitted.
For example, physical evidence may be admitted even though it was the
product of an unlawful search, detention, or arrest. 34 Thus, it would
129. See KEETON, supra note 90, at 21; Langbein, supra note 20, at 315-16.
130. Langbein, supra note 20, at 301. Professor Landsman has similarly concluded that in the
Old Bailey during the years 1717, 1722, and 1727 hearsay evidence was routinely admitted. See
Landsman, supra note 20, at 565. However, by 1730, hearsay rules had begun to develop that
required evidence to be excluded or the party seeking admission to demonstrate the reliability of the
evidence. See id. at 567; see also id. at 595 (stating that "[tihe late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries witnessed the vigorous development of the rules of evidence"); John Henry Wigmore, A
GeneralSurvey of the History ofthe Rules of Evidence, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 691,695 (Comm. of the Ass'n of Am. Law Sch. ed., 1908) ("A.D. 1790-1830. The
full spring-tide of the system [of evidence] had now arrived.").
131. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 302. According to Professor Langbein,
Old Bailey judges knew that there was something wrong with hearsay, but even
as late as the 1730s they do not appear to have made the choice between a system of
exclusion or one of admissibility with diminished credit. Even when they disapproved of
hearsay, calling it "no evidence," the judges did not give cautionary instructions to the
jury to disregard the hearsay as we would require today. Nor was the jury sent from the
courtroom in the modem fashion while the judge previewed evidence in order to decide
whether to admit it.
Id.
132. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
133.

See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRMINAL PROCEDURE: GER ANY 69 (1977).

134. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 67(8), (10) (Eng.); Regina v. Sang,
1980 App. Cas. 402, 436 (1978) (Eng. C.A.); Fox v. Chief Constable, 3 All E.R. 392, 396-97 (H.L.
1985); Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of TestimonialEvidence: A Comparisonof the
English and American Approaches, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 1, 32-33 (1986). Although English law
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appear that, at least in relative terms, more relaxed evidentiary rules have
remained a defining characteristic of English jury trials.
However, even in England, the law of evidence slowly developed
such that more information was excluded from the jury. By the seventeenth century, judges had increased their power over juries through the
development of the law of evidence. The judge was authorized to resolve
questions of admissibility, competency, and privilege. 3 5 Furthermore,
jurors were forced to hear jury instructions, and the failure to follow
36
these instructions became grounds for overturning jury verdicts.
Thus, the judge obtained power to keep certain evidence from the jury
and to persuade the jury through jury instructions, as well as to override
its verdict in cases where persuasion was not sufficient. From this
evidence, Professor Langbein has concluded that the law of evidence did
not grow up as a result of the jury system, but rather was a result of the
rise of lawyers-that "the true historical function of the law of evidence
may not have been so much jury control as lawyer control."'3 7 Arguably, however, the development of the rules of evidence made it possible
for a more talented lawyer to gain an advantage over less talented
competition through skillful argument of evidentiary points. Furthermore,
whomever the evidentiary rules were designed to control, that power of
control ultimately rested with the judge presiding over the trial who
resolved evidentiary questions. Thus, the development of the rules of
evidence served to empower the judge at the expense of the other legal
actors in the trial-the members of the jury and the lawyers.
D. Role of the Jury
The role of the jury in the English trial underwent a number of
changes over the years. However, some generalizations may be made.
First, in England, there appeared to be a relatively sharp distinction
drawn between issues of law and issues of fact, with the latter being
within the province of the jury and the former being left to the judge's
discretion. Second, the jury was a much more active participant in the
adjudicatory process than its modem counterpart. Jurors were originally

excludes coerced confessions, it does not adhere to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine

concerning knowledge of facts obtained as a result of extorted confessions. See Police and Criminal
Evidence
1783).
135.
136.
137.

Act, 1984, cl. 60, § 76(4) (Eng.); The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234,235 (K.B.
See JOINER,supra note 3, at 158.
See id. at 160-61.
Langbein, supra note 20, at 306.
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active investigators of the facts who gathered evidence and questioned
witnesses. Finally, juries possessed indirect, if not direct, authority to
participate in the determination of sanction in criminal trials.
1. The Authority of English Juries Concerning Issues of Fact
and Issues of Law
A preliminary issue that must be addressed in assessing the role of
the early English jury is the dichotomy drawn between issues of law and
issues of fact. To a large extent, this dichotomy served to define the
scope of the powers exercised by the jury and those exercised by the
judge. It was along this line that the separation of powers between judge
and jury was formulated. However, it was not an altogether bright line.
Many issues of law might be characterized as issues of fact and vice
versa. Furthermore, many issues could be characterized neither as purely
legal issues nor purely factual issues. Thus, the resulting boundary
between the functions of the judge and those of the jury was equally
vague.
It seems that the general rule, as laid down by Lord Coke, was that
juries in England possessed the power to judge issues of fact, but not of
law.'38 William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England, argued that although juries were "the best investigators of
truth," they were less well-equipped to determine issues of law, since "if
the power of judicature were placed at random in the hands of the
multitude, their decisions would be wild and capricious, and a new rule
of action would be every day established in our courts."' 39 Thus, at
least one reason for the law-fact dichotomy was a concern with certainty
in the law, which was viewed as being better achieved by leaving legal
questions to the judge, who was more likely to render decisions
concerning issues of law that were consistent with established legal practice. English juries could and did disregard the instructions of judges.
However, they had no official authority to do so. This limitation of
English juries to decide only issues of fact is consistent with the large
measure of control that judges originally exercised over juries.

138.

See 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

§ 234, at 155(b) (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979) (1832) ("[A~d questionemfactinon respondentjudices . .. ad questionenjuris non respondentjuratores.');see alsoJames B. Thayer, "Law and Fact"
in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 147, 148-49 (1890). However, as one commentator has noted, "there
could have been no sharp cleavage between law and fact in a country where the testimony consisted
of legal conclusions and God was the ruling principle." R. J. Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their
Role in the JudicialProcess, 42 YALE L. 194, 196 (1932).
139. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *379-80.
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However, the allocation of factual issues to the jury with the judge
presiding over legal issues was not universally accepted. For example, in
the noteworthy trial of John Lilbume for treason, Lilburne disputed the
traditional rule that juries were allowed only to determine factual issues,
stating that "[t]he jury by law are not only judges of fact, but of law
also."' l" After Lilbume's acquittal, there was a great public celebration,
and a medal was made bearing the names of the jurors and the inscription: "'John Lilbume, saved by the power of the Lord and the integrity
of his jury, who are judge of law as well as fact."",141 Thus, although
there may have been no legal authority for the proposition that the jury
could determine issues of law, there seems to have been some popular
support for this notion in England. 42
Furthermore, the fact that juries could render general verdicts
probably resulted, to a certain extent, in a de facto power to determine
issues of law.143 The jury was charged with applying legal principles
given by the judge to the factual determinations that it made in the case.
Therefore, the jury had the power to consciously misapply the law to the
facts in the case. This practical problem illustrates the difficulty in any
attempt to assign certain decisions to the judge or the jury based on a
distinction between issues of law and issues of fact.
2. The Role of the Jury in the Trial
The early version of the English jury undertook a more active role
in the adjudicatory process than that of the modem English or American
jury. Part of the function of the early jury was to gather evidence, and as
a result, the jury was composed of individuals who were familiar with
the disputed facts in the case.'" Jurors could properly be characterized
as not only being more like witnesses, but also as being more like active
investigators of the facts in dispute. Not until 1410 was the jury limited
to evidence that was offered in open court. 45 At this point in time, the
jury started to be viewed more as passive observers of the evidence at
trial, rather than as active investigators.

140. GREEN, supra note 20, at 173. The court concluded that Lilbume's statement was
unsupported by any English authority. See id. at 175.
141. Id. at 176.
142. See Alschuler & Deiss, supranote 11, at 903 ("In England, although juries may have often
disregarded the instructions of judges, they never acquired de jure authority to do so.").
143. See William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's

ConstitutionalJurisprudence,76 MtCH. L. REv. 893, 904-06 (1978).
144. See FORSYTH, supra note 20, at 64-65; 2 POLLOCK & MArTLAND, supra note 20, at 621.
145. See FORSYTH, supra note 20, at 131.
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This more active role of the early jury was a product of the
historical roots of the English jury in the Norman inquisition. Jury
practice under the Norman inquisition differed significantly from modem
jury practice. As noted above, jurors were called who possessed relevant
facts concerning the matter in question. 146 Thus, jurors were selected
based on their ability to obtain or have knowledge of the relevant
facts.'47 The jury was described as "a body of neighbours... summoned by some public officer to give upon oath a true
answer to some question." 148 Jurors were summoned by royal command
to testify on matters concerning property arrangements, local customs,
and taxable resources. 49 Thus, jurors served primarily as knowledgeable witnesses concerning the matter before the court.'
As noted
above, an implication of the status of jurors as witnesses was that they
might be found guilty of perjury should they return the wrong verdict.'' Furthermore, trial procedures "were arranged so that jurors
would feel at least some 'duty' to investigate the questions to be
tried."' 52 Therefore, in early English trials, the role of the jury in
factfinding was more active than that of the modem jury, and was not
constrained to in-court factfinding.' 53 Jurors could properly be character-

146. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text; Thayer, supra note 34, at 250; Warner,
supra note 29, at 463.
147. See Thayer, supranote 34, at 261. The explanation for this method ofjuror selection may
be as follows:
In a day when writing was a scarce commodity, important events were conducted with
a great ceremony, publicity, festivity, and public outcry. The object was to make
witnesses to such events as marriage, birth, death, livery of seisin, payment, gifts, sales,
endowment, and crimes. Those in the vill or the hundred would usually remember these
events. It was quite natural, therefore, that witnesses from the hundred would not need
persons to appear before them to prove a fact. They already knew it.
Jack Pope, The Jury, 39 TEx. L. REV. 426, 439 (1961).
148. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 138.
149. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 582-83.
150. See THAYER, supranote 20, at 100; see also GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
95 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979) (1754) ("[T]he Jury of their own Knowledge may have further
Light in the Fact than what they have from the Witness in Court."); GREEN, supra note 20, at 245
("Jurors' knowledge. . . was ...an important evidentiary guide."). However, some modem
commentators have argued that by 1670 the jury was no longer supposed to rely on personal
knowledge in trying the case. See id. at 239-45; Langbein, supra note 20, at 298-99 & n.105.
151. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also FORSYTH, supra note 20, at 105.
152. Landsman, supra note 2, at 585; see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 625.
153. See HELLER, supra note 27, at 8 (stating that "[i]t was the jurors' duty, upon being
summoned for jury service, to make inquiry into the facts of the case to be tried, to sift the
information and then, in court, to state their conclusion in terms of guilt or innocence"). However,
eventually jurors were not allowed to make use of private knowledge. See POTTER'S, supranote 29,
at 245 (stating that "[i]n 1650 it was held that a juror might no longer use private knowledge but
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ized as both witnesses and active investigators of the facts.
Eventually, the role of the jury as a finder of fact was limited to
being presented with evidence at trial. It became a punishable offense to

contact or inform jurors of facts and law related to an impending

trial."5 However, even after this period, jurors often asked questions
of witnesses or the accused, requesting that certain witnesses be called,
and made observations, concerning the facts and testimony or the
character of the witnesses and the accused.' 55 For example, Blackstone

in his Commentaries on the Laws of England states that "the occasional
questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the

witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth,"' 5 6 and Hale in his
History of the Common Law states that "by this Course of personal and
open Examination, there is Opportunity for all Persons concern'd, viz.
The Judge, or any of the Jury ... to propound occasional Questions,
which beats and boults out the Truth."' 57 Furthermore, it seems that
jurors were permitted, if not required at times, to take notes.' Thus,

must be sworn as a witness if he wished to testify"). Eventually, exclusionary rules developed during
the latter part of the seventeenth century, further curtailing the factfinding abilities of jurors. See
MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 580-81 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972);
THAYER, supra note 20, at 47; 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1364 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
154. See MOORE, supra note 26, at 70.
155. See Langbein, supra note 20, at 288. In the nineteenth century, jurors were permitted to
"'ask questions for their better information, at any stage of the proceedings."' Dragan D. Petroff, The
PracticeofJury Note Taking-Misconduct,Right, or Privilege?,18 OKLA. L. REV. 125, 127 (1965)
(quoting FL PHILLIPS, POWERS AND DunES OF JURIES 206-07 (1811)). Jurors might also interject
to admonish counsel. For example, in one of the Old Bailey cases, a juror admonished counsel for
his vigorous cross examination of the victim: "'We desire his Lordship would please to ask the
Questions that are proper, and that the Man may not be interrupted."' Landsman, supra note 20, at
512. Similarly, in another case, the jury reacted to the vigorous cross-examination of a child, stating
"We consider it only as the evidence of a child, Mr. Garrow, and you should not try to draw things
from him." Id. at 557.
156. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *373.
157. MATHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 164 (Charles M. Gray
ed., 1971).
158. According to one commentator:
The propriety of the practice [ofnotetaking] was never questioned, never doubted;
in fact, it was considered to be a must on the part of at least some jurors; and while no
juror could be compelled to take notes, every juror was expected to retain and decide
upon the evidence.
Petroff, supra note 155, at 127. For example, one nineteenth-century source states:
"After a Juryman has been sworn, he takes his seat in the jury-box, where, for the
purpose of making minutes, he ought to be provided by the Sheriff with pens, ink, and
paper. These memorandums should consist of heads and objects of the trial--of the
leading features of the evidence-accompanied by such incidental observations of his
own, as he may deem it worthy to urge in debating afterwards on the verdict."
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the early English jury originally possessed greater authority to assume a
more active role in the adjudicatory process by questioning witnesses and

bringing its own knowledge to bear concerning the disputed issues.
During the twentieth century, the role of the jury was greatly limited
in England. The role of the jury in civil cases was severely curtailed in
1933 when the English effectively abolished civil jury trials."5 9 Thus,
over time the jury moved from being an active investigator of the truth
both inside and outside of court, to a passive observer, whose service
was no longer utilized in most civil trials.
3. Authority to Determine Sanction in Criminal Cases
Historically, although the jury did not directly determine the
sanction in criminal cases, it had an indirect role in determining sanction
through application of its factfinding power. 6 The crime under which
a defendant was convicted, and therefore the sanction, depended on the
particular facts found by the jury in the case.' 6 ' For example, most
felonies were punishable by the death penalty.162 However, defendants
could escape execution for committing a felony if the jury found that

they had committed a "clergyable offense."'163 Originally, benefit of
clergy was a medieval procedural device through which clerics charged
with felonies in the royal court were released into ecclesiastical courts,
but by the eighteenth century it became a fiction employed to distinguish

capital from noncapital felonies."6

Id. at 127-28 (quoting R. PHILLIPS, POWERS AND DUNES OF JURIES 119 (1811)).
159. See Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch.
36, § 6; see also Ward v. James, 1 Q.B. 273, 279-304 (C.A. 1966) (discussing the limited number
of remaining areas in which the civil jury may preside). Because of this development, the United
States presently conducts almost all of the world's civil jury trials. Furthermore, more than ninety
percent of the world's criminal trials take place in the United States. See Gerhard Casper & Hans
Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135-36 (1972).
160. See GREEN, supra note 20, at 282, 365, 383; Langbein, supra note 56, at 41, 55, 121.
161. See Langbein, supra note 56, at 52-55. "The jury not only decided guilt, but it chose the
sanction through its manipulation of the partial verdict." Id. at 55.
162. See 1 JAmEs FrT.zAmEs STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 470-72
(London, MacMillan 1883); Langbein, supra note 56, at 36-37.
163. Langbein, supra note 56, at 37-40.
164. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *239.
[B]y the merciful extensions of the benefit of clergy by our modem statute law, a person
who commits a simple larciny to the value of thirteen pence or thirteen hundred pounds,
though guilty of a capital offence, shall be excused the pains of death: but this is only
for the first offence.
Id.; see also Langbein, supra note 56, at 37-41 (discussing the benefit of clergy and its effect on
redefining capital and noncapital crimes).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:377

One example of a clergyable offense was grand larceny. While
grand larceny was clergyable, other offenses such as burglary, shoptheft
of goods valued at five shillings or more, and thefts in dwelling houses65
of goods valued at forty shillings or more were not elergyable.'
Furthermore, if the value of the goods stolen was less than a shilling, the
defendant would be guilty of petty larceny, which was punishable by
whipping, rather than grand larceny, which was punishable by transportation to the American colonies for seven years of indentured service. 66 The distinction between grand larceny and these other nonclergyable offenses was based on a determination of fact made by the jury.
The jury determined whether the theft was committed by breaking and
entering at night or whether it was committed in a dwelling house or
shop. The jury also returned a special verdict concerning the value of the
goods stolen. 67 Thus, the jury indirectly had the power to determine
not only whether the accused would be guilty of a capital crime or not,
but it also possessed a more extensive power to determine the extent of
an accused's punishment by finding the facts in such a way as to dictate
the crime and the accompanying sentence.
The historical evidence indicates that the jury sometimes employed
its factfinding power to mitigate harsh sentences.168 The fact that most
felonies were punishable by execution led juries to find defendants guilty
of lesser crimes based on a factual determination. During the nineteenth
century, legislative reforms were passed, authorizing the death penalty for
only the most serious offenses due to the recognition that juries tended
to engage in mitigation of sentences anyway. 169 The fact that these
reforms defined crimes with great specificity resulted in an increase in
the jury's ability to determine sentence, since the jury was still responsible for determining the facts that resulted in conviction.

165. See Langbein, supra note 56, at 40.
166. See id. at 41-52.
167. See id. at 40-41; see also GREEN, supra note 20, at 277-80 (discussing the valuation
function of the jury).

168. See GREEN, supra note 20, at 356 (stating that the jury was "one of the principal
institutions of mitigation" of harsh sanctions); Langbein, supra note 56, at 37, 41, 52-55. For
example, Professor Langbein found that in 39 of 171 cases surveyed, the jury downgraded the
sentence by downcharging or downvaluing goods. See id. at 52.

169. See GREEN, supra note 20, at 356 (discussing the well-established jury function of
mitigation).
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I.

THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM

The historical development of the American jury has been less
studied than that of the English jury. 70 However, even a cursory
examination of the historical materials indicates that, like the English
jury, the early American jury played an important role within the legal
system. It seems that there was great flexibility both among the several
states, as well as over time, in the way in which the jury functioned.
Despite this variation, some generalization is possible. The early
American jury differed significantly from the modem American jury in
terms of the nature of judicial control exercised over the jury, the
selection of jurors, and the role of the jury in the trial process. Furthermore, the historical evidence indicates that the power that the American
jury exercised eclipsed that of the English jury in some respects. For
example, early American juries often possessed the power to judge issues.
of law as well as issues of fact. Therefore, the American jury was
empowered to invade what formerly had been the sole province of the
judge.
A.

Significance of the American Jury

The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people. It has always
been an object of deep interest and solicitude ....
The right to a trial by jury and the institution of jury trial were
deeply rooted in English law prior to the foundation of the American
colonies. For the American colonists, the institution of the jury provided
an important avenue for community representation in court." As
Tocqueville noted, the influence of the jury extended beyond the parties

170.

Some important scholarly treatments of the American and colonial juries exist, however.

See, e.g.,

BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY
CONNECTICUT 67-100 (1987); WLLIAii E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1994); JOHN PHILLIP REID,
IN A DEFIANT STANCE: THE CONDITIONS OF LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS BAY, THE IRISH COMPARISON,

AND THE COMING OF THE AmRICAN REVOLUTION (1977); STIMSON, supra note 11; Alschuler &

Deiss, supranote 11; John M. Murrin, Magistrates,Sinners, and a PrecariousLiberty: Trial by Jury
in Seventeenth-Century New England, in SAINTS AND REVOLUTIONARIES: ESSAYS ON EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY 152, 152 (David D. Hall et al. eds., 1984).
171. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (Story, J.).
172. See Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 11, at 28-29. In fact, in Rhode Island, there was a right
to two jury trials until 1878. See Amasa M. Eaton, The Development ofthe JudicialSystem in Rhode
Island, 14 YALE L.J. 148, 154-55 (1904-05).
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to a case: "It would be a very narrow view to look upon the jury as a
mere judicial institution; for however great its influence may be upon the
decisions of the courts, it is still greater on the destinies of society at

large."' 73 Consistent with the importance of the jury as an institution,
several of the colonial charters guaranteed jury trial as a fundamental
right. 74 More importantly, in pre-revolutionary America, the jury was the

central instrument of governance, assessing legal claims and enforcing
legal rights in American communities. 75 Therefore, from the beginning
of English settlement in the colonies, the jury represented an important
avenue through which the members of the community might exercise
political power.
However, despite the importance of the institution and its almost

universal acceptance, there were great differences in the manner in which
the right to trial by jury, particularly in civil cases, was exercised among
the several colonies. 17 6 Alexander Hamilton made note of this fact in

The FederalistNo. 83: "It would be extremely difficult, if not impossi-

173. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Phillips Bradley ed., 7th ed.
1956).
174. The 1606 Charter of the Virginia Company included a right to jury trial that was granted
in all civil and criminal cases by 1624. See Hyman & Tarant, supra note 11, at 24-25. The
Massachusetts Bay Colony introduced the jury trial in 1628, which was guaranteed as a fundamental
right in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641. See MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES 29
(1641), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIERTIES 151 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds.,

1959). The Colony of West New Jersey adopted the jury trial in 1677, and Pennsylvania adopted
it in 1682. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 592. Rhode Island adopted trial by jury in 1647; South
Carolina adopted it in 1712; and Delaware adopted the language of the Magna Charta in 1727. See
1 J. KENDALL FEW, IN DEFENSE OF TRIAL BY JURY 36 (1993).

175. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 20-23.
176. See Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Jan. 20, 1788), reprintedin 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 323, 326-27 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (noting "the little different

appendages and modifications tacked to [civil jury trial] in the different states'); see also JAMES
IREDELL, ANSWERS TO MR. MASON'S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION (1788), reprinted
in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTrTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 333, 361 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,

1968) (1888) (discussing the various practices among the states and arguing that "[a] general
declaration therefore to preserve the trial by jury in all civil cases would only have produced confusion"); Charles W. Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 639, 654 (1973). The differences in the types of cases in which the civil jury trial was available
as of right and the different practices in the various states was argued to preclude any guarantee of
civil jury trial under Article III of the original Constitution. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL

CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587-88 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (Mr. Gorhan commented that "[i]t
is not
possible to discriminate equity cases from those in which juries are proper" and Mr. Sherman argued
that "[there are many cases where juries are proper which cannot be discriminated"). Mr. Gorham
objected to a proposal that "trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases" by arguing that
the "constitution of Juries is different in different States and the trial itself is usual in different cases
in different States." Id. at 628.
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ble, to suggest any general regulation that would be acceptable to all the
states in the union, or that would perfectly quadrate with the several state
' With respect to the civil jury, there were differences in
institutions."177
the types of cases that could be tried, the threshold dollar amount
necessary for a jury trial, whether the jury possessed the power to
determine issues of law as well as issues of fact, and the extent of
judicial control over the jury.1 78 As Edith Guild Henderson noted in her
seminal article concerning the history of the jury trial right under the
Seventh Amendment:
Nowhere in the history of the Philadelphia convention, the ratifying
conventions of the several states, or the specific "legislative history" of
the Bill of Rights can any evidence be found that the relation of judge
to jury was considered as affected in any but the most general possible
way by the seventh amendment, or even that it was considered at all.
Nor can any implicit understanding as to this relationship be presumed,
for among the thirteen original states there were at least half a dozen
widely differing patterns of civil practice .... 17 9
Thus, the right to jury trial was embodied in the organic law of the
colonies that would subsequently emerge as states after independence
was won from Great Britain. All of the thirteen original states retained
the institution of civil jury trial through express constitutional provision,

177. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 571 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
178. See Henderson, supra note 15, at 299-320.
179. Id. at 290. James NWilson, a member of the Committee on Detail, stated with respect to the
right to jury trial in civil cases:
When, therefore, this subject was in discussion, we were involved in difficulties, which
pressed on all sides, and no precedent could be discovered to direct our course. The cases
open to a jury, differed in the different states; it was therefore impracticable, on that
ground, to have made a general rule. The want of unifomity would have rendered any
reference to the practice of the states idle and useless: and it could not, with any
propriety, be said, that "the trial by jury shall be as heretofore:" since there has never
existed any foederal [sic] system of jurisprudence, to which the declaration could relate.
Besides, it is not in all cases that the trial by jury is adopted in civil questions: for causes
depending in courts of admiralty, such as relate to maritime captures, and such as are
agitated in the courts of equity, do not require the intervention of that tribunal. How,
then, was the line of discrimination to be drawn? The convention found the task too
difficult for them; and they left the business as it stands-in the fullest confidence, that
no danger could possibly ensue, since the proceedings of the supreme court are to be
regulated by the congress, which is a faithful representation of the people: and the
oppression of government is effectually barred, by declaring that in all criminal cases, the
trial by jury shall be preserved.
PAUL L. FORD, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITuTION 157-59, reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 101 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
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by statute, or through judicial practice.180 However, the particulars of

jury practice were not prescribed, at least with respect to civil jury
practice. This fact led Professor Landsman to conclude that "[t]he jury
has been anything but a simple and unchanging icon of courtroom
Its most pronounced characteristic has been its adaptabiliprocedure.
1
18

ty.2

This fundamental right was embodied in the organic law of the new-

born nation. For example, the Stamp Act Congress of 1765 declared that
"trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject

in these colonies."18 2 The First Continental Congress proclaimed the
right to jury trial in the Declaration of Rights of 1774,183 which listed
the deprivation of "the benefits of trial by jury""i as one of the
grievances against King George III. Finally, the Declaration of Independence of 1776 listed denial of "the benefits of trial by jury" as a
grievance against King George I that led to the American Revolution. 8 5 The right of jury trial was also guaranteed in the Northwest
Ordinance in 1787.186 Finally, "[t]he only right secured in all state

180. See Wolfram, supra note 176, at 655; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1963) (stating that "[t]he right to trial by jury was
probably the only one universally secured by the first American state constitutions').
181. Landsman, supra note 2, at 580.
182. RESOLUTIONS OF THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS, 1765, 7, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 270, 270 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
183. See 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 69 (Worthington C. Ford
ed., 1904). The fifth resolve of the First Continental Congress in 1774 stated that "the respective
colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable
privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law." Id.; see
also DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774, reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 272 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959) [hereinafter
DECLARATION AND RESOLVES].
184. DECLARATION AND RESOLVES, supra note 183. This declaration was reiterated during the
Second Continental Congress, in which the colonists challenged the English practice of expanding
admiralty jurisdiction. See Landsman, supranote 2, at 596; Wolfram, supra note 176, at 654 & n.47.
19 (U.S. 1776). England had deprived the
185. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
colonists of trial by jury in certain cases by enlarging the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty courts,
in which there was no right to trial by jury. See 4 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 168-71,254-69 (1938); CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VIcE-ADMIRALTY COURTS
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUoN 209-11 (1960); Arnold, supra note 26, at 14.
186. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787 Art. II, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAwS 960-61 (Francis N. Thorpe ed.,
1909). "The inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of the vwits of
habeas corpus, and of the trial by jury; of a proportionate representation of the people in the
legislature, and of judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law." Id.
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constitutions penned87 between 1776 and 1787 was the right of jury trial
''
in criminal cases."
This fundamental right to jury trial was embodied in several
provisions of the Constitution including Article Im,Section 2, which
provides that "[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury"; 88 the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees federal
criminal defendants the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed";1 89 and the
Seventh Amendment, which provides that "[i]n Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved."' 0 The importance of this fundamental
right to the notion of American liberty is illustrated by Alexander Hamilton's comments in The FederalistNo. 83:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they
agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial
by jury: Or if there is any difference between them, it consists in this;
the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter
represent it as the very palladium of free government. 19'

187. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.

1169, 1169 (1995). Similarly, the civil jury was equally revered in many states. Section IIof the
Bill of Rights of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 provided: "That in controversies respecting
property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other, and
ought to be held sacred." VA. CONST. of 1776, § 11, reprintedin SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 311,

312 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided: "That in all controversies at law,
respecting property, the ancient mode of trial, by jury, is one of the best securities of the rights of
the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable." N.C. CONsT. of 1776, art. XIV, reprinted
in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 355, 356 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).

The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided: "In all controversies concerning property,
and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been
otherways used and practised, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method ofprocedure
shall be held sacred... :"MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XV, reprintedin SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES

373, 376 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
188. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
3.
189. Id. amend. VI.
190. Id. amend. VII. The right to a jury trial in civil cases was so important that it was one of
three rights found in all of the pre-United States bills of rights. See Arnold, supra note 26, at 14;
see also ROSCOE POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 71

(1957) (listing eight grievances regarded as violations of immemorial rights or liberties secured by
the law of the land, one of which was "deprivation of jury trial by extending admiralty jurisdiction
at the expense of the common law"). The failure to include a right to jury trial in civil cases in the
original Constitution led to great opposition and protest. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 598;
Wolftan, supra note 176, at 661 n.61.
191.

THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 177, at 562.
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As historian William Nelson has concluded, "[fjor Americans after the
Revolution, as well as before, the right to trial by jury was probably the
most valued of all civil rights ...it was the only right universally
secured by the first American state constitutions."' 92 Although its
implementation has been criticized, the right to trial by jury in civil as
well as criminal cases 9 3 remains a fundamental feature of American
19 4
civil liberty.
B.

InternalStructure and Composition of the Jury

The most accurate conclusion concerning the understanding of jury
trial in early America is that, although it was deemed a fundamental right
of constitutional magnitude, the mode or manner in which it was
exercised was subject to great flexibility.'95 However, like the English
jury, although there was great variation in jury practice, there seem to
have been a few particular aspects of the jury that were well established
in traditional notions of jury trial in America. Among these essential
elements of jury practice were a jury composed of twelve members of
the community,'9 6 a rule of unanimity in rendering the verdict, and a
requirement that the jury be impartial.
1. Jury Size
One matter that seems to have been well established in America was
a jury composed of twelve jurors. According to Judge Richard Arnold,
a jury of fewer than twelve was a "concept both alien and ominous" to
early Americans.' In contrast, other commentators have argued that
the jury, as understood in 1791, need not necessarily be composed of
twelve jurors.' 98 However, dicta in several early American cases seems

192. NELSON, supra note 170, at 96.

193. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 742 (suggesting that the Founders understood the right to
jury trial in civil and in criminal cases to be a single unified "fundamental right").
194. In discussing the right to a trial by jury in civil cases under the Seventh Amendment, the

Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and
fundamental feature ...

which is protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and

sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be
jealously guarded by the courts." Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942).
195. See Henderson, supra note 15, at 289 (arguing that the Seventh Amendment was "not
intended to codify a rigid form of jury practice").
196. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
197. Arnold, supra note 26, at 14.
198. See H. Richmond Fisher, The Seventh Amendment and the Common Law: No Magic in

Numbers, 56 F.R.D. 507, 511, 521, 533-34 (1973). But see Wolfram, supra note 176, at 724 n.247.
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to indicate that part of the definition of "trial by jury" included a jury of
twelve. 99 Furthermore, colonial criminal juries were generally composed of at least twelve members."' 0 Finally, early state constitutions
explicitly guaranteed the right to trial by a jury of twelve members of the
community.0 ' Therefore, when the Constitution was ratified, it is likely

that the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury was thought to necessari20 2
ly include a jury composed of twelve members of the community.
This sentiment continued late into the nineteenth century, when
commentators maintained that the term "jury" encompassed a body

199. See In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 719, 729 (D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7,866).
[A]II agree that the substance of the trial by jury, as known and established in England
for several hundred years, must be preserved. Could congress direct a trial by jury, and
provide that the jury should consist of three men; and that a majority should convict? No
person will assert the affirmative.
Id. The issue of the number of members of the jury was considered to be of constitutional magnitude
early in the history of the United States. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898); Collins
v. State, 7 So. 260, 260-61 (Ala. 1890); Dixon v. Richards, 3 Miss. (2 How.) 771 (1838); Foster v.
Kirby, 31 Mo. 496,498 (1862); Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, 41 N.H. 550
(1860); Lovings v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 35 S.E. 962, 964 (W.Va. 1900). But see Froelich v. Southern
Express Co., 67 N.C. 1, 6 (1872).
[T]he very first of our state statutes to be held unconstitutional was a New Jersey statute
providing for a jury of six, which, in 1780, was held by the Supreme Court of that state
to violate the constitutional provision that "the inestimable right of trial by jury shall
remain confirmed as a part of the law of this colony, without repeal forever." This idea
that the requirement of twelve persons on the jury is of the essence has been frequently
affirmed.
Scott, supra note 12, at 673 (discussing Holmes v. Walton, 4 Am. Hist. Rev. 456 (N.J. 1780)).
200. See Hyman & Tarrant,supra note 11, at 26 ("Generally, petit juries in Virginia courts were
composed of 12 men, although early records of the General Court (colonial assembly) show that
some juries were composed of 13, 14, or, in one instance, 24 men." (citation omitted)). The
Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey of 1677 guaranteed a trial by a jury composed of
"twelve good and lawful men of [the] neighbourhood." CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF \VEST
NEW, JERSEY, 1677, ch. XVII, reprintedin SOURCES OF OuR LIBERTIES 184, 185 (Richard L. Perry
& John C. Cooper eds., 1959). Similarly, the Frame of Government of Pennsylvania of 1682
provided:
That all trials shall be by twelve men, and as near as may be, peers or equals, and of the
neighborhood, and men without just exception; in cases of life, there shall be first twentyfour returned by the sheriffs, for a grand inquest, of whom twelve, at least, shall find the
complaint to be true; and then the twelve men, or peers, to be likewise returned by the
sheriff, shall have the final judgment.
FRAME OF GOVERNMNT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682, LAWS AGREED UPON IN ENGLAND, &c., art. VIII,
reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 209, 217 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
201. For example, Section 8 of the Bill of Rights of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 provided
that "in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right.., to a speedy trial by an impartial
jury of twelve men of his vicinage." VA. CONST. of 1776, § 8, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 311, 312 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
202. See Scott, supra note 12, at 690 (concluding that questions of fact must be determined by
twelve persons).
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composed of twelve members.2 °3

In the civil context, there may have been more flexibility in the size
of the jury during the colonial era prior to ratification of state and federal

constitutions. For example, a 1645 Connecticut regulation authorized
judges to impanel either six- or twelve-member juries. 0 " Similarly, in
Massachusetts, where twelve persons were not available, juries of six
persons were allowed in actions of debt or trespass involving less than
ten pounds.20 5 Thus, although in the criminal context the number
twelve was a constant, in the civil context there seems to have been more

room for experimentation, at least during the colonial period. However,
once state and federal constitutions were put into place, such minor
experimentation may have been prohibited. Just as "experimentation" by
the British involving moving cases to admiralty courts without juries was
forbidden, experimentation with the size of the jury may have been
forbidden as well.
2. Rule of Unanimity

In criminal cases, it seems that "trial by jury" was understood to
mandate a rule of unanimity.2 6 As Justice White noted in Apodaca v.
Oregon,0 7 the unanimity requirement had been well established during
203. One commentator explained:
A petit, petty, or traverse jury is a body of twelve men, who are sworn to try the
facts of a case as they are delivered from the evidence placed before them. Any less than
this number of twelve would not be a common-law jury, and not such a jury as the
constitution preserves to accused parties ....
THOMAs M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 319 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1868); see PROFFATr, supra note 12, § 76, at 111 (noting that the term jury "implies
a body of twelve men.. .[;] a trial jury of any other number is unknown to the common law, and
would not be such as our various Constitutions guarantee").
204. See MANN,supra note 170, at 70 n.5.
205. See COLONIAL JUSTICE INWESTERN MASSACHUSEmTS (1639-1702), at 90, 203 (Joseph H.
Smith ed., 1961).
206. See Scott, supranote 12, at 690. For example, the first draft of the proposed amendments
to the Constitution by the Select Committee chosen by the House of Representatives during the first
session of the First Congress contained the following language in Proposition Seven: "The trial of
all cerims... shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage with the requisite of
unanimity for conviction, the right of challenge and other accustomed requisites .. . ." S. Mac
Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Direof Jurors:A ConstitutionalRight, 39 BROOK. L. REV.
290, 297 (1972).
Similarly, in discussing the ninth section of the Bill of Rights of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which expressly mandated a rule of unanimity, Chief Justice M'Kean of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania stated: "Ihave always understood it to be the law, independent of this section,
that the twelve jurors must be unanimous in their verdict, and yet this section makes this express
provision." Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 323 (Pa. 1788).
207. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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the Middle Ages and "had become an accepted feature of the common-

law jury by the 18th century."2 "8 Four eighteenth-century state consti-

tutions mandated unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases," 9 and
others "provided for trial by jury according to the course of the common
law."210 For example, early state legislatures were often prevented from
changing the rule from unanimity due to constitutional constraints.2 '
The Supreme Court recognized this essential element of trial by jury in
Thompson v. Utah,21 where the Court, relying on historical evidence,
interpreted the Sixth Amendment as mandating a unanimous verdict of
twelve jurors in criminal trials.213
This understanding of the jury guarantee continued late into the
nineteenth century, after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. For
example, John Proffatt, in his 1876 treatise on the jury, stated the
following:
The unanimity of the twelve members constituting the jury is [an]
essential attribute of a trial jury. To accept a verdict of any number less

208. Id. at 408.
209. See id. at 408 n.3 (noting that the North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia
eighteenth-century state constitutions explicitly provided for unanimous jury verdicts in criminal
cases).
210. Id.
211. Some early state constitutions explicitly guaranteed a rule of unanimity in criminal cases.
For example, Section 8 of the Bill of Rights of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 guaranteed a trial
by jury "without whose unanimous consent [the accused] cannot be found guilty." VA. CONST. of
1776, § 8, reprintedin SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 311, 312 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper
eds., 1959). Similarly, the Maryland Constitution of 1776 provided "[tihat, in all' criminal
prosecutions, every man hath a right to... a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose
unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty." MD. CONsT. of 1776, art. XIX, reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LmERTIES 346, 348 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959). The North
Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided "[tihat no freeman shall be convicted of any crime, but by
the unanimous verdict of ajury of good and lawful men, in open court." N.C. CONST. of 1776, art.
XIV, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 355, 355 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds.,

1959).
Courts have also upheld a requirement of unanimity as a constitutional norm. See Springville
v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707, 708 (1897); American Publ'g Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897).
212. 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
213. See id. at 355; see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 382 n.1 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("The unanimous jury has been so embedded in our legal history that no one would
question its constitutional position .... "); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930)
(interpreting trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment to be "a trial by jury as understood and
applied at common law, and includes all the essential elements as they were recognized in this
country and England when the Constitution was adopted").
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than the whole is quite foreign to the idea suggested by a jury trial as
it has been established for centuries, and as now generally presented to
US.214

Similarly, Justice Story noted in his Commentaries that "[a] trial by jury
is generally understood to mean... a trial by a jury of twelve men,
impartially selected, who must unanimously concur in the guilt of the
accused before a legal conviction can be had. Any law, therefore,
dispensing with any of these requisites, may be considered unconstitutional."2 15 Thus, the early practice in the states leads one to conclude
that the rule of unanimity had risen to the level of a constitutional norm.
During the colonial period, the rule of unanimity, like the number
of members of the jury, was not thought to be fundamental in the civil
context. 22166 For example, a 1643 regulation of civil juries in Connecticut
authorized a verdict by the majority ofjurors if all of the jurors could not
reach an agreement." 7 A judge could then render a special verdict in
a case of disagreement. 18 Presumably, a verdict from the majority of
the representatives of the community would be preferable to that of a
single individual, the judge. However, as with jury size, the fact that
colonial practices may have occasionally deviated from the norm of
employing a unanimity rule does not mean that the rule was not
constitutionalized under early federal and state constitutions.

214. PROFFATT, supra note 12, § 77, at 112. "[T]he practice is so ancient and so long
sanctioned, that the idea of unanimity becomes inseparably connected in our minds with a verdict."
Id. § 77, at 113.
215. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 559 n.2

(5th ed. 1891).
216. For discussions of the rule of unanimity in the civil context, see 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 503-49 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).

When I speak ofjuries, I feel no peculiar predilection for the number twelve ....
...I see no peculiar reason for confining my view to a unanimous verdict, unless
that verdict be a conviction of a crime ....
...

When I speak ofjuries, I mean a convenient number of citizens, selected and

impartial, who, on particular occasions, or in particular causes, are vested with
discretionary powers to try the truth of facts ....

Id. at 503; see FORSYTH, supranote 20, at 197-215; Sam F. Miller, The System of Trial by Jury, 21
AM. L. REV. 859, 865 (1887).
217. See MANN, supra note 170, at 69. But see NELSON, supra note 170, at 27 (noting that

"[m]istrials were ordered and verdicts set aside in civil cases if they had been rendered by eleven
instead of twelve jurors").

218. See MANN, supra note 170, at 69.
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3. Method of Selecting Jurors
The conclusions reached concerning English juror selection translate
to the American context. It appears that in early America: (1) random
selection of jurors was the general rule except where juror experience or
knowledge might improve the ability of jurors to act as factfinders; (2)
the use of voir dire and peremptory challenges was curtailed; (3) special
juries were impaneled where appropriate; and (4) aliens were entitled to
the right of a trial de medietate linguae. However, as with many of the
practices discussed in this Article, the particulars of these procedures
were never uniform among the states or over time.219
a. Experience and Qualifications of the Jury
One feature of the American jury that was deemed important was
its impartiality.220 For example, several Antifederalists, decrying the
lack of a Bill of Rights in the original Constitution, quoted Blackstone's
statement concerning the utility of the institution of the jury in facilitating the impartial administration of justice. According to Blackstone:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our
persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that
be entirely entrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those
generally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in
the state, their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will
have frequently an involuntary bias toward those of their own rank and
dignity; it is not to be expected from human nature that the few should
be always attentive to the interests and good of the many.22 '
This guarantee of impartiality of the jury is also embodied in the text of

219. For example, in discussing proposed jury selection procedures to be incorporated into the
Judiciary Act of 1789, James Madison made the following statement:
"The truth is that in most of the States, the practice is different, and hence the

irreconcilable difference of ideas on the subject. In some States, jurors are drawn from
the whole body of the community indiscriminately; in others, from larger districts
comprehending a number of counties, and in a few only from a single county."

Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REV.
49, 106 (1923) (quoting letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS

297-98 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991)).
220. See Scott, supra note 12, at 674 (describing the impartiality and competence of the jury
as "another fundamental requirement which is clearly of the essence of trial by jury; the jury must
be so selected and so constituted as to be an impartial and fairly competent tribunal").
221. J. W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 682 (1959).
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the Constitution in the context of criminal juries under the Sixth
Amendment. 2m The Supreme Court has assumed that the impartiality
requirement applies in the civil context as well.' Although some
notion of impartiality has been thought to be inherent in just adjudication
of disputes throughout American history,2 4 what constitutes an "impartial" jury has since been a matter of great controversy in American law,
particularly in the twentieth century. 5
Despite the fact that juror impartiality was an important characteristic of early American juries, the method for selecting jurors was not
always particularly random. Selection procedures were often devised to
ensure that better-qualified individuals were impaneled on juries.226 As
John Adams stated, although jurors were the "voice of the people," the
"people" were not "the vile populace or rabble of the country, nor the
cabal of a small number of factious persons," but rather the more
"judicious part" of the citizenry. 7 Consistent with the belief that juries
did not necessarily have to be "representative," in the sense that all
segments of the population, no matter how potentially incompetent, must
serve on juries, American law often ensured that only better-qualified
citizens would serve on juries. For example, the American colonies
followed the English practice of imposing property qualifications on juries." Early on in the country's history, several states also imposed

222. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Seventh Amendment contains no such "impartiality"
language. See id. amend. VII.
223. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
224. Several commentators have noted the importance of impartiality as a prerequisite to just
adjudication. See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 156 (1961) ("To say that the
law ...is justly applied is to say that it is impartially applied ... ."); Lon L. Fuller, The Formsand
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 364 (1978) (asserting that "participation through
reasoned argument loses its meaning if the arbiter of the dispute is inaccessible to reason because
he... has been bribed, or is hopelessly prejudiced").
225. See George C. Thomas III, Legal Skepticism and the GravitationalEffect of Law, 43
RUTGERS L. REv. 965, 978-82 (1991) (discussing the difficulty of specifying the content of the
impartiality requirement).
226. However, at certain times, "bystander"juries were authorized in order to save expense and
delay in impaneling jurors. See DAviD J. BODENHAMER, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND LAW
INANTEBELLUM INDIANA 87 (1986) (describing bystander juries in Indiana and concluding that in
practice "[i]t is doubtful whether bystander juries represented the lower classes of the community").
Often individuals impaneled in such juries might be less qualified than those impaneled under
normal selection procedures.
227. 4 THE WoRKs OF JOHN ADAMS 82 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851).
228. See Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 11, at 27. For example, in colonial New York,
[t]he
basic requirements were that a juror be a freeman over twenty-one years of age who
owned a good house or ten acres of freehold. In New York City and Albany one dwelling
house free from encumbrances or a net personal estate of fifty pounds would suffice.
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qualifications that potential jurors had to meet. 9 For example, Georgia
required that potential jurors be drawn from those qualified to vote.23°
Connecticut required that potential jurors be freeholders until 1818.231
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, many states began to
abandon property qualifications, allowing those individuals qualified to
vote to serve on juries.232 However, some states retained property
qualifications until relatively recently.233 For example, New York had

Aliens were excluded. Roughly two-thirds of adult white males were disqualified.
Farmers and craftsmen predominated in county juries, and merchants and artisans in those
of the city.
COURTS AND LAW INEARLY NEW YORK: SELECTED ESSAYS 123 n.28 (Leo Hershkowitz & Milton
M. Klein eds., 1978). In fact, property qualifications were almost constitutionalized as prerequisites
for jury service by the Select Committee of the House of Representatives, which drafted proposed
amendments to the Constitution. In its first draft, Proposition Seven guaranteed an impartial jury trial
of "freeholders of the vicinage." Gutman, supra note 206, at 297.
Jury selection in the colonial decades was, almost universally, related to property
ownership. In Virginia, under a 1699 law, jurors in the General Court, and in the higher
criminal courts of Oyer and Terminer under a 1734 law, had to be freeholders who
possessed at least £100 in property. In the county courts, jurors were also required to be
freeholders, but they had to possess only £50 worth of property.
Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 11, at 27.
229. See Richard C. Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon" Jury, 35 IOWA L. REv. 409, 415
It is
(1950) (arguing that "the jury has never been considered a purely democratic institution ....
common knowledge that in all our states many people who vote and even hold high public office
are nevertheless deprived of the privilege of serving on juries"). But see MANN, supra note 170, at
78 (noting that there were property qualifications for jurors in early Connecticut); 2 TOCQUEVILLE,
supranote 173, at 359-60 (describing the powers of sheriffs charged with summoningjurors as "very
extensive and very arbitrary"); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 11, at 879 (arguing that in practice
"formal qualifications offered no clear indication of who served on juries in fact"). As Alschuler and
Deiss have argued:
Just as formal eligibility for jury service did not always mean eligibility in fact,
statutory disqualification did not always mean real disqualification. When qualified jurors
failed to appear, statutes permitted court clerks or sheriffs to impanel unqualified
"bystanders." In a number ofjurisdictions, the nonappearance of qualified jurors and the
use of bystanders was common.
Id. at 880; see also BODENHAM ER, supranote 226, at 83-88 (discussing bystander juries); DOUGLAS
GREENBERG, CRImE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK, 1691-1776, at 172-73
(1976) ("[A] number of bills were proposed and passed in order to assure 'the returning of able and
sufficient jurors."').
230. See An Act to Revise and Amend the Judiciary System § 27 (Feb. 9, 1797), Digest of the
Laws of the State of Georgia 271, 278 (Marbury & Crawford 1802).
231. See 1836 Conn. Pub. Acts 5, ch. 6 (repealing freeholding requirement); see also KIRK H.
PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 110 (1918).

232. See PROFFATT, supra note 12, § 115, at 161 (noting that the Mississippi Constitution of
1870 abandoned property qualifications, that Connecticut abandoned property qualifications in 1837,
and that Alabama abandoned property qualifications in 1868).
233. See id. at 161-62 (noting that property qualifications remained in California, Indiana,
Kansas, New Jersey, Michigan, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Rhode
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a $250 property-holding requirement until 1967.234 Thus, as in England, property qualifications ensured that the better-educated members of
society were chosen for jury service. Furthermore, it was common for

states to maintain requirements that individuals serving as jurors be wellinformed and intelligent.235 Therefore, the principle of random selection
was often abandoned in order to improve the ability of juries to carry out
their factfinding roles. These early practices indicate that there has
always been a diversity in jury selection procedures, and therefore, no
single selection methodology rose to constitutional magnitude.2 36
b. Voir Dire and Peremptory Challenges

As in England,23 extensive utilization of voir dire and peremptory

challenges was curtailed in early American jury trials. 38 Furthermore,
attorney-conducted voir dire was less prevalent early in the history of the

Island, and New York).
234. See An Act to Amend the Judiciary Law, in Relation to Qualifications of Jurors § 1, ch.
49, 1967 N.Y. Laws 68, § 596; see also United States v. Foster, 83 F. Supp. 197, 208 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (upholding this requirement).
235. See PROFFATr, supranote 12, § 118, at 164 (describing statutes prescribing such qualifications).
236. The fact of diversity in jury selection procedures was reflected in the laws concerning
federal jury selection procedures passed by the First Congress:
[J]urors in all cases to serve in the courts of the United States shall be designated by lot
or otherwise in each State respectively according to the mode of forming juries therein
now practised, so far as the laws of the same shall render such designation practicable
by the courts or marshals of the United States; and the jurors shall have the same
qualifications as are requisite for jurors by the laws of the State of which they are
citizens, to serve in the highest courts of law of such State, and shall be returned as there
shall be occasion for them, from such parts of the district from time to time as the court
shall direct, so as shall be most favourable to an impartial trial, and so as not to incur an
unnecessary expense, or unduly to burthen the citizens of any part of the district with
such services.
An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States § 29, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (1789).
Similarly, a number of courts have held that a statute that changes jury selection procedures is not
unconstitutional provided that the selection method is fair. See People v. Harding, 18 N.W. 555, 560
(Mich. 1884); Dowling v. State, 13 Miss. (5 S. & M.) 664, 685 (1846); State ex rel. Kansas City &
S. Ry. v. Slover, 36 S.W. 50, 51 (Mo. 1896); People v. Meyer, 56 N.E. 758, 759 (N.Y. 1900).
237. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
238. Evidently, voir dire became an increasingly lengthy process toward the end of the
nineteenth century. For example, one commentator made the following observation:
[W]e find the process [of voir dire] lengthened to a tedious and exasperating extent in
trials of great importance, as for instance in the impanelling of the jury in the late trial
ofTilton v. Beecher, when the examination was extended over a period of four days, and
twenty-four jurors were examined on a challenge for principal cause.
PROFFATT, supra note 12, § 166, at 220.
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United States.239 Thus, lawyers were prevented from utilizing these
procedures to gain a strategic advantage, and trial delay was lessened.
Despite the fact that the use of peremptory challenges was curtailed,
the ability of the criminal defendant to exercise challenges for cause was
thought to be inherent in the definition of an "impartial jury.' 240 For
example, Article 30 of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, adopted in
1641, explicitly mentioned this right of challenge.241 Similarly, the
Frame of Government of Pennsylvania of 1682 guaranteed that "reasonable challenges shall be always admitted against the said twelve men, or

any of them."'242 This understanding also prevailed after ratification of

the Fourteenth Amendment.243 The right to challenge for cause was
thought to be inherent in what was meant by "trial by jury."
Although peremptory challenges were not constitutionally guaranteed, defendants in criminal trials often had the statutory right to exercise

239. See Gutman, supra note 206, at 290 ("Since the seventeenth century, the criminal trial bar
has fought for the right to attorney-conducted voir dire. At common law the right was not recognized .... ").
240. For example, the Select Committee of the House of Representatives, charged with drafting
the Bill of Rights, originally included the phrase "the right of challenge" in the text of what became
the Sixth Amendment, which was replaced with the "impartial jury" language. See id. at 296-97.
James Madison stated during the Virginia debates, "[w]here a technical word was used, all the
incidents belonging to it necessarily attended it. The right to challenge is incident to the trial by jury,
and, therefore, as one is secured, so is the other." 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 531 (J. B. Lippincott Co., 1941)
(2d ed. 1874). Similarly, Edmond Pendleton stated: "It is strongly insisted that the privilege of
challenging, or excepting to the jury is not secured. When the constitution says that the trial shall
be by jury, does it not say that every incident will go along with it." Id. at 546.
In United States v. Burr,25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g), Chief Justice John
Marshall noted the rationale behind the guarantee of the right of challenge, stating that an individual
related to a litigant "will listen with more favor to that testimony which confirms, than to that which
would change his opinion; it is not to be expected that he will weigh evidence or argument as fairly
as a man whose judgment is not made up in the case." Id. at 50.
241. Article 30 reads as follows:
It shall be in the libertie both of plantife and defendant, and likewise every
delinquent (to be judged by a Jurie) to challenge any of the Jurors. And if his challenge
be found just and reasonable by the Bench, or the rest of the Jurie, as the challenger shall
choose it shall be allowed him, and tales de cercumstantibus impaneled in their room.
MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES, 1641, art. 30, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 148, 151
(Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
242. FRAmE OF GOVERNmENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1682, LAWS AGREED UPON INENGLAND,
&C., art. VIII, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LmERTIES 209, 217 (Richard L. Perry & John C.

Cooper eds., 1959).
243. See, e.g., PROFFAiT, supra note 12, § 147, at 199 (concluding that the "right of challenge
must necessarily accompany the trial by jury as a necessary incident").
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a certain number of them. 2 " This number varied from state to state and
over time.245 However, in several cases there is dicta to the effect that,
although there was a constitutional right to exercise challenges for cause,
there was no such right to exercise peremptories. For example, Justice
Clifford stated in United States v. Plumer24" that "[c]hallenge for cause
is doubtless a constitutional right, as without its exercise the prisoner
might be deprived of an impartial jury, but the peremptory challenge is
a privilege conferred by law, which may be enlarged, abridged, or
annulled by the legislative authority.' 247 Furthermore, courts held that

a statute changing the maximum number of peremptory challenges
allowed did not violate constitutional prohibitions. 248 Even after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, commentators expressed the
view that the legislature could regulate the number of peremptory
challenges without impairing due process or jury trial guarantees.249
The single exception seems to have been when a criminal defendant was
accused of a capital crime. In such a case, it seems that it was thought
that the defendant was entitled to exercise peremptory challenges.25 °

244. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 21 (noting that in colonial Massachusetts, defendants

received a certain number of peremptories that varied with the charge).
245. See PROFFATT, supra note 12, § 158, at 209-11 (noting that the number of peremptory
challenges allowed in state criminal cases varied between thirty-five and six). Evidently, the right
to peremptorily challenge jurors in civil cases arose in the late nineteenth century. As Proffatt noted,
"[the right [to peremptorily challenge jurors in civil cases] is becoming more extended and
recognized here, and late enactments have given it where it did not exist before." Id. § 163, at 215.
The number of peremptories allowed was generally between two and four. See id. § 163, at 216.
246. 27 F. Cas. 561 (C.C.D. Mass. 1859) (No. 16,056).
247. Id. at 575-76.
248. See, e.g., Walter v. People, 32 N.Y. 147, 159-60 (1865).
249. See, e.g., PROFFATr, supra note 12.
[T]he legislature may limit the number of peremptory challenges, even in capital cases,
without infringing on the constitutional right; for this right is to have twelve free and
lawful men who are impartial between either party, who will by an unanimous verdict
find the truth of the issue, and any legislation, therefore, which merely points out the
mode of arriving at this object, but does not rob it of any of its essential ingredients,
cannot be considered an infringement of the right.
Id. § 106, at 150.
250. See United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588 (1855).
The court is of opinion that the power conferred upon the federal courts to adopt
"rules and regulations for conforming the designation and impanelling of juries to the
laws and usages in force at the time in the State," enables them to adopt the laws and
usages of the State in respect to the challenges of jurors, whether peremptory or for
cause, and in cases both civil and criminal, with the exception, in criminal cases, of
treason and other crimes, of which the punishment is declared to be death.
Id. at 590. Similarly, the Concessions and Agreements of Vest New Jersey of 1677 provided the
following:
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c.

Special Juries

Like the English practice, 251 the principle of random juror selec-

tion in the United States was abandoned in certain circumstances in order
to facilitate juror factfinding and to reach a more just outcome. For
example, special juries could be impaneled in certain cases that required
special juror expertise. 252 Several American states provided for special

juries.253 For example, an 1807 Louisiana law provided for special
juries composed of members of certain professions when the issues to be
tried were "of such a nature as to require certain information peculiar to
certain occupations or professions.""2 Similarly, New York provided

[I]n all causes to be tryed [where life, limb, or property might be lost], and in all tryals,
the person or persons, arraigned may except against any of the said neighbourhood,
without any reason rendered, (not exceeding thirty five) and in case of any valid reason
alleged, against every person nominated for that service.
CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF VEST NEW JERSEY, 1677, ch. XVII, reprinted in SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTIES 184, 185 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
251. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
252. See HuGo HIRSH, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON JURIES §§ 857-972, at 249-300 (New York,
George S. Diossy 1879); MORTON J. HORwVTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860, at 155-59 (1977); RICHARD HOLCOMBE KILBOURNE, JR., LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW 10105, 155-56 (1980); SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & EDWin G. MERRIAM, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, CUSTODY AND CONDUCT OF JURIES, INCLUDING GRAND JURIES 15-18 (1882); see also

Baker, supra note 229, at 409-13 (noting that special or blue ribbon juries were utilized in the United
States during the first half of the twentieth century); Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 4, at 903
("Special juries have been used in this country also, though express authorization for their use
appears to have been confined primarily to state statutes.").
253. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 12, 1768, ch. 980, § 19, 7 S.C. Acts 197, 203 (D. McCord 1840);
see also Harvey v. Richards, 11 F. Cas. 746, 746 n.2 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 6,184) (noting that
the case was tried by a special jury and that "[t]he practice of summoning special juries appears,
from the records of our courts, to have been early prevalent in Massachusetts"); Peisch v. Dickson,
19 F. Cas. 123, 125 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 10,911) (same). Some states apparently still provide
for struck jury procedures. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 12-16-122 (1975); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:75-1
to -7, repealedby Act of 1991, ch. 91, § 533 (West Supp. 1996); see also Luneburg & Nordenberg,
supra note 4, at 906 (noting that "[s]eventeen states have used some form of special jury at one time
or another").
254. An Act to Authorize a Special Jury in Certain Cases, 1807 Acts of the Territory of Orleans,
2d Sess. 168, 170; see also Talcott v. M'Kibben, 1 Mart. (2 o.s.) 298, 304 (La. 1812); KILBOURNE,
supra note 252, at 101 (discussing this statute and the use of merchant juries in Louisiana and noting
that "[1]itigation involving the constitution of special juries never came before the Louisiana Supreme
Court"). It is also noteworthy that some individuals seem to have served on the merchant juries in
Louisiana multiple times. See id. at 103 (finding that from 1839 to 1842 in New Orleans "many
names appeared more than once on the jury lists" and that "some of the commission merchants who
served as jurors... were among the most prominent in the city").
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for a struck jury as far back as 1741.55 Provision for special juries

continued in many states after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
indicating that there were apparently no constitutional concerns under the
Due Process Clause of that Amendment. 5 6
d. Trial de Medietate Linguae
As in England, 217 the right to trial de medietate linguae was
available in America to aliens involved in legal proceedings.2 8 The
right to a trial de medietate linguae was recognized in Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, South Carolina, and Kentucky
between 1674 and 1911.259 An extreme example of this sort of practice
was to be found in colonial America where Professor Thayer observed
that "two centuries ago the Puritans of our Plymouth Colony used now
and then, out of policy, when they were trying a case relating to an
255. See Baker, supra note 229, at 411. The struck jury even presided in some criminal cases:
"There are not many criminal cases where a struck jury was used, but it should be observed that it
was employed in some of the most important quasi-political trials of the eighteenth century." JULIUS
GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY
IN CRMflNAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776), at 620 (1944).
256. See PROFFATT, supra note 12, § 72, at 106-07 (noting that New York, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey, among others, provided for special juries given certain
conditions); see also 2 MICH.COMP. LAwS 1724; 2 New Jersey Nixon's Dig. 4532; 2 N.Y. REV.
STAT. 1829, pt. 3, ch. 7, tit 4, § 46-52; 1 OHio REv. ST.758; An Act to Regulate Arbitrations and
Proceedings in Courts of Justice, ch. 147, 1806 Pa. Laws 184. The special jury was available in both
crininal and civil suits. See PROFFATr, supranote 12, § 72, at 107; see also State v. Murat, 9 NJ.L.
3 (1827); Sutton v. State, 9 Ohio 133, 135 (1839).
257. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
258. See LaRue, supra note 81, at 850-51; Ramirez, The Mixed Jury, supra note 82, at 782
("After English colonists settled in North America, bringing with them the common law and its
ancient custom of the mixed jury, trial by jury de medietate linguaefor a time became an active part
of practice in the colonies and, after the revolution, the United States." (footnote omitted)).
259. See Ramirez, An Overview ofthe Mixed Jury,supranote 82, at 1220 & n.28; Ramirez, The
Mixed Jury, supra note 82, at 790. Chief Justice John Marshall recognized the right to a trial de
medietate linguaein UnitedStates v. Cartacho,25 F. Cas. 312, 313 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 14,738).
Similarly, Thomas Jefferson recognized the practice in a letter to James Madison, stating that "[i]n
disputes between a foreigner and a native, a trial by jury may be improper. But if this exception
cannot be agreed to, the remedy will be to model the jury, by giving the mediatas linguae, in civil
as well as criminal cases." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in THE
LIFE AND SELECTED WRrriNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 450,451 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden
eds., 1944). Noteworthy is the fact that Jefferson looked to procedural reform ofjury practices where
the propriety of trial by jury was in question.
However, in UnitedStates v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936), the Supreme Court subsequently
held that the Sixth Amendment did not require a trial de medietate linguae in a criminal case. See
id. at 145. According to the Court, "[a]lthough aliens are within the protection of the Sixth
Amendment, the ancient rule under which an alien might have a trial by jury de medietate linguae,
'one half denizens and the other aliens,'-in order to insure impartiality-no longer obtains." Id.
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Indian, to add Indians to the jury, as in a criminal case in 1682.

" 0

,26

Thus, besides the goal of facilitating juror factfinding, the goal of
ensuring the appearance of fairness in the adjudicatory process could
justify deviation from the principle of random selection of jurors.
4. Trial Length
As in England, it appears that American trials were fairly short until
recent times. For example, colonial trials often lasted only a single
day.261 This reduction in the length of trials may have been due to

factors similar to those that reduced the length of early English trials.
Jurors were generally among the more educated members of society,
except perhaps if they were bystanders; there was less in the way of
procedural formalism; and there were not the extensive voir dire and use
of peremptory challenges characteristic of modem American trials.
C. Judicial Control of the Jury
Judicial control of the jury in America seems to have been, on the
whole, less than that exercised by judges in England.262 As in England, 263 American trial judges were generally prohibited from coercing
the jury. Similarly, judges were forbidden in many cases from utilizing
procedural mechanisms to erode the power of the jury. For example, it

was agreed that judges could not direct verdicts of conviction in criminal

cases or reverse jury acquittals.2 " Also, judges could not require juries
to return "special verdicts., 265 Therefore, both coercive and procedural
260. Thayer, supra note 34, at 307 & n.l.
261. See ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 101 (1930) (noting that
in colonial Virginia, felony trials were supposed to last only a single day); Hyman & Tarrant, supra
note 11, at 26 (same); Murrin, supra note 170, at 169 (concluding that 'juries probably disposed of
most cases in ten or fifteen minutes, to judge from the case load they dispatched. But in Rhode
Island, a few juries sat for days unable to reach a verdict.").
262. See Lettow, supra note 3, at 515 ("In contrast to their English counterparts, American
colonial judges generally exercised little control over juries. New trials were rarely granted, and other
mechanisms of control seldom used."). But see Henderson, supra note 15, at 336 (stating that in the
case of the civil jury "[in some states there was much less judicial control of the jury than in
England, and in some states rather more" and that this was the "reason why the seventh amendment
was drafted in such general terms").
263. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
264. See MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY
OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 50 (1973).

265. See id. at 52. However, jurors could elect themselves to render a special verdict instead
of a general verdict. See Scott, supra note 12, at 684 (concluding that "[iln the American colonies
the special verdict was well known"). For example, Article 31 of the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties of 1641 provides:
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power over juries were limited to a greater extent in early American jury
trials.
The greater power of the jury in early America is evidenced by the

practices of certain colonies. For example, judicial control over the jury
in Rhode Island has been characterized as slight; the judges were present
"'not for the purpose of deciding [cases] ...but merely to preserve
2 66
order, and see that the parties had a fair chance with the jury."'
Similarly, in Massachusetts, judges could offer their opinions concerning
the state of the law to the jury, but the jury could disregard the judges'
opinions." Therefore, judicial control of the jury in many of the
colonies was less than that exercised by judges in England.

1. Judicial Coercion of Juries
As in England, there was a prohibition in America against the
exercise of coercive power by the judge over the jury. During early

colonial times, it appears that judges in some of the colonies utilized
coercive tactics in order to influence the jury's verdict.2 6 However, by
the time the Constitution was ratified, such practices were frowned upon.
For example, in 1771, John Adams stated that it was "an Absurdity to
suppose that the Law would oblige [the jury] to find a Verdict according
to the Direction of the Court, against their own Opinion, Judgment and
Conscience. 2 69 Americans took to heart the principle that Chief Justice
Vaughn had laid down in Bushell's Case that juries could not be

In all cases where evidences is so obscure or defective that the Jurie cannot
clearely and safely give a positive verdict, whether it be a grand or petit Jurie, It shall
have libertie to give a non Liquit, or a spetiall verdict, in which last, that is in a spetiall
verdict, the Judgement of the cause shall be left to the Court, And all Jurors shall have
libertie in matters of fact if they cannot finde the maine issue, yet to finde and present
in their verdict so much as they can, If the Bench and Jurors shall so suffer at any time
about their verdict that either of them cannot proceede with peace of conscience the case
shall be referred to the Generall Court, who shall take the question from both and
determine it.
5 SOURcES AND DOCUrMNTS OF THE UN1TED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 51-52 (William F. Swindler
ed., 1975).
266. Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 591
(1939) (quoting Daniel Chipman).
267. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 3, 13-35.
268. See Scowt, supra note 261, at 101 (noting that jurors were locked up and kept without
food until they rendered their verdict); Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 11, at 26 (noting that in
colonial Virginia the jury "was locked up without food or water until it reached a verdict"). "T]he
jury 'shall be kept together in some convenient private place without meat, drink, fire or lodging
until they all agree upon a verdict."' Scott, supranote 12, at 674 n.21. Evidently, during colonial
times, the attaint was used as another method of judicial control. See id. at 681.
269. 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
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punished or threatened with punishment for their verdicts.27
2. Jury Instructions

Jury instructions represent one way in which a judge may exercise
persuasive control over the jury. However, in some of the colonies,

American judges did not always give jury instructions. For example, the
Earl of Bellomont, in a report to the English government, noted that
judges in colonial Rhode Island "'give no directions to the jury nor sum
up the evidence to them.""'27 In Massachusetts, jurors were free to
disregard the judges' views of the law.272 Furthermore, jury instructions

in Massachusetts often were not given. When they were, they were not
particularly elaborate.273 Similarly, Professor Bruce H. Mann concluded

from a study of civil cases in seventeenth century Connecticut the
following:
There is no indication that judges instructed juries on the law to apply,
although by the end of the century judges may have made a general
charge to identify for the jury the questions they were to consider....
...There were no issues to be "framed" for a jury because the
entire dispute was within the province of the jury.274
Besides often being brief, there is evidence that jury instructions were
270. See 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009, 1013 (C.P. 1670).
271. Eaton, supranote 172, at 153 n.* (speculating that the lack of instructions may have been
due to the fact that judges had no greater legal knowledge than jurors).
272. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 3, 13-35 (noting that panels of multiple judges who each

may have given their opinions concerning the legal issues in the case may have given rise to the
practice of jurors resolving disputes among the judges with respect to the correct legal opinion).
There is some evidence that there were occasional collegial trial benches in England. See Langbein,
supra note 56, at 33 (concluding that "in some Old Bailey cases we can be confident that more than
one judge v.,as sitting. Yet these manifestations of collegiality look more incidental than systematic,
and there are a variety of indications that the norm was trial before a single judge"). Professor
Langbein hypothesizes that the reason that a collegial bench was not adopted in most English trials
was that the jury was deemed a sufficient guarantor against the arbitrary exercise of power by the
government. See id. at 35 ("The main reason that the English were not particularly concerned to have
a collegial bench v/as, of course, that the jury system served as an alternative safeguard against
judicial excesses, since it divided the adjudicative power and allocated much of it away from the
bench.").
273. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 26. "In colonial Massachusetts.... instructions were
scarcely an effective means of jury control.... [1]t appears that in many civil cases no instructions
were given at all and that even in those cases where the jury was charged the charges were often
brief and compressed." Id. (endnote omitted); see Lettow, supra note 3, at 523 ("American judges... with the notable exception of Connecticut judges, tended not to send jurors back for
reconsideration.'); Nelson, supra note 143, at 910-11.
274. MANN, supra note 170, at 74, 85.
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often contradictory, which reduced their effectiveness. 5 However, the
weight of authority seems to indicate that the jury was bound to follow
jury instructions, if given, and almost always did in civil cases. 6
Despite this fact, the historical evidence indicates that even persuasive
control over the jury might not have existed to any great degree in some
of the states.277
3. Judicial Commentary on the Evidence

Another method by which judges may exercise persuasive control
over the members of the jury is through their power to comment on the
evidence. As in England, initially American judges had the power to

comment on the evidence and to express an opinion concerning the
credibility of witnesses. 278 However, this practice was phased out
beginning in 1795.279 By 1913, the practice was almost dead, with
forty-one states or territories having abandoned it.2t0 The practice was

eliminated by constitutional provision, statute, and judicial decision

275. See Nelson, supra note 143, at 911-12 (noting that judges often gave conflicting
instructions).
276. See Henderson, supra note 15, at 302. But see Nelson, supra note 143, at 913-15
(collecting cases from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, New
Jersey, Georgia, and Virginia).
277. In the nineteenth century, instructions were actually required to be in Writing in many
states. See PROFFATr, supra note 12, §§ 349-50, at 416-18.
278. See THAYER, supranote 20, at 188-89 n.2; 9 JOHN HENRY XVIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2551, at 664 (James H. Chadboum rev. ed. 1981). A number of courts held that
judges retained their power to comment on the evidence even though trial by jury was guaranteed
by the Constitution. See Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 155 (1891); Lovejoy v. United
States, 128 U.S. 171, 173 (1888); United States v. Philadelphia & Reading R.R., 123 U.S. 113, 114
(1887); Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886).
279. See MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS INA CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876,
at 85 (1976) (noting that during the nineteenth century "new procedural rules in some jurisdictions
gave laymen a more decisive role in the outcome ofjury trials, as judges were forbidden to comment
on the evidence or otherwise to assist the jury in reaching a verdict"); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 137 (1973) (noting that the power of trial judges to comment on the
facts and law of cases was gradually diminished); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 39 (noting that
"state legislatures passed laws that forbid the judge to comment on the evidence"); PROFFATr, supra
note 12, § 322, at 387 ("Commenting on the weight of evidence is an abuse to which a charge is
often liable-an abuse which is condemned by authority as well as positively prohibited by statute
in a great many places."); Kenneth M. Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury Trials, 12 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOc'Y 76,78 (1928) (noting that in 1796, the North Carolina legislature passed a statute
providing that "judges are forbidden in the charge to the jury to express any opinion as to whether
a fact was fully or sufficiently proved); Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role ofthe Judge in Jury Trials:
The Elimination ofJudicialEvaluation ofFact in American State Courtsfrom 1795 to 1913, 62 U.
DET. L. REv. 595, 595 (1985).
280. See Krasity, supra note 279.
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largely during the period spanning 1835 to 1860.281 Therefore, although
in early American jury trials it was not uncommon for the judge to
comment on the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, this practice fell into disuse toward the end of the nineteenth century. Arguably,
the removal of the judge's ability to comment on the evidence increased
the power of the juries to a small extent. However, it also deprived the
members of the jury of a source of guidance in evaluating the evidence
and testimony of witnesses given at trial.
4. Other Mechanisms of Judicial Control
Besides persuasive authority over the jury, judges also had
procedural mechanisms at their disposal that they could employ to lessen
the power of the jury. Soon after ratification of the Constitution, judges
possessed the power to direct a verdict in civil cases. Several state courts
exercised the power to direct verdicts, including those in Maryland,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia.2" The
constitutionality of this practice was affirmed early in the history of the
new nation. In the federal courts, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed directed verdicts sub silentio in the case of Kempe ' Lessee v.
Kennedy, 83 decided in 1809. Furthermore, the Court explicitly recognized the power of judges to direct a verdict in Drummond v. Executors
of George Prestman,2 4 decided in 1827, in which the Court held that
the failure of the judge to instruct the jury with regard to the plaintiff's
entitlement to a verdict was reversible error.285 By the middle of the
nineteenth century, the directed verdict had become even more accepted.
In 1828, Justice Story explained that a statement that the verdict "ought

281.

See id. at 597-99. Krasity concludes that it was the judiciary that was "largely responsible

for the departure from the common-law practice.' Id. at 599. But see George M. Hogan, The
StrangledJudge, 14 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 116, 121 (1930) (concluding that the practice was
eliminated by legislatures concerned with curbing specific judges); Johnson, supra note 279, at 76

(same).
282. See Henderson, supra note 15, at 303; see also State v. Stewart, 4 H. & McH. 422 (Md.
Gen. Ct. 1799) (civil action); Ridgely's Lessee v. Ogle, 4 H. & McH. 123 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1798),
affd, 4 H. & McH. 130 (Md. 1800); Lessee of Lee v. Tiernan, Add. Pa. 348 (Fayette County Ct.
1798); United States v. Wolf, Add. Pa. 312 (Washington County Ct. 1796); Lessee of Tanant v.
Terry, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 239 (1792); Lessee of Gordon v. Executors of Parsons, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 37

(1786); Johnson v. Macon, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 4, 5 (1790); MANN, supra note 170, at 70 (noting that
in colonial Connecticut "Dj]udges had the power to override jury verdicts that were not to their

liking').
283. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 171 (1809); see also United States v. Hall, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 171
(1810) (Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's directed verdict).
284. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 515 (1827).

285. See id. at 519.
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to be for the defendants" was not "merely in the nature of advice to the
jury" but "imposed an obligation upon the jury."28 6 Thus, there was a
trend toward greater judicial control of the jury that originated at the end
of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.
5. Minimal Rules of Evidence
As in England, 287 American evidentiary rules were originally less
restrictive, allowing a greater amount of information to reach the jury.
There were, however, certain restrictions that prevented evidence that was
thought to be inherently unreliable from reaching the jury. Many of the
rules of evidence had developed in England by the time the colonies
were founded and were transported to America. For example, in colonial
Massachusetts, testimony from persons interested in the disputed matter
was excluded. 88 Along the same lines, testimony from persons convicted of serious crimes was also excluded. 289 Finally, the rule against
hearsay was observed in early Massachusetts courts. 210 Similarly, in
colonial Virginia, although the rules of evidence were fairly minimal,
hearsay evidence was not admissible.29 1 Therefore, by the time the
American colonies were founded, the law of evidence had begun to
develop, restricting the information available to jurors in rendering their
verdict.
6. Erosion of the Jury's Power
During the nineteenth century, the role of the jury was restricted
while that of the judge was enlarged, a development similar to that which
had occurred in England at an earlier time.2" As discussed below,293
286. M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 170, 182 (1828).
287. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
288. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 24 ("[Ihe rule contemplated the exclusion of testimony
of witnesses who would be directly and immediately subject to a legally enforceable gain or liability

as a result of the outcome of the case."); see also Allison v. Cockran, Quincy 94, 99 n.3 (Mass.
1764); Barnes v. Greenleaf, Quincy 41 (Mass. 1763); Wrentham Proprietors v. Metcalf, Quincy 36
(Mass. 1763).

289. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 25; see also Rex v. Pourksdorff, Quincy 104, 105 (Mass.
1764).
290. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 25 (stating that in colonial Massachusetts "lawyers
honored rules against the admission of hearsay more in the breach than in the observance").
291. See ScoTr, supra note 261, at 97 (noting the observation of rules against hearsay and the
best evidence rule).
292. See HORWITZ, supra note 252, at 27-28. "By enlarging the domain of 'legal questions,'
by recognizing devices that facilitate second-guessing of jury decisions, and by redefining the

circumstances under which that interference may occur, the legal system has quietly but
unquestionably eroded the power of the jury." Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The
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the power of the jury to pass judgment on issues of law was curtailed
through judicial decision. Furthermore, the mechanism of the directed
verdict became available in civil trials to keep questions of fact from the
jury. Finally, judges began developing rules that kept certain cases from
the jury.2 94 Thus, the judiciary was able to contain the decisionmaking
power of the jury by determining what evidence could be heard by the
jury, as well as by determining what were issues of fact within the
purview of the jury, as opposed to issues of law, which were within the
province of the judge's decisionmaking authority.
This trend of increasing judicial control over the jury was perhaps
a response to the greater distrust of the jury that accumulated during the
nineteenth century. Juries were originally viewed as protectors of the
liberties of the people against government infringement, and as embodying the common sense of ordinary members of the community. However,
over time, there was some feeling that juries tended to act irrationally
and could not function well when the issues to be tried were complex.
Thus, it is not altogether surprising that as legal principles (and society
in general) grew increasingly complex, the role of the jury in adjudicating disputes decreased. Furthermore, one must not forget that two
powerful interest groups had a vested interest in seeing certain aspects of
the jury's power curtailed. Both judges and lawyers would fill the
vacuum left by the erosion in the jury's power. These interest groups
disproportionately influenced the development of legal principles in the
United States. Therefore, it is not surprising that erosion of jury power
occurred since it was beneficial to both these groups.

Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 325, 334-35 (1995)
(footnotes omitted). As Professor Langbein has noted, this shift in the balance of power between the
judge and the jury may have been due in part to a realization of the "unavoidable complexity" of
legal rules and the jury's limited ability to deal with this complexity:
In the first decades of American independence there occurred a titanic struggle
about the character of American law .... Arrayed on one side were people who were
hostile to lawyers and legal doctrine. They viewed the legal system as serving an essentially arbitral function: Ordinary people, applying common sense notions of right and
wrong, could resolve the disputes of life .... Opposing this vision of folk law were

those who understood that the intrinsic complexity of human affairs begets unavoidable
complexity in legal rules and procedures. With legal complexity comes legal professionalism.
John H. Langbein, ChancellorKent and the History ofLegal Literature, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 547,

566 (1993).
293. See infra notes 298-333 and accompanying text.
294. See Wolfram, supra note 176, at 644.
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Role of the Jury

As in England,2 95 the role of the American jury underwent a
number of changes over the years. Originally, the American jury was a
much more active participant in the adjudicatory process than its modem
counterpart. However, unlike under English law,2" no sharp distinction
was drawn in American law between the power of the jury to decide
issues of law and the power of the jury to decide issues of fact.
Originally, at least, it seems that the jury often possessed the power to
decide both issues of law as well as issues of fact. Moreover, like
English juries,297 it appears that American juries possessed indirect, if
not direct, authority to participate in the determination of sanction in
criminal trials. Furthermore, in certain instances, the jury may have even
been vested with the authority to directly determine the sentence.
1. The Authority of American Juries Concerning Issues of Fact
and Issues of Law
In contrast to the traditional English jury,298 American juries were
often granted the authority to resolve issues of law as well as issues of
fact.2" This authority was recognized in constitutions,3 . statutes,3"'

295. See supra text accompanying notes 138-69.
296. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
298. The earliest colonial juries may have followed the English practice of merely deciding
questions of law. For example, a Plymouth Colony statute from 1623 provided that "all Criminall
facts... should [be tried] by the verdict of twelve Honest men to be Impanelled by Authority in
forme of a Jury upon their oaths." Murrin, supra note 170, at 157 (quoting RECORDS OF THE
COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH INNEW ENGLAND XI, 3 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff& David Pulsifer eds.,
1855-61)).
299. One commentator concluded that "[i]n
America by the time ofthe Revolution and for some
time thereafter, the power to decide the law in criminal cases seems to have been almost universally
accorded the jury and quite generally, it determined the law in civil cases." Farley, supra note 138,
at 202; see also NELSON, supra note 170, at 3-4 (discussing the power of juries to determine law
as well as to find facts); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 11, at 903 ("In America following the
Revolution,. . . the authority of juries to resolve legal issues was frequently confirmed by
constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions.); Howe, supra note 266, at 583-84, 589 (noting that
juries could disregard the court's opinion, and that judges and justices have specifically instructed
juries that they were "the judges both of the law and the fact in a criminal case"). Nelson has noted:
[Tihe various eighteenth-century procedural devices for controlling the power of the jury
were only infrequently used and partially effective. It accordingly seems safe to conclude
that juries in most, if not all, eighteenth-century American jurisdictions normally had the
power to determine law as well as fact in both civil and criminal cases.
Nelson, supra note 143, at 916. However, Thayer concluded that this was not a right of the jurors,
but rather a rule of common sense:
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and judicial decisions"' following the Revolution. Furthermore, it was
emphasized in a variety of celebrated eighteenth century cases involving

I am disposed to think that the common-law power of the jury in criminal cases does not
indicate any right on their part; it is rather one of those manifold illogical and yet rational
results, which the good sense of the English people brought about, in all parts of their
public affairs, by way of easing up the rigor of a strict application of rules.
Thayer, supranote 138, at 171; see also Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Jan. 18,
1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 176, at 315, 320 (arguing that civil and
criminal juries should be able to "decide both as to law and fact, whenever blended together in the
issue put to them"). But see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abb6 Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in
15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds.,
1958) [hereinafter Amoux Letter] (stating that juries "are not qualified to judge questions of law").
However, Jefferson also stated:
It is left... to the juries, if they think the permanent judges are under any biass [sic]
whatever in any cause, to take upon themselves to judge the law as well as the fact. They
never exercise this power but when they suspect partiality in the judges, and by the
exercise of this power they have been the firmest bulwarks of English liberty.
Id. at 283.
300. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI ("The jury shall be judges of law, as well as of
fact, and shall not be allowed to bring in a special verdict.... .'); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7
("[In all indictments for libels the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under
the direction of the court, as in other cases.'). After adoption of the Bill of Rights, several states
amended their constitutions to allow for determination of issues of law as well as issues of fact by
juries. See IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 19 ("In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the facts."); TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 19 ("[I]n all indictments
for libels, the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the
court as in other cases.").
Other state constitutions proclaimed merely the right of juries to determine issues of fact.
See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XIII, reprintedin SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTES 373, 376
(Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959) ("In criminal prosecutions, the verification of facts,
in the vicinity where they happen, is one of the greatest securities of life, liberty, and property of
the citizen."). Some nineteenth-century courts held that the constitutional right ofjuries to determine
issues of law meant that lawyers could argue points of law and issues of constitutionality, and not
just fact, to the jury. See Note, The ChangingRole of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE
L.J. 170, 176 (1964) [hereinafter The ChangingRole] (acknowledging that in the past there was a
general acceptance of the jury's right to decide matters of law in criminal cases); see also Lynch v.
State, 9 Ind. 541, 542 (1857) (recognizing a constitutional grant of power to jurors to decide both
law and facts); NELSON, supra note 170, at 3 (noting that lawyers in early Massachusetts could
"argue law to the jury").
301. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 266, at 602 (stating that in criminal cases, the court must
"'state their opinion to the jury, upon all questions of law.. . and ... submit to their consideration
both the law and the facts, without any direction how to find their verdict' (quoting the REVISION
OF THE LAWS OF CONN., tit. 22, § 112 (1821))). Additionally, it was believed that petit juries should
'decide at their discretion, by a general verdict, both the fact and the law, involved in the issue."'
Id. at 606 (quoting 13 LAWS OF MASS., ch. 139, § 15 (1808) (repealed in 1836)); see also id. at 611
("'[J]uries in all [criminal] cases shall be judges of the law and fact."' (quoting ILL. CRIM. CODE
§ 188 (1827))).
302. According to one commentator, "[t]here was only one judge in the United States who,
between 1776 and 1800, was to deny the jury the right to decide law in criminal cases.' MOORE,
supra note 26, at 107.
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political crimes during English rule of the colonies. For example, in the
trial of John Peter Zenger, a New York printer who was accused of
seditious libel for criticizing the royal governor of New York, °3
Andrew Hamilton stated that juries had "the right... to determine both
304 According to Hamilton, this authority was "bethe law and the fact.,,
305
yond all dispute:
I know they [the jury] have the right beyond all dispute to determine
both the law and the fact, and where they do not doubt of the law, they
ought to do so. ... [L]eaving it to the judgment of the Court whether
3 6
the words are libelous or not in effect renders juries useless ...
Thus, the right of the jury to determine issues of law as well as issues of
fact seems to have been accorded some measure of popular sanction.
In some of the states, procedural devices may have contributed in
solidifying the jury's power to determine issues of law. For example, in
Massachusetts, as Professor Nelson has noted, the jury's ability to
determine issues of law, as well as issues of fact, was facilitated by the
fact that trials were conducted before three judges who could state
different opinions concerning the law in their closing instructions. Jurors
were apparently free to choose among differing opinions where these
occurred. From this, Professor Nelson has concluded that the jury had
broad control over both legal and factual issues and was therefore vested
with the ultimate decisionmaking authority in the adjudicatory process.3 °7 Finally, as in England, the fact that juries could enter a general
verdict without having to give any reason for their verdict gave them a
de facto ability to determine issues of law as well as issues of fact. As
John Adams stated, a juror could "find the Verdict according to his own
best Understanding, Judgment and Conscience, tho in Direct opposition

303. See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 4-8 (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 1963); see

also Pope, supra note 147, at 445 (recounting the American jury's resistance against royal courts by
making independent determinations of law and fact).
304. ALEXANDER, supra note 303, at 78.
305. Id.

306. Id.
307. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 28-30. According to Nelson:
As one looks generally over the various rules regulating the division between the
functions of judge and jury, it becomes clear that although the jury's power to find facts
was limited by rules excluding relevant evidence and keeping the jury from weighing
probability and credibility, its power to find law was virtually unlimited.
Id. at 28.
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308
to the Direction of the Court.
This understanding of jury competency to determine issues of law
as well as issues of fact was extended into the early years of the United
States government. For example, in 1794, in one of the few jury trials
before the Supreme Court, Georgia v. Brailsford,3°9 Chief Justice John
Jay stated in his charge to the jurors that "it is presumed, that juries are
the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the
court[s] are the best judges of law."31 However, he added that "by the
same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction,
you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both,
' 311 Similarand to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.
ly, in 1807, Chief Justice John Marshall stated to the jury in the treason
trial of Aaron Burr that "' [tihe jury have now heard the opinion of the
court on the law of the case. They will apply that law to the facts, and
will find a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their own consciences may
direct."' 312 Therefore, at least in the early years of the Republic, the
jury was recognized as possessing the power to judge both issues of law
as well as issues of fact. 1This
power contributed to the independence of
3 3
juries in early America.
Part of the early willingness to allow juries to pass judgment on
issues of law may have been the perceived or actual parity in the

308. Adams' DiaryNotes on the Right of Juries (Feb. 12, 1771), in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAmS 228,230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) [hereinafter Adams'DiaryNotes].

309. 3 U.S. 1 (1794).
310. Id. at 4.
311. Id.

312. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 67 (1895).
313. See NELSON, supra note 170, at 3, 28-30 (concluding that the jury had broad control over
legal, as well as factual, issues and therefore ultimate authority in the trial process).
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knowledge of the law upon the part of ordinary citizens and the

professional lawyers and judges.3 4 For example, John Adams stated in
a diary entry:
The general Rules of Law and common Regulations of Society, under
which ordinary Transactions arrange themselves, are well enough
known to ordinary Jurors. The great Principles of the Constitution, are
intimately known, they are sensibly felt by every Briton-it is scarcely
extravagant to say, they are drawn in and imbibed with the Nurses Milk
and first Air.315

Often, judges themselves had little legal knowledge or possessed limited
access to the law.3" 6 Thus, the authority of juries to pass judgment on
issues of law may have been a peculiar feature of the American system
that was a result of the ignorance of early American legal professionals,
and which, therefore, disappeared as knowledge of law possessed by
legal professionals increased over time relative to that possessed by the
general public.
During the nineteenth century, the power of the jury became less
clear.317 As Professor Landsman notes, there was judicial pressure to

314. See Alsehuler & Deiss, supra note 11, at 904 ("In the absence of law books and lawtrained judges, jurors may have seemed about as well suited to resolve legal issues as anyone else.");
see also NELSON, supra note 170, at 33 (noting that between 1760 and 1774 nine of eleven judges
who sat on the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had never practiced law, and six of these nine had
no legal training); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 11, at 906 (observing that limited access to legal
materials may also have evened the playing field between judges and jurors). As Alschuler and Deiss
have concluded,
Jurors initially resolved legal issues at a time when lawbooks and legal professionals were
in short supply. Although some people resisted displacement of the jury's power after real
"law" became available, most consumers of governmental dispute-resolution services
preferred the guidance of legal rules to the uncertainties of ad hoc community judgments.
Commercial interests may have valued the greater certainty offered by professional law,
but they were not alone.
Id. at 917.
315. Adams' DiaryNotes, supra note 308, at 230.

316. See Alsehuler & Deiss, supra note 11, at 905-06. It has been suggested that "the authority
of American juries to judge questions of law may have arisen from haphazard practice at a time
when most judges lacked legal training." Id. at 906.
317. For example, Professor Radin argues that during the beginning of the nineteenth century,
the power of the jury was increased.
[I]n the several states the power of the judge became more and more restricted in the era
that accompanied the rise of Andrew Jackson and the reorganized Democratic
Party. .. - The emphasis shift[ed] more and more to the jury. In many jurisdictions,
judges were prevented from commenting on the evidence. In some, juries were made the
judges of law as well as fact.
RADIN, supra note 29, at 217. However, another commentator argues that any increase in the power
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curtail the power of the jury. "The judiciary came to believe that the jury
was incapable of comprehending the new industrial reality. Judges also
assumed that jurors were irremediably biased against corporate defendants. Based on these assumptions, judges sought to curtail the jury's
authority."318 There was a sharpening of the law-fact dichotomy that
led to the disparate roles of judge and jury.319 Between 1850 and 1931,
courts in at least eleven states rejected the notion that juries had the
power to pass on issues of law as well as issues of fact.320 In 1835,
Justice Joseph Story, sitting as a trial judge, seemed to disagree with the
notion that the jury could judge both issues of law and fact. Nevertheless,
he recognized that the general verdict of a jury was "compounded of law
and of fact."3 21 In United States v. Battiste, Justice Story disputed the
idea that
in any case, civil or criminal, [jurors] have the moral right to decide the
law according to their own notions, or pleasure. On the contrary, I hold
it the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime,
that the jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law.

of the jury was offset by corresponding decreases injury power.
On the one hand, the jury's right to decide questions of law, a colonial heritage acknowledged earlier in the century, was lost. The directed verdict and the special verdict, both
methods of limiting the jury's function to fact-finding, were introduced. On the other
hand, attempts were made in a majority of the states to preclude trial judges from
commenting on the evidence. By the end of the [nineteenth] century, jury trial was a
substantially different process from what it had been in the early days of the Republic.
The Changing Role, supra note 300, at 170 (footnote omitted); see also NELSON, supra note 170,
at 8 (noting that by 1830 in Massachusetts, law was "stated to juries by the court, and their verdicts
were set aside if they failed to follow the court's instructions"); Martin A. Kotler, Reappraisingthe
Jury's Role as Finderof Fact,20 GA. L. REV. 123, 127 (1985) (noting the decline of the jury's lawfinding power during the nineteenth century).
318. Landsman, supra note 2, at 607. After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, one
commentator stated that "[t]he preponderance of judicial authority in this country is in favor of the
doctrine that the jury should take the law from the court and apply it to the evidence under its
direction." PROFFAr, supra note 12, § 376, at 440.
319. As one commentator has noted:
An attempt was made to sharpen the law-fact dichotomy and give it concrete institutional
expression. On the one hand, the jury's right to decide questions of law was denied; and
the special verdict at the discretion of the judge and the directed verdict were developed
to keep determinations of law from the jury.
The ChangingRole, supra note 300, at 173; see also Kotler, supranote 317, at 127 ("The eighteenth
century conception of the jury's function as that of finder of law evolved during the early nineteenth
century into the modem notion that the jury is essentially a finder of fact.").
320. See Howe, supra note 266, at 592-613 (noting that Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia
rejected the notion that juries had the power to decide issues of law).
321. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
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It is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the
duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court.3 22

Therefore, it would seem that the law-fact dichotomy became elevated
to the level of a constitutional imperative during the nineteenth century,
whereas prior to this time, such a dichotomy and restriction on the power
of the jury to determine issues of law may have been seen as constitutionally impermissible.
It does appear, however, that even in the nineteenth century there
was still some support for the notion that the jury possessed the power
to determine issues of law. Even in 1851, several states declared the
authority of juries to decide questions of law in their constitutions or
statutes, including Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.323 Six states
established the authority of the jury to determine issues of law through
judicial practice.324 Therefore, the power of the jury to determine issues
of law was not one that vanished overnight, but rather was gradually
rolled back over a period spanning at least one hundred years.
This erosion of the power of juries to decide questions of law
culminated in 1895 when the Supreme Court held in Sparf v. United
States that in the federal courts "it is the duty of juries in criminal cases
to take the law from the court."3' The Court reasoned that "the
functions of court and jury... cannot be confounded or disregarded
without endangering the stability of public justice, as well as the security
of private and personal rights. 326 Thus, it appears that the value of
legal certainty stood as the purported rationale for the erosion of the
jury's power, which had originally been conceived of as extending to the
determination of issues of law as well as issues of fact. The power of the
jury was thus significantly curtailed relative to that of the other participants in the adjudicatory process--the judges and the lawyers who
controlled the rules of the legal system and had seemingly enlarged their
respective powers to the jury's detriment.
Today, as a formal matter, there is still no complete uniformity
among the states concerning the power of juries to decide issues of law

322. Id.

323. See Howe, supra note 266, at 596-613, 614 nn.125-26.
324. The following states established this authority: Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode

Island, Vermont, and Virginia. See id.at 590-96, 596 n.57.
325. 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895). But see id. at 114 (Gray & Shiras, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that
the jury in a criminal case has an inherent right to decide both questions of fact and law).
326. Id. at 106.
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as well as issues of fact, although the general rule is that the jury lacks
the power to determine questions of law.327 The state constitutions of
Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland all provide that jurors shall judge
questions of law as well as questions of fact.328 However, the effect of
these constitutional provisions has been virtually eliminated by judicial
decisions.329 Thus, it would seem that the erosion of the jury's power
to determine issues of law is complete.
The vagueness of the law-fact dichotomy may be seen not only in
what questions are left for the jury, but also in what questions are left for
the judge. Just as early judges did not possess the power to determine all
questions of law, early juries did not have the authority to pass on every
question that might be characterized as one of fact. As James Thayer
noted over a century ago, "there is not and never was any such thing as
an allotting of all questions of fact to the jury."330 Thayer defined the
"fundamental conception" of a fact as that of "a thing as existing, or
being true.' 33 Thayer defined "law" as "a rule or standard which it is
the duty of a judicial tribunal to apply and enforce. 332 According to
Thayer, judges traditionally employed several mechanisms for removing
questions of fact from the province of the jury. Judges could fix the
definition of legal terms, employ a demurrer upon evidence, change the
forms of pleading, urge (and perhaps compel) special verdicts, and guide
and supervise the jury.333 These mechanisms illustrate the fact that the
separation of powers between the judge and jury, based largely on the
law-fact dichotomy, has never been a razor-sharp separation, but one that
has existed in a state of flux. Gradually, the power of the jury along this

327. See KADISH & KADISH, supra note 264, at 50.
328. See GA. CONST. art. I, § I, 11 ("In criminal cases ... the jury shall be the judges of the
law and the facts."); IND. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the facts."); MD.CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 23 ("In the trial
of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court
may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.").
329. See Sparks v. State, 603 A.2d 1258, 1277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) ("[C]ase law has
made it clear that curious constitutional relic has, through the interpretive process, been shrivelled

up to almost nothing."); see also Conklin v. State, 331 S.E.2d 532, 543 (Ga. 1985) (reading the
Georgia Constitution narrowly with regard to jurors as judges of law).
330. Thayer, supra note 138, at 148.
331. Id. at 152. Thayer continues by stating that the fundamental conception "is not limited to

what is tangible, or visible, or in any way the object of sense; things invisible, mere thoughts,
intentions, fancies of the mind, propositions, when conceived of as existing or being true, are
conceived of as facts.' Id.
332. Id. at 153.

333. See id. at 161-67. For a detailed discussion of such mechanisms ofjudicial control of the
jury, see infra Part lII.D.2.
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line has been eroded in favor of the judge with issues increasingly being
characterized as legal rather than factual, and with additional procedural
mechanisms such as the directed verdict, summary judgment, and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict developing in the civil context that
remove questions from the jury's factfinding province on the grounds
that there is no real issue of fact.
2. The Role of the Jury in the Trial
The role of the jury in the adjudicatory process has been curtailed
in other ways. As in England,334 the role of the jury during the course

of a trial in America originally was much greater than that of the modem
American jury. Traditionally, jurors undertook a more active role in
gathering facts and questioning witnesses. 335 Early jurors were given

wide latitude in consulting with individuals who might aid them in their
decisionmaking process. 336 During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, courts allowed jurors to question witnesses.337 This practice

334. See supra notes 138-69 and accompanying text.
335. See Petroff, supra note 155, at 126-27; Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the Silence:
Should JurorsBe Allowed to Question Witnesses During Trial?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 117, 121 (1991)
("In the early days of the development of the jury system, jurors played a more active role in the
trial process.'); Lisa M. Harms, Note, The Questioning of Witnesses by Jurors, 27 AMi.U. L. REV.
127, 134 (1977) ("Historiealy, jurors... actively marshalled facts and asked questions of witnesses
who could help piece together a complete story.').
336. It is interesting to note that in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, jurors were
actually guaranteed the right to consult with any persons in order to render their verdict. Article 76
provides as follows:
Whensoever any Jurie of trialls or Jurours are not cleare in their Judgements or
consciences conserning any cause wherein they are to give their verdict, They shall have
to resolve or direct them,
libertie in open Court to advise with any man they thinke fitt
before they give in their verdict.
MASS. BODY OF LIBERTiES, 1641, art. 76, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTES 148, 156
(Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
337. See Pacific Improvement Co. v. Weidenfeld, 277 F. 224,227 (2d Cir. 1921) (reversing the
trial court's allowance of juror questioning); Superior & Pittsburg Copper Co. v. Tomich, 165 P.
1101, 1104 (Ariz. 1917), aff'd, 250 U.S. 400 (1919); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v.
Krueger, 23 Ill. App. 639, 643 (1887) (discussing whether juror questioning of witness was biased);
Schaeffer v. St. Louis & S. Ry., 30 S.W. 331, 333 (Mo. 1895) (approving juror questions); State v.
Kendall, 57 S.E. 340, 341 (N.C. 1907) (stating that allowing juror questions "has always been
followed without objection.., in the conduct of trials in our superior courts"); Michael A. Wolff,
Comment, JurorQuestions:A Survey of Theory and Use, 55 MO. L. REV. 817, 817 (1990); see also
1889) (finding no cause for complaint in
Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Havelick, 22 N.E. 797 (Ill.
1889)
allowing jurors to ask questions); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Harper, 21 N.E. 561, 561 (Ill.
(finding no error in failing to exclude juror who questioned witness).
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was mentioned in appellate opinions dating back to 1825.338 At least

some Antifederalists also intended that the jury have a "strong and
' Thus, within a significant segment
significantly independent role."339
of society, the jury was perceived as an active institution. Finally, there

is evidence that early juries were at least permitted to take notes during
trial.3 40 Thus, it is likely that the role of the early American jury closely

paralleled the active role of the early English jury.
3. Authority to Determine Sanction in Criminal Cases
Although scant research has been done on the subject, from what is
known, it seems that early colonial juries had authority to indirectly
determine sentencing much as the early English jury did. Furthermore,
some colonies conferred on juries greater authority to determine
sentences in criminal cases explicitly.341 Even toward the middle of the
twentieth century, state statutes authorized juries to determine sentencing
in capital and noncapital cases. 42 Thus, as in England, the American
jury frequently played a broader role in the trial process by determining
criminal sanction as well as issues of guilt or innocence.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Although many of the proposed reforms of the jury system
discussed in this Article have not met with much opposition on

338. See Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, ProprietyofJurorsAsking Questions in Open Court
During Course of Trial, 31 A.L.R.3d 872, 878-80 (1970). In the case of United States v. Burr, 25
F. Cas. 55, 97-98, 101, 105-13 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693), several members of the grand jury
asked questions of witnesses as did the accused.
339. Wolfram, supra note 176, at 723.
340. See Petroff, supra note 155, at 128-29. For example, in the trial of Aaron Burr before a
grand jury, the reporter made the following observation:
After the indictment was read, Mr. Hay [the district attorney] requested that the
jury should be furnished with implements necessary to enable them to take notes on the
evidence, and also on the arguments if they should think proper, that as the cause was
important, and would require their attention, it would be proper to afford them this
assistance. This was accordingly done.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 89.
341. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 27 (1931); Michael H. Tonry, Jury Sentencing, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1465 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) ('The original reasons for jury sentencing in America
included colonial distrust of judges appointed by the Crown, a democratic faith in citizen
involvement in the justice system, and the general lack of differences in training and competence
between the judge and the jury during much of the nineteenth century.").
342. See Comment, ConsiderationofPunishmentby Juries, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 400, 405 n.21
(1949-50).
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constitutional grounds, any proposed reform of jury procedures must fit
within the confines of due process and jury guarantees. Reforms of federal jury procedures must be consistent with Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Amendment guarantees, while states are constrained by the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process and trial by jury in criminal
cases. States may be further constrained by jury trial and due process
guarantees found in state constitutions. Therefore, what was meant by
"trial by jury" and "due process" at the time of the founding343 (in the
case of the federal government) and at the time of ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment (in the case of the states) are critical issues.
Several commentators have noted that there may be constitutional
objections to reform of the jury system. 3" However, most of the reforms discussed in this Article have never been found to be constitutionally objectionable, and are actually authorized by current procedural
rules in some jurisdictions. Under the most charitable evaluation, it seems
that professional inertia on the part of lawyers and judges has resulted in
their disuse. In order to overcome some of this inertia, it may be
beneficial to demonstrate the constitutionality of the proposed reforms as
well as their historical pedigree.
The constitutional and historical analysis proceeds as follows:
Subpart IV.A discusses the internal structure and composition of the jury,
arguing that jurors should be selected for their experience and that the
use of peremptory challenges and extensive voir dire be curtailed or
eliminated. As noted above,345 the practice in early English and American jury trials was to select jurors in a way that was relatively random
except where special characteristics of potential jurors, such as their level

343.

For example, in analyzing whether or not the number and qualifications of jurors were

prescribed under the constitution of Mississippi, Chief Justice Sharkey stated:
[T]he right of trial by jury, being of the highest importance to the citizen, and essential

to liberty, was not left to the uncertain fate of legislation, but was secured by the
constitution of this and all the other states as sacred and inviolable. The question

naturally arises, how was it adopted by the constitution? that [sic] instrument is silent as
to the number and qualifications of jurors; we must, therefore, call in to our aid the
common law for the purpose of ascertaining what was meant by the term jury.

Byrd v. State, 2 Miss. (1 Howard) 163, 177 (1835) (reargument of the case).
344. For example, several commentators have noted potential constitutional objections to the
more radical reform of replacing the jury with a mixed panel similar to that found in continental
systems. See supra note 14. But see Alsehuler, supra note 14, at 995-1011 (arguing that

constitutional requirements could be met without resort to constitutional amendment or "radical"
judicial reinterpretation if reforns such as implementing a mixed court ofprofessional and lay judges
were found to adequately serve the purposes of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights).

345. See supra notes 55-64, 219-39 and accompanying text.
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of education or experience with issues to be adjudicated, warranted a
departure from the principle of random selection. In contrast, in the
United States, extensive voir dire and the use of peremptory challenges
not only increase delay, but also lead to undesirable strategic behavior on
the part of lawyers who use these procedures in order to gain an unfair
advantage at trial.
The analysis of this Subpart illustrates that the following reforms are
not constitutionally problematic and are consistent with historical
practices in England and America: (1) selecting jurors for their level of
education or previous trial experience as well as impaneling special juries
when necessary to improve jury functioning; (2) abandoning the practice
of extensive lawyer-conducted voir dire and peremptory challenges,
except perhaps in capital cases where peremptory challenges exercised
by the defendant were traditionally viewed as essential to the notion of
"trial by jury"; (3) insisting on a jury of twelve as being inherent in the
jury guarantee; and (4) insisting on a rule of unanimity as inherent in the
jury guarantee.
Subpart IV.B examines judicial control of the jury and proposals to
allow more extensive judicial commentary on the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses, as well as to relax the rigid rules of evidence
that keep probative evidence from the jury. As noted above,346 early
English and American judges possessed greater power to comment on the
evidence and credibility of witnesses. The fact that this is not often done
in modem American jury trials deprives the jury of a valuable source of
information concerning the weight they should assign the evidence in
rendering their verdict. Furthermore, this judicial power authorizes the
exercise of merely persuasive authority over the jury, and not coercive
authority. Therefore, its exercise would not seem to impair the rights of
the parties.
The analysis of this Subpart illustrates that the following reforms
would not be constitutionally problematic and would be consistent with
historical practices in England and America: (1), 'simplifying jury
instructions and making the interaction between judge and jury less
formal; (2) allowing judicial summary and comment on the evidence;
(3) eliminating many of the complex and truth-defeating rules of
evidence found in the American system; and (4) cutting back on
procedures such as the directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict that constrain the power of the jury.

346. See supra notes 106-16, 278-81 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

81

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 25:377

Finally, Subpart IV.C examines the role of the jury in the adjudicatory process and proposals that allow jurors to question witnesses,
communicate with each other prior to deliberations, and take notes. The
jury has evolved from an active investigator of the facts to a passive
observer of the evidence in court. This is arguably an undesirable procedural development, for it deprives the jury of its ability to accurately
carry out its factfinding duty. It also deprives the other participants in the
trial of information concerning the jury's view of the case.
The following reforms would be constitutional as well as consistent
with historical English and American practices: (1) allowing juror
questioning of witnesses; (2) allowing communication among the jurors
prior to deliberation; (3) allowing jurors to take notes; and (4) giving the
jury a greater role in determining sanctions in criminal trials.
A.

Internal Structure and Composition of the Jury

The internal structure and composition of the modem American jury
has evolved away from the internal structure and composition of early
English and American juries. Modem jurors are less experienced than
their counterparts in early English and American juries. Extensive voir
dire and the use of peremptory challenges eliminate some of the most
qualified potential jurors from consideration. Furthermore, there is
pressure to reduce the size of the jury and abandon the requirement of
unanimity-procedural aspects of jury practice that were historically
relatively constant and therefore probably viewed as being essential to

trial by jury.
1. Experience and Qualifications of the Jury
Selection of modem jurors is not particularly random in the sense
that modem procedures result in the exclusion of many categories of
individuals, particularly those who are better educated or have heavy
demands on their time.347 In contrast, jurors in early English and
347. See STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR INTHE AMERICAN CoURTRooM

219-20 (1994). Despite the fact that jury selection often results in jurors being less educated than
the average member of the population, courts have at times exhibited a great deal of confidence in
their abilities. For example, the Ninth Circuit made the following remarks concerning jurors in
complex civil cases:

The opponents of the use ofjuries in complex civil cases generally assume that jurors are
incapable of understanding complicated matters. This argument unnecessarily and
improperly demeans the intelligence of the citizens of this Nation. We do not accept such
an assertion. Jurors, if properly instructed and treated with deserved respect, bring

collective intelligence, wisdom, and dedication to their tasks, which is rarely equalled in
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American trials had greater trial experience and were probably better
educated relative to the average member of society than are modem
jurors. The fact that modem American jurors are deficient in these areas
can only lead to problems in the functioning of the jury. This prediction
is supported by empirical evidence concerning the functioning of the
jury.34 Thus, there have been calls for reform of procedural mechanisms that tend to reduce the average education and level of trial
experience of jurors.
Jurors in early English and American juries were on average more
experienced in trial practice than modem jurors because of the large
number of trials for which they were impaneled and previous experience
they often had serving on juries.349 The relatively short length of these
early trials made it practical to follow such a procedure. Requiring jurors
to sit for multiple trials was only practical where trials were relatively
short and jurors would not be drawn away from their roles in society for
long periods of time.
Not only were jurors more experienced with trial practice than
modem jurors, but they were also, unlike modem jurors, among the

other areas of public service.
In re United States Fin. See. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
348. Empirical studies support the conclusion that often the members of the jury do not possess
the requisite experience or ability necessary to understand the issues that they are charged with
resolving. For example, a number of studies have indicated that jurors do not understand specific
words used injury instructions or their overall meaning, which may result in misapplication of the
law to the facts in a case. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 80-81 (1983) (noting that
jurors tried to follow the judge's instructions, but often made a number of mistakes of law); Amiram
Elwork et al., Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 432, 440 (1982)
(concluding that jurors with higher educational levels were more likely to answer questions
correctly).
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that educated jurors tend to participate in
deliberations more frequently and remember more than other jurors. See HASTIE ET AL., supra, at
135-47 (noting that jurors who participated more during deliberations were also more open-minded).
Finally, as might be expected, empirical studies also tend to indicate that more educated or
more experienced jurors tend to better comprehend jury instructions. See Robert P. Charrow & Veda
R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable:A PsycholinguisticStudy ofJuryInstructions,
79 COLUMi. L. REv. 1306, 1320-21 (1979) ("[T]he only factor that consistently and significantly
correlated with performance was the amount of education that a subject had had ....
[C]omprehension rose as education level rose."); Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward CriminalJury
Instructions thatJurorsCan Understand,75 J. CRli. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198,224 (1984) ("[J]urors
with greater experience and learning apparently comprehend and apply jury instructions better than
those who are less experienced and/or less well educated."); David U. Strawn & Raymond W.
Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 483 (1976) (concluding that
"those jurors with some previous college experience tended to score higher [on juror comprehension
tests] after receiving instructions than those without college experience").
349. See supra notes 55-64, 219-36 and accompanying text.
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better-educated members of society. Property qualifications and the
prohibition against women serving on juries, although negative aspects
of traditional practice when viewed through modem eyes, probably
helped to ensure that the members of the jury would be among the most
educated members of society. While it is true that not all property
holders necessarily were more educated than the average citizen (and the
same might be said of women), on average, property holders could be
expected to have the requisite wealth and leisure time necessary to obtain
a greater amount of education. Therefore, the selection of jurors for the
average jury was not particularly random, reflecting a perfect "crosssection" of the whole community, but rather was skewed in favor of
selection of the better-educated segment of society.
In contrast to the early English or American juror, the modem juror
is often relatively uneducated in relation to the general population. The
modem selection process is skewed in favor of selection from less
educated and experienced segments of society. Members of society who
are better educated often escape jury duty. Furthermore, more educated
members of society are sometimes excused from jury service for
cause, 350 and there is some evidence that lawyers may attempt, in
certain instances, to utilize peremptory challenges to strike more educated
jurors.3 51 The result is a less-qualified jury. For example, in a 1973
commercial suit,352 alleging various antitrust and patent violations in
which the plaintiff asked for damages of up to one and one-half billion
dollars, the members of the jury had an average of a tenth-grade education.353 In such cases, the education and experience of the jurors is a
factor in reaching an accurate outcome, due to the complexity of the
issues and the length of the trial.
Furthermore, under early selection procedures, individuals having
knowledge or expertise that might be useful in understanding the facts
and issues involved in the case were often favored to serve on juries. In
contrast, the modem American jury is composed of jurors who are not

350. See Douglas W. Ell, Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: ProtractedCommercial
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 779-80 (1978). For example, the
Federal Jury Selection and Service Act allows district court judges to excuse members of the
community from jury service upon a showing of "undue hardship or extreme inconvenience." 28
U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5)(A) (1994).
351. See Ell, supra note 350, at 780-81.
352. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 1195

(2d Cir. 1981).
353. See Ell, supranote 350, at 776. The jury heard evidence in the trial for approximately 215
days and deliberated for another 38 days. See SCM Corp., 463 F. Supp. at 986.
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selected for their expertise in areas that will be dealt with at trial.3
Instead, modem jurors may bring an array of experiences to the trial
process that may have nothing to do with the issues to be tried, or which

may randomly influence their decisions in unexpected ways.

5

These

advantages of the early jury have been eroded due to modem innova356 and peremptory challenges 357
tions. Modem exemption statutes
both serve to remove individuals who might be experienced in the field
that is the subject of the lawsuit or who might be more qualified to serve
as jurors. Furthermore, individuals who might overcome inexperience due
backgrounds, for example, are often weeded
to having better educational
58
out of the jury pool.
Finally, early English juries were expected to rely on personal
knowledge concerning issues to be tried.3 9 This is unlike the modem

354. This is a particularly salient problem in the area of complex civil cases. For example,
Professor Lempert has noted:
[T]he qualities of those who serve as jurors affect the quality of jury decisionmaking ....The time demands of complex cases mean that employed workers tend
disproportionately to be missing from the juries that hear them. This is unfortunate
because the employed include people with special knowledge regarding the issues that
the jury must resolve as well as higher status, better educated individuals who, when they
sit on juries, tend to make particularly valuable contributions.
Lempert, supra note 4, at 117-18 (footnote omitted).
355. As Professors Kalven and Zeisel observed in their study of the American jury:
Interviews with jurors and access to experimental jury deliberations abundantly show that

jurors bring to their deliberations much extra knowledge-some of which certainly would
not be known to the judge. The jury's extra information tends to be some item of
personal experience not part of the trial, or some generalization about human nature, such
as "people drink a good deal at Polish weddings" or "the very inability of the doctor to
find anything wrong with a person's back is really good evidence that there is something
seriously wrong," to take two vivid examples from our files for other parts of the jury
study.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supranote 2, at 131-32 (footnote omitted).
356. See Carrie Shrallow, Note, Expanding Jury Participation:Is It a Good Idea?, 12 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 209, 217 (1991).

357. See Dale IV. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?,21 U. CHt. L. REV.
386, 391 (1954).
358. In support of this contention, Professor Broeder makes the following observation: "The
body of law governing the selection of jurors, rather than recognizing and attempting to reduce the
effects of the juror's inexperience in handling legal matters, has instead exempted from service many
of the groups who might best be expected to overcome this handicap.' Id. at 390.
359. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. As one commentator noted in discussing
the ancient mode of jury trial in England:
The jury rendered their verdict upon their own private beforehand knowledge of
the facts in the case, and were selected because they possessed such knowledge ....
Under the moder jury system all this is changed: jurors are now selected because
of their lack of beforehand knowledge of the facts in controversy, and the jury in
rendering its verdict, so far as these facts are concerned, can only act upon knowledge
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American approach, which rigidly prohibits the use of personal
knowledge by jurors in the resolution of factual issues arising during

trial. 3' This modem approach is perhaps unduly naive in that it is
likely that jurors will utilize personal knowledge to some extent in every

trial. Jurors cannot come to trial with a completely blank slate. Furthermore, the modem approach perhaps unduly restricts the power of the
jury, much like the presence of complex and technical rules of evidence
that keep relevant information from the jury and prevent the jury from
basing its decisionmaking process on such information.
Even though historical jury selection procedures were not particu-

larly random, there are some potential constitutional objections to
abandonment of random selection of jury members under the Supreme

Court's modem case law.36' In the context of the criminal trial, impartiality of the jury is constitutionally mandated by the Sixth Amendment.362 Impartiality and representativeness of the jury have been of
particular concern to the Supreme Court in recent years. 63 However,

obtained from the evidence given in the case. This radical change in the power and
functions of th6e jury came about quite gradually, and it is probably as difficult to
determine the exact time when it became complete as it is to determine at what precise
moment daylight ends and darkness begins.
David Torrance, Evidence, in TWO CENTURIES' GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: 1701-1901, at 319,
321 (1901).
360. The Supreme Court has discussed the modem view on several occasions. See, e.g., Patton
v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12 (1984) (discussing the fact that a juror must be able to set aside
his or her own opinion in order to be considered impartial); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351
(1966) (noting that there was a "requirement that the jury's verdict be based on evidence received
in open court, not from outside sources"); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (noting that the
jury's "verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial"); Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454, 462 (1907) ("The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will
be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether
of private talk or public print."). This was the view entering the twentieth century. See PROFFATr,
supra note 12, § 369, at 434-35. Proffatt explains:
In former times it was the rule for the jury to decide according to their individual
knowledge. Now they can only decide upon the evidence produced before them; their
oath expressly binds them to this; and a consideration of knowledge otherwise obtained
will vitiate their proceedings in nearly all cases.
Id.
361. But see Henry G. Connor, The ConstitutionalRight to a Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage,
57 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 203-04 (1909) (concluding that "the Legislature may enact statutes
prescribing the qualification, mode of selection, number and causes of challenge" of jurors without
constitutional objection).
362. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
363. The concept of impartiality has been recognized as implicit in the concept of the jury. For
example, in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court asserted that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, there were three bases for precluding racially-based peremptories: (1) the defendant's
right "to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria," (2)
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the Court has not recognized a fundamental requirement of a representative jury.36 Nor has the Court held that the Constitution requires
random selection of the jury.3 65 The Court has, however, interpreted the
the right of an individual not to be assumed incompetent for or excluded from jury service on
account of race, and (3) the need to maintain "public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice." Id. at 85-87; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (emphasizing the
public confidence rationale as welt as the need to guarantee "diffused impartiality"). The rule in
Batson has been extended to gender-based peremptories. See J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511
U.S. 127 (1994). Furthermore, in recent years, the Court has decided a number of cases concerning
racial discrimination in jury selection. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (prohibiting
criminal defendant from exercising race-based peremptories); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991) (prohibiting private civil litigants from exercising race-based peremptories);
Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (upholding a finding by the trial court that the
prosecutor's explanation for peremptory challenges of hispanic jurors was sufficiently race-neutral);
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that a white criminal defendant has standing under
the Equal Protection Clause to challenge the prosecutor's striking of racial minorities); Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (holding that a white criminal defendant has standing under the Sixth
Amendment to challenge the prosecution's striking of black jurors, but rejecting a claim on the
merits because the Sixth Amendment's cross-section requirement is inapplicable in the context of
peremptory challenges).
364. See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522. In Taylor, the majority explicitly stated:
[Me impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community
and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled
to a jury of any particular composition, but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or
venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups
in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.
Id. at 538 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), a civil
case involving the exclusion of individuals working for a daily wage from jury lists, the Court stated:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either
criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community. This does not mean, of course, that every jury must
contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and
geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation would
be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials
without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups.
Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
365. For example, in Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 (1970), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of an Alabama requirement that jurors be 'generally reputed to be honest and
intelligent and ... esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound
judgment."' Id. at 323 (quoting ALA. CODE § 12-16-60 (1967)); see also Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.
346, 354-55 (1970) (upholding another Georgia law allowing jury commissioners to eliminate
persons found not to be "upight" and "intelligent").
Courts have also upheld age-based criteria for jury selection. See, e.g., United States v.
Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 105-06 (4th Cir. 1988); Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 1000 (1st Cir. 1985)
(en bane); Donald H. Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 1045, 1047 (1978) ("Judges have lamented the underrepresentation caused by the unwillingness
of the young to serve but have declined to remedy it .... ."). But see Vikram David Amar, Jury
Service as PoliticalParticipationAkin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 203, 204 (1995) (interpreting
the Court's case law as suggesting that the use of wealth classifications in jury selection is
disturbing). Professor Amar continues by arguing that age-defined groups are essential participants
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impartiality requirement of the Sixth Amendment to mean that a jury

must be derived from a cross-section of the community.3s Juries "must
be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community,

367

and

in the jury process and that the Court should protect against jury service discrimination on the basis
of age. See id. at 206.
Even when the Court has indicated that group-based selection criteria such as wealth might
be problematic, it has indicated that competence is important and that competence as measured
individual-by-individual would be a permissible selection factor. For example, in Thiel, the Court
stated:
Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the
very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and
discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.
Jury competence is not limited to those who earn their livelihood on other than
a daily basis. One who is paid $3 a day may be as fully competent as one who is paid
$30 a week or $300 a month. In other words, the pay period of a particular individual is
completely irrelevant to his eligibility and capacity to serve as a juror. Wage earners,
including those who are paid by the day, constitute a very substantial portion of the
community, a portion that cannot be intentionally and systematically excluded in whole
or in part without doing violence to the democratic nature of the jury system. Were we
to sanction an exclusion of this nature we would encourage whatever desires those
responsible for the selection of jury panels may have to discriminate against persons of
low economic and social status.... That we refuse to do.
328 U.S. at 220, 223-24 (footnote omitted).
366. See, e.g., Thel, 328 U.S. at 220; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). However, as two commentators have noted, the fact that the jury
must be drawn from a cross-section of the community does not mean that non-random jury selection
procedures and special juries are necessarily unconstitutional:
In ascertaining the scope of permissible action Congress might take to alter
current jury selection practices in an effort to improve juror competence, constitutional
cross-section requirements must be considered carefully. At the same time, however, the
limits of the cross-section doctrine itself must be recognized. The Court's discussions of
the need for a representative jury in the context of civil litigation have been infrequent,
and significantly, the Supreme Court has never used the Constitution to condemn civil
jury selection practices that result in deviation from the fair cross-section standard.
Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 4, at 922. The commentators continue:
Although any plan for special juries necessarily would involve the systematic exclusion
of those persons eligible for "regular" jury service but unable to meet the more
demanding standards set for service on a special jury, such a plan need not result in a
cross-section violation as defined by the Court.
Id. at 927.
367. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. At least one commentator has noted that it is not at all clear why
juries must necessarily be representative of the community:
As an initial matter, it is not obvious that a jury should be representative at all.
Democracy requires that citizens be the ultimate decisionmakers on questions of
policy-questions of what the law should be. Such decisions are reached through the
political process, and for its legitimacy, that process must represent the people. Juries,
however, do not decide what the law should be; they decide facts. Their role is the
technical one of applying the law and not making it. Once the people have decided
political issues through the legislative process, it might seem that the need to represent
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there may be no systematic exclusion of any "'distinctive groups in the
community' from the jury.368 As the Court has stated, "[r]ecognition
must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be
found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual
rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the
jury system., 369 In Duren v. Missouri, 3 ° the Court enumerated the
elements necessary to show a cross-section violation:
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded

is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of
this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and

reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;
and (3) that this underrepresentation is 371
due to systematic exclusion of
process.

the group in the jury-selection

This cross-section requirement has been justified by the Court on the
grounds that it guards "against the exercise of arbitrary power" that
might occur where certain groups are excluded from the pool of potential
jurors.372 Furthermore, the Court has attempted to justify the fair cross-

the citizenry has been satisfied.
Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE LJ. 1177, 1188

(1980).
368. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 510 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Taylor,
419 U.S. at 538); see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (plurality opinion) (concluding
that "[w]hen any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the
effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience,
the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable").
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public
justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial
discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups
not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our
basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (footnote omitted).
This preoccupation with group bias is somewhat problematic in the sense that it may be too
simplistic to assume that every individual in some way identifies with a particular group and
therefore is somehow representative of that group. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Casefor RaceConsciousness,91 COLuM. L. REV. 1060, 1076 ("The allure of colorblindness is strong ....
[I]t fits
with liberal, individualistic principles that each person should be assessed on individual merits, not
upon the basis of group membership.").
369. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220.
370. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
371. Id. at 364.
372. Taylor,419 U.S. at 530. In Taylor, the Court recognized that the cross-section requirement
might also prevent governmental abuse:
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power--to make
available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the
overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
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section requirement in terms of the advantages of the jury as an
adjudicatory body. The Court has stated that the requirement "make[s]
available the commonsense judgment of the community,' '373 helps to
further "public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system,"374 enables a broad section of the populace to share responjury's
sibility for the administration of justice, 375 and ensures that the
376
deliberations will be characterized by "a diffused impartiality."
The problematic nature of the impartiality requirement was noted by
the Court in Batson v. Kentucky,377 a case striking down racially-based
peremptory challenges as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
[T]hough the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the petit jury will be
selected from a pool of names representing a cross section of the
community, we have never held that the Sixth Amendment requires that
"petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the
various distinctive groups in the population." Indeed, it would be
impossible to apply a concept of proportional representation to the petit
jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of our society. Such impossibility is illustrated by the Court's holding that a jury of six persons is
not unconstitutional.378
However, there has been pressure to read a representativeness requirement into the requirement of an impartial jury.379 In general, litigants
have a right to a jury that is selected at random from a fair cross-section
of the community.380 The purported rationale behind this requirement

overconditioned or biased response of a judge. This prophylactic vehicle is not provided
if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large,
distinctive groups are excluded from the pool. Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage
but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.
Id. at 530 (citation omitted).

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
78, 100

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 85-86 n.6 (citations omitted) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538).
See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 362; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
(1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).

380. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982) ("[L]itigants ...have the right to ...petit juries selected

at random from a fair cross section of the community. .."); see also Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (reversing a conviction by an all-male jury where women were excluded);
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 US. 217, 220 (1946) (holding that the American tradition of trial

by jury necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community);
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is "to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power" 381 that might result
populace or
"if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of3the
82
if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool.,
However, arguably the selection of jurors based on nonarbitrary
criteria does not run afoul of the impartiality requirement as enunciated
by the Court. Criteria such as intelligence, educational background, or
trial experience may be perfectly suitable and constitutional criteria by
which to select jurors when necessary to serve the goal of just adjudication.383 As one lower court has stated:
The less educated, like the young, are a diverse group, lacking in
distinctive characteristics or attitudes which set them apart from the rest
of society. They are of varying economic backgrounds, and races, and
of many different ages. We believe the interests of this3 4group can be
adequately protected by the remainder of the populace.

Such criteria do not resemble impermissible criteria such as race or
gender with which the Court has been concerned. In many cases, the

Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (holding that a state policy excluding blacks from jury
service violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because resulting juries
were not representative of the community).
381. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
382. Id.
383. It is noteworthy that several states already permit the selection of jurors based on criteria

such as whether the person is "experienced, intelligent, and upright." Nancy J. King, Racial
Jurymandering:Cancer or Cure?A ContemporaryReview of Agrmative Action in Jury Selection,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 715 (1993).
Though not a perfect measure of juror ability, level of education does have a bearing on
an individual's ability to function as a juror, especially in a complex, technical case.
Furthermore, reliance upon educational background can result not only in an administrable system, but one that, in this time of rather general educational opportunities, produces
reasonably representative panels.
Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 4, at 900.
384. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted); see also
Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting the "unanimous rule that the less educated
do not constitute a cognizable group'); United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir.
1977) (noting that the young and the less educated "have no internal cohesion nor are they viewed
as an identifiable class by the general populace"); United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522, 526
(7th Cir. 1962) (holding that intelligence tests are not arbitrary, as there is no constitutional/statutory
right that ignorance be represented in a jury box); United States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp.
799, 804, 807 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that blue-collar workers, young adults, and under-educated
persons do not constitute a legally cognizable group); United States v. Abell, 552 F. Supp. 316, 324
(D. Me. 1982) (declining to find existence of a lower socioeconomic class in Maine); People v.
Estrada, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731, 740 (Ct. App. 1979). Butsee United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571
(lst
Cir. 1970) (concluding that "the less educated are a sufficiently large group with sufficiently
distinct views and attitudes that its diluted presence on the actual jury pool requires some explanation
by the government").
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above criteria will be directly relevant to achieving an accurate result
from the jury. Although there are potential constitutional objections to
utilizing selection criteria that put a premium on education level or trial
experience in some cases, they may be obviated.
For example, the Supreme Court has specifically addressed the
constitutionality of special juries. 8 5 In upholding the constitutionality
of the New York special jury selection procedure in 1947, the Supreme
Court stated that "[e]ach of the grounds of elimination is reasonably and
closely related to the juror's suitability for the kind of service the special
panel requires or to his fitness to judge the kind of cases for which it is
most frequently utilized. 38 6 However, in the same case, dissenting
Justice Murphy voiced the following concerns:
The constitutional vice inherent in the type of "blue ribbon" jury
panel here involved is that it rests upon intentional and systematic
exclusion of certain classes of people who are admittedly qualified to
serve on the general jury panel. Whatever may be the standards erected
by jury officials for distinguishing between those eligible for such a
"blue ribbon" panel and those who are not, the distinction itself is an
invalid one. It denies the defendant his constitutional right to be tried
by a jury fairly drawn from a cross-section of the community. It forces
a manner which tends
upon him a jury drawn from a panel chosen in 387
to obliterate the representative basis of the jury.
Therefore, although there are serious issues regarding the constitutionality
of special juries and other nonrandom selection procedures, it is unlikely
that such procedures run afoul of traditional notions of due process or
trial by a jury of one's peers, even under the Court's modem case law.
The Court's statements concerning the competency of jurors seem
to leave the door open to selection based on educational background as
a factor indicating an individual's competence as a juror, rather than
385. See, e.g., Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565,566 (1948); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
270 (1947). The constitutionality of such nonrandom selection procedures has been upheld by several
different courts in the United States. See, e.g., Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1035-40
(E.D. La. 1972) (discussing the Supreme Court's decisions concerning special juries); Lommen v.
Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 68 N.W. 53, 55-56 (Minn. 1896); Fowler v. State, 34 A. 682, 682 (N.J.
1896). As one court stated in the latter part of the nineteenth century:
Special juries, it need scarcely be said, were familiar adjuncts and adjuvants in the
administration of justice from the earliest period of the common law. This is but the
assertion of what might almost be termed aprehistoric legal truism, since their origin is
too remote in the mists of authority to be now successfully traced.
State v. Withrow, 36 S.W. 43, 46 (Mo. 1896) (emphasis added).
386. Fay, 332 U.S. at 270.
387. Id. at 297-98 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss2/1

92

Smith: The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform
1996]

JURY REFORM

singling out a certain group as incompetent to serve as jurors. Furthermore, although jury selection is designed to result in a jury reflecting a

representative cross-section of the community, there is no right to 88
a
representative cross-section of the community on any given jury

There is also no right to a randomly selected jury.389 Finally, it must
be noted that textually, the impartiality
requirement only applies in the
390
context of the criminal jury.
However, even if the Court's current position cannot be reconciled
with the selection of jurors based on some criterion indicating an ability

to reach a just outcome in deciding cases, arguably such a selection
procedure would better reflect principles embodied in the constitutional

protections of due process and jury trial. As one commentator has noted:
[W]hile the cross-section requirement ensures that the jury is representative of the community and has the full moral weight of the community behind it, if juries were composed of specially qualified individuals
or groups-for example, those selected on different grounds, such as
intelligence--a jury decision arguably would be more accurate. The
cross-section impartiality requirement thus appears to sacrifice the
competence of the individual decisionmaker for representative, group
decisionmaking.391
Such an abandonment of the goal of accuracy in favor of a blind
adherence to the principle of representativeness arguably tramples on the
litigants' due process rights in the civil context, and a defendant's right
to a fair trial in the criminal context.

388. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,478 (1990) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does
not preclude the use of peremptory challenges to strike members of particular groups from the jury);
Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 507-08 (1948) (holding that if a jury is selected lawfully, it
does not matter that the jury is not representative of the community).
389. See United States v. Wellington, 754 F.2d 1457, 1468 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the
Sixth Amendment does not compel random selection of jurors).
390. However, Congress has statutorily imposed a fair
cross-section requirement with regard
to civil cases in federal courts. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994)
("It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall
have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community
in the district or division wherein the court convenes."). Furthermore, statements by the Attorney
General indicate that this cross-section requirement should be construed to prevent special juries. See
MiscellaneousProposalsRegardingthe CivilRights ofPersons Within the Jurisdictionof the United
States: Hearings on H.R. 14765 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1078 (1966) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach). As two commentators have
concluded, "[a]ny move toward more stringent standards in the selection of federal jurors would
seem.., to require congressional modifications of the present jury selection act." Luneburg &
Nordenberg, supra note 4, at 915.
391. Friedland, supra note 4, at 195-96.
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2. Voir Dire and Peremptory Challenges
The American system of extensive voir dire and peremptory

challenges may be starkly contrasted with early English and American
practice. In the United States, selection of the jury often adds to
excessive delay3 92 and may be subject to strategic abuse by lawyers.

Historically, in both England and America, impartiality was not thought
to encompass a right to extensively interrogate jurors or to exercise
3
peremptory challenges against jurors who were thought to be biased. 1

Peremptory challenges were not often utilized in early English jury trials,
and have now been abolished in England." 4 The excessive voir dire
that is a component of modem American criminal trials has been ineffi-

cient" 5 and may result in greater gamesmanship among lawyers
attempting to select jurors who they believe will be predisposed to find
in favor of their client.
Several commentators have criticized the American system of
extensive voir dire and the use of peremptory challenges.396 Eliminating

extensive voir dire would be consistent with traditional understandings
of jury trial and due process in England and the United States, and would
incorporate the advantages found in the modem English and civil law
systems of procedure. 397 Furthermore, eliminating these procedures
would increase the legitimacy of jury decisions by removing the

392. See Alschuler, supra note 66, at 157; Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 535-36.
393. See supra Parts II.B, III.B; see also Moore, supra note 66, at 449 (noting that in early
English cases "it was not uncommon for the judge to examine jurors as to their qualifications, even
in the absence of challenge, where he had reason to doubt their impartiality").
394. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
395. For example, the University of Chicago Jury Project found that most of voir dire time is
spent preparing jurors for the case rather than in selecting jurors. See HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY
INTHE COURT 103 n.9 (2d ed. 1959) (citing a study by Professor Saul Mendlovitz).
396. See, e.g., KASsN & vRIGHTSMAN, supra note 8, at 51-52 (arguing that voir dire is used
by lawyers to create bias rather than to discover it); Bradley, supra note 6, at 659; Dale W. Broeder,
Voir DireExaminations: An EmpiricalStudy, 38 S.CAL. L. REV. 503, 522 (1965) (observing in a
study of lavyer-conducted voir dire that "most of the questions and statements were either wholly
or chiefly intended to indoctrinate," and estimating that "about eighty per cent of the lawyers' voir
dire time was spent indoctrinating, only twenty per cent in sifting out the favorable from the
unfavorable veniremen"); Levit et al., supra note 69, at 942-44 (discussing lawyer abuse of voir
dire); Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 535 (arguing that "[s]ubstantial time could be saved by simply
shifting responsibility for jury voir dire from lawyers to judges').
397. One commentator has also noted that "the elimination of extensive voir dire would not
change the basic adversary character of our criminal trial. There is nothing inherent in the adversary
system that necessitates the American-style extended voir dire." Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 462.
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possibility that they are merely the result of skillful lawyering at the voir
dire stage.

Despite the advantages that might arise from eliminating extensive
lawyer-conducted voir dire and the exercise of peremptory challenges,

some commentators have argued that peremptory challenges are essential
to maintaining the guarantee of an impartial jury. These commentators

argue that the exercise of peremptory challenges is not only necessary to
maintain substantive impartiality of the jury, but also to maintain the
appearance of impartiality, and thereby increase the perceived legitimacy

of judicial proceedings.398
However, other commentators, most notably Justice Marshall, have
advocated the abandonment of the peremptory challenge, evidently
thinking that this would not run afoul of existing constitutional con-

straints."' Furthermore, the Supreme Court has emphasized that it does
not believe that there is a constitutional right to exercise
peremptories."' Most commentators who have advocated the elimina-

tion of the peremptory challenge have been primarily concerned with its
use as a tool of racial or gender discrimination. However, peremptory
challenges may be utilized in other ways that may serve to destroy the
impartiality of the jury. Although traditional notions of impartiality were

evidently consistent with the exercise of peremptory challenges in
whatever matter the parties saw fit, the issue of whether or not the

exercise of peremptory challenges can lead to an impartial jury must be
398. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the
Clash Between Impartialityand Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 356-57 (1982) (stating
that "not only impartiality, but also the appearance of impartiality, is an important goal of the
exercise of peremptories"). In fact, commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the existence
of the right to exercise peremptories is not only sufficient, but also necessary in maintaining an
impartial jury: "[I]t appears that the peremptory challenge is more than just a traditional statutory
right that may be helpful in obtaining a fair jury. The inadequacies of random selection and
challenges for cause strongly suggest that the peremptory challenge is essential to the impartial jury
right." Id. at 357.
399. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion,
argued for the abolition of the peremptory challenge: "The decision today will not end the racial
discrimination that peremptories inject into thejury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished
only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely." Id. at 102-03. Some commentators have
endorsed Justice Marshall's position. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 66, at 208. But see Saltzburg
& Powers, supra note 398, at 370 (stating that although "[m]inority participation in the administration of justice... creates respect for the system and contributes to the legitimacy of the resuit[,] ... it cannot take precedence over the need for impartiality in any particular case").
400. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58 (1992); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81,
88 (1988) (stating that "peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension"); Batson, 476
U.S. at 91; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,219 (1965); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 538, 586
(1919).
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considered in a modem light.
Elimination of peremptory challenges, although not constitutionally
mandated, would be constitutionally permissible. As the Court has
noted,4"' and as the historical materials indicate, 402 peremptory challenges were not thought to be inherent in the notion of "trial by jury,"
except perhaps in the isolated case of a criminal defendant's right to
exercise peremptory challenges in a capital case. 40 3 Thus, elimination
or reduction in the use of peremptories would represent a trend toward
the historically more constrained use of peremptories, which in turn
might have beneficial effects in terms of reducing the delay and strategic
behavior on the part of lawyers that are features of modem American
trials.
3. Jury Size
A third issue that has been important in modem debate over the jury
is its size. There has been a trend toward allowing smaller juries, even
in criminal cases. The impetus behind the move toward smaller juries has
been a concern with judicial economy.4° 4 However, commentators have
argued that this move toward smaller juries is not desirable.40 1 Furthermore, it is inconsistent with traditional jury trial procedures, which

401. See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
404. See George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, Juries,and Jeopardy,91
MICH. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1992).
405. Several commentators have noted that the interaction among jury members is an essential
advantage of the jury that may be curtailed if the size of the jury is reduced. See MICHAEL J. SAKS,
JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIzE AND SOCIAL DECISION RULE 32-34 (1977); Broeder,
supra note 2, at 388-89 (arguing that "[a] fundamental tenet of the jury tradition... lies in its
assumption that controverted factual issues are best resolved through reasoned discussion and
debate," and that "a judgment proceeding from several persons is probably as good or even better
than the judgment of [the judge] whose unconscious mental and emotional processes cannot be
checked against the reactions of others"); Richard 0. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible"
Differences: EmpiricalResearch and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 644, 705-07 (1975);
Hans Zeisel,.. . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the FederalJury, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 710, 724 (1971) (concluding that reductions in the number of jurors and the margin necessary
for a verdict "make for differences in adjudication"). But see Paul Lermack, No Right Number?
Social Science Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 951, 967-72 (1979) (questioning the results of empirical studies concerning jury size); Ralph Black, Comment, The Impact ofJury
Size on the CourtSystem, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1103, 1103 (1979) (same); cf Alschuler, supra note
14, at 1016-17 (arguing that the debate over juror dynamics and jury size is "myopic" given the
realities of the Court's decisions).
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remained unchanged for hundreds of years. 05 From the foregoing discussion of American juries, there is strong evidence that a jury of twelve
persons was thought to be an essential feature of the early American
jury.40 7 Thus, despite the Court's decisions in this area, abandonment
of the twelve-member jury seems to run afoul of traditional constitutional
guarantees.
Earlier Supreme Court decisions recognized that the Sixth Amendment guaranties a jury of twelve in federal criminal cases.4" In Thompson v. Utah, Justice Harlan noted that "[w]hen Magna Charta declared
that no freeman should be deprived of life, etc., 'but by the judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land,' it referred to a trial by twelve jurors." 40 9 However, the Court has subsequently moved away from this
position. In 1970, the Supreme Court held that a jury of six persons in
state criminal cases is not unconstitutional.41 1 In 1973, the Court held

that the Seventh Amendment does not require twelve-person juries in
civil cases.411 Therefore, it appears that in this area the Court has

406. See supra notes 45-47, 197-205 and accompanying text. As Richard S. Arnold has aptly
noted:
When the Founders drafted the Bill of Rights to include the Seventh Amendment,
a jury of twelve was what they contemplated: the common law of England had fixed the
number at twelve over four hundred years before the drafting of the Bill of Rights.

Furthermore, it was a scholarly axiom at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted that a
jury was comprised of twelve. This clearly was the understanding of the Founding
Generation and continued to be the understanding in this country until Williams.
Arnold, supra note 26, at 5 (referring to Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)); see also Pierce
v. Patterson, I Del. Cas. 541 (1815); Gillaspy v. Garrat, 2 Del. Cas. 225 (1805); Commonwealth v.
Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1, 4 (1851); Whitehurst v. Davis, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 134 (1800) (holding
that it was constitutional error to try a case with more than twelve jurors); State v. Simons, 29 S.C.L.
(2 Speers) 761,767 (1844); Bennet v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 154, 155 (1795) (stating that
a jury of twelve was required in cases triable by juries at common law); 3 MATTHEW BACON, A
NEW ABRDGmNT OF THE LAv 727 (6th ed. 1807); 2 HALE, supra note 107, at 141; Jerome L.

Edelstein, Comment, The JurySize Question in Pennsylvania:Six ofOne and a Dozen of the Other,
53 TEMP. L.Q. 89, 112 (1980) (recognizing that the Bill of Rights requires no less than twelve
members to constitute ajury (citing 2 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTrUTION
OF PENNSYLVANIA 296 (B. Singerly ed., 1873))).

407. See supra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
408. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 355 (1898) (striking down a conviction by a jury
of eight in the territory of Utah).
409. Id. at 349.
410. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970). Justice White, writing for the
majority, stated the following: 'Ve conclude [that] the fact that the jury at common law was
composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury
system and wholly without significance 'except to mystics."' Id at 102 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 182 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
411. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973).
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ignored the weight of the historical evidence in allowing juries with less
than twelve members.
4. Requirement of Unanimity
The requirement of unanimity is important for maintaining the
representativeness of the jury. However, as with jury size, the Supreme
Court has allowed the states to deviate from the historically mandated
unanimity rule. The decisions of the Court in this area indicate that votes
of 9-3 or 6-0 do not violate the constitutional right to jury trial, while
votes of 5-0 or 5-1 do.41 2 Furthermore, one of the Justices has stated
in dicta that a conviction based on a 7-5 vote would be unconstitutional.4 3 Thus, like the jury size issue, erosion of the prohibition against
nonunanimity rules seems to be at odds with traditional understandings
of "trial by jury."
B. Judicial Control of the Jury
The modem jury is subject to greater control in certain ways and
less control in other ways compared to its early English and American
counterparts. Modem juries do not give reasons for their opinions.
Therefore, jury errors in understanding the evidence or applying the law
are not ordinarily evident from the verdict. This fact has led to the
development of certain "prophylactic safeguards at the trial stage. 4 14
Rules of evidence prevent certain information from reaching the jury,
including the rule against hearsay and the rule excluding evidence of past
criminal convictions. Therefore, as in the case of juror experience, the
fact that jurors provide no explanation for their verdicts has led to the
development of procedural mechanisms that result in more lengthy trials
and impede the jury in discovering the truth and arriving at just
outcomes.
This state of affairs differs from that found in the early American
and English jury systems.1 5 In early English and American jury trials,
412. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979) (striking dovn 5-1 verdict); Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (rejecting 5-0 verdict); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362
(1972) (approving 9-3 verdict); Williams, 399 U.S. at 103 (approving 6-0 verdict).
concurring).
413. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366 (Blackmun, J.,
414. Langbein, supra note 20, at 273.
415. Langbein has noted the following:
[I]n the Old Bailey of that day, as in the German or French courtroom of our own day,
there was no law of evidence in our sense-no body of rules designed to exclude
probative information for fear of the trier's inability to evaluate it. Hearsay and prior
conviction evidence were received about as freely as in the modem Continental systems.
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the professional judge was allowed to give jurors greater guidance in
rendering their decisions. Modem jury practice has evolved away from
this tradition, arguably to the detriment of jury functioning.
1. Jury Instructions
A number of scholars have commented on the instructions that
judges give to jurors,4 16 identifying several problems with current
practice. Jurors often have difficulty understanding the judge's instructions, which are crafted in the archaic rubric of the legal system. Jurors
have difficulty remembering their instructions since they often are not
provided with written copies of these instructions. Jurors typically are not
given any instructions when they might be most useful-namely, at the
very beginning of the trial when jurors may be completely unaware of
the nature of their role in the adjudicatory process and the issues that will
be important in resolution of the dispute. Finally, in complex or lengthy
trials, this procedural defect is magnified-jurors must remain passive
and uninstructed through trials that may last years and involve complex
technical or legal issues.
In early American and English trials these problems were not as
apparent. Informal communication between judge and jury was a defining
characteristic of early English and American trials.4" 7 Furthermore,
there is evidence that judges often did not even charge juries in early
American trials. 418 Thus, there was less of a problem with juror com-

Id. at 315-16.
416. See, e.g., A~MRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 4

(1982) (arguing that "there is no justification for juries, out of ignorance, to reach verdicts that are
inconsistent with the law"); KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 8, at 141-56; William W.
Schwarzer, Communicatingwith Juries:Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. 731, 759 (1981)
(concluding that "[p]roper communication with jurors is the most direct and effective way of
mobilizing [jurors'] qualities to further the cause of intelligent administration ofjustice'); see also
Charrow & Charrow, supra note 348, at 1359 (stating that "if many jurors do not properly
understand the laws that they are required to use in reaching their verdicts, it is possible that many
verdicts are reached either without regard to the law or by using improper law"); Severance et al.,
supra note 348, at 233 (concluding that "simplified language and organized presentations of legal
concepts can effectively help jurors, particularly when coupled with the opportunity to discuss and
deliberate"); Walter W.Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G.Thomburg, JuryInstructions:A PersistentFailure
to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77 (1988) (stating that "[j]uror comprehension of instructions.., is essential to the jury's ability to fulfill its role as contemplated by the law").
417. See supra notes 106-16, 271-81 and accompanying text.
418. See MANN, supra note 170, at 74 (discussing juries in seventeenth-century Connecticut);
NELSON, supra note 170, at 26 (discussing Massachusetts juries). As Bruce Mann has concluded:
Juries in Connecticut in the seventeenth century decided cases on the basis of the
evidence submitted to them, on their personal knowledge of the dispute, on their
understanding of the law in a formal sense, and doubtless also on their sense of what the
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prehension of judicial instructions. Excessive procedural formalism did
not trump the practical necessities of the trial.

a. Form of Instructions
One potential improvement on the modem system advocated by
reformers would be to encourage jury instructions to be drafted in plain
English.419 This would be consistent with the tradition of more informal
communications between judge and jury in England and the United

States. There is no reason to rigidly craft jury instructions in order to
ensure affirmance on appeal when, historically, instruction from the judge

was informal. More informal communication should also satisfy the
constraints of due process.

b. Furnishing Written Copies of the Instructions
A second potential improvement of the current system advocated by
reformers is to furnish the jurors with a written copy of their instructions.42 Generally, courts have found this practice to be acceptable as
long as the judge instructs the jury that they must consider the written

law ought to be. There is no indication that judges instructed juries on the law to apply,
although by the end of the century judges may have made a general charge to identify
for the jury the questions they were to consider.
MANN, supra note 170, at 74.
419. See GUINTHER, supranote 8, at 70-73; KASSIN & WRiGHTSMAN, supra note 8, at 151-53;
Complex Cases, supra note 8, at 43-52; B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking
Rights": CreatingEducated and DemocraticJuries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1256 (1993) ("Complaints
about jurors' difficulties in understanding and following the judge's final legal instructions have been
around for some time. . . "). Some commentators have argued, however, that more is needed to
overcome the problem of lack ofjuror comprehension than drafting instructions in plain English. For
example, Judge Jerome Frank noted the following, concerning the ability ofjurors to understand the
law:
To comprehend the meaning of many a legal rule requires special training. It is
inconceivable that a body of twelve ordinary men.., could, merely from listening to the
instructions of the judge, gain the knowledge necessary to grasp the true import of the
judge's words. For these words have often acquired their meaning as the result of
hundreds of years of professional disputation in the courts. The jurors usually are as
unlikely to get the meaning of those words as if they were spoken in Chinese, Sanskrit,
or Choctaw.
FRANK, supra note 2, at 116.
420. A number of commentators have suggested this as a possible reform. See, e.g., Complex
Cases, supra note 8, at 51-52; Comm. on Fed. Courts of the New York State Bar Ass'n, Improving
Jury Comprehension in Complex Civil Litigation, 62 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 549, 564 (1988)
[hereinafter Improving Jury Comprehension];Dann, supranote 419, at 1256 (decrying the "absence
of written copies for each juror" which "contributes to confusion and poor recall').

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss2/1

100

Smith: The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform

19961

JURY REFORM

instructions in their entirety, and not narrowly focus on one part of the
instructions." ' Furthermore, many nineteenth-century cases held that
it was permissible to give the jury written instructions that they could
take with them into deliberations.4n Thus, even after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, this practice was viewed as constitutionally
permissible.
The practice of giving the jury a copy of the charge at the end of
the trial has been discussed by the Supreme Court twice. In Hopt v.
People,42 3 the Court seemed to approve of a Utah statute that required
the charge to be reduced to writing 24 Similarly, in Haupt v. United
States," 5 the Court ruled that submitting a copy of the charge to the
jury did not constitute "unfairness or irregularity."4' 26 Thus, such a
procedure probably falls within the range of constitutionally permissible
reforms.
c. Preinstructing the Jury
A third potential improvement in communications between the judge
and the jury advocated by reformers is to give jury instructions at the
beginning, as well as at the end, of the trial and to furnish the jury with
a written copy of its instructions at the beginning of the trial so that the
jury may have some idea of what issues are important in the trial.427
421. See Dann, supra note 419, at 1259 (stating that there are not "many reversals on appeal
for furnishing copies of instructions to jurors"); Warren K. Urbom, Toward Better Treatment of
Jurors by Judges, 61 NEB. L. REV.409, 422-26 (1982).
422. See, e.g., Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631, 635 (1881); State v. Bennington, 25 P. 91, 92
(Kan. 1890); State v. Tompkins, 71 Mo. 613, 617 (1880); State v. Bungardner, 66 Tenn. 163, 165
(1874) (following state statute mandating the practice); Newman v. State, 65 Tenn. 164 (1873)
(same); Manier v. State, 65 Tenn. 595, 603 (1872) (same); Edwards v. Washington Territory, 1
Wash. Terr. 195, 197 (1862) (stating that "[tihe jury had a right to the instructions given, and to a
copy of the statutes"); Loew v. State, 19 N.W. 437, 439 (Wis. 1884). But see Hall v. State, 8 Ind.
439, 443 (1856) (expressing the view in dictum that written instructions were probably not appropriate).
423. 104 U.S. at 631.
424. See id. at 634-35.
425. 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
426. Id. at 643. However, at least one circuit court has stated that providing the jury with a
written copy of the charge may be problematic. See, e.g., United States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519,
526 (5th Cir. 1977).
427. See AusTIN, supra note 8, at 101 (noting potential increases in juror comprehension);
CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM: REPORT FROM AN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATIoN/BRooKINGS SYMPOsIUM 23 (1992); HANS & VIDMAR, supranote 2, at 122-23; Complex Cases,
supra note 8, at 49-5 1; Dann, supra note 419, at 1248; Amiram Etwork et al., JuridicDecisions: In
Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163, 172 (1977); Larry Heuer &
Steven D. Penrod, InstructingJurors:A FieldExperiment with Written andPreliminaryInstructions,
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Judges are authorized to instruct the jury at the beginning of the trial in
both civil and criminal cases. Courts that have considered this procedure
have concluded that it is permissible, particularly when instructions are
given again at the end of the case.428 Furthermore, the current federal
rules already provide for this procedure. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 30 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 authorize
preinstruction of the jury.42 9 Under both Rule 30 and Rule 51, instructions may be given to the jury before the presentation of the evidence

during trial. In practice, this is seldom done. However, it might aid the
jury to better understand the issues to be tried, and would force the judge
and lawyers to be better prepared for the trial so that they will be in a
position to carry out this procedure at the start of the trial. Not only are

13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 412-16 (1989); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the
Requirements ofProof.The Timing of JudicialInstructionandMock Juror Verdicts, in IN THE JURY
Box 143, 145 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds., 1987); E. Barrett Prettyman, Jury Instructions-Firstor Last?, 46 A.B.A. J. 1066, 1066 (1960); Sand & Reiss, supra note 8, at 437-42; see
also Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: CognitiveFiltersin the Courtroom,37 UCLA L. REV. 273,
278 (1989) (suggesting that an advocate "learn to utilize a new, more explicit form of oral speech
which accommodates the jurors' limited information-processing capabilities").
428. See United States v. Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 274 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (approving trial
judge's decision to follow the "better practice of instructing the jury on the fundamentals of a
criminal trial prior to taking any evidence"); Jerrold Elecs. Corp. v. Wescoast Broad. Co., 341 F.2d
653, 665 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that preinstructions were not prejudicial when given both before
and after argument).
429. In criminal cases, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 provides:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in the requests. At the same time copies of such requests shall be
furnished to all parties ....The court may instruct the jury before or after the arguments
are completed or at both times. No party may assign as error any portion of the charge
or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider
its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the
objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury
and, on request of any party, out of the presence of the jury.
FED. R. CRim.P. 30. Similarly, in civil trials, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 authorizes the
judge to issue jury instructions. However, unlike Rule 30, under Rule 51, parties do not have to
furnish their adversaries with copies of their requested instructions. Rule 51 provides:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in the requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action
upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury. The court, at its election, may
instruct the jury before or after argument, or both. No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of
the objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the

jury.
FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
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there no perceived constitutional objections to such a procedure, but
current procedural rules actually facilitate such a practice.
d. Interim Statements or Instructions
Similarly, several commentators have advocated giving interim

statements or instructions in complex or lengthy cases in order to
improve juror understanding of the evidence,43 enhance juror recall of
the evidence,431 facilitate more coherent presentation of the evidence
by counsel, 32 and keep jurors focused on the trial.433 The arguments
concerning interim statements are substantially the same as those for
preinstruction of the jury. As with preinstruction, interim statements
would be consistent with the traditionally more informal communication
between judge and jury found in early English and American trials.

2. Judicial Commentary on the Evidence
Both the modem English434 and continental4 35 legal systems
allow for judicial commentary on the evidence for the benefit of the lay

participants in adjudication. In the United States, at least in civil trials,
the judge may also freely comment on the evidence.436 Commentators

430. See Improving Jury Comprehension,supra note 420, at 557.
431. See Complex Cases, supra note 8, at 34-37; Improving Jury Comprehension, supra note
420, at 557.
432. See Improving Jury Comprehension,supra note 420, at 557-58.
433. See KASSiN & WRIGHISMAN', supra note 8,at 136-37; Improving Jury Comprehension,
supra note 420, at 558.
434. Commentators have noted that the English judge's power to comment on the evidence
stands in place of the prosecutor's summation in criminal trials, replacing the prosecutor's more
partisan arguments with the judge's potentially more balanced arguments. For example, Professor
Van Kessel has noted:
[S]ince the English prosecutor is generally not allowed to answer defense counsel's final
argument as in our system, the judicial summary takes the place of the prosecutor's
closing argument. Since our trial system was largely derived from the English, it would
be ...accurate to say that we have replaced the balanced judicial summary and
evaluation of the evidence with the prosecutor's closing argument-a partisan
presentation which is probably the most powerful tool in the prosecutor's trial arsenal.
Lawyer power has replaced judicial power. Balance has been sacrificed for partisan
advocacy.
Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 434.
435. The professional judge in the continental system may comment upon the evidence during
the deliberations with the lay judges. See Casper & Zeisel, supra note 159, at 150-52.
436. See also United States v. Philadelphia & Reading R.R., 123 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1887)
(stating that judicial charge to the jury that the evidence raised a presumption of liability does not
infringe on the functioning of the jury); Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553
(1886) (stating that a judge may "comment upon the evidence, call [the jury's] attention to parts of
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have argued that such a practice may aid in improving the rationality of
jury factfinding.4 37 Allowing the judge to comment on the evidence
provides the members of the jury with a valuable guide to measure the
weight to accord the different pieces of evidence presented at trial.
However, there are currently some constitutional restraints hampering the judge's ability to comment on the evidence, particularly in
criminal trials where the defendant is entitled to an "impartial" hearing. 3 1 In the criminal context, trial judges must "satisfy the appearance
'
of justice."439
The appearance of bias alone is enough to constitute
440
grounds for reversal even if the trial judge is completely impartial.
In a criminal trial, the trial judge compromises, if not negates, the
appearance of impartiality if the judge's appearance, conduct, or behavior
44
indicates to the jury that the judge believes that the accused is guilty. '

it which he thinks important, and express his opinion upon the facts" without abridging the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial); M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 170, 182 (1828)
(stating that a trial judge may "sum up the facts in the case... and submit them, with the inferences
of law deducible therefrom, to the free judgment of the jury"). This practice has been acknowledged
by the Supreme Court to be derived from the English practice. See Vicksburg & Meridian R.R., 118
U.S. at 553 ("In the courts of the United States, as in those of England, from which our practice was
derived, the judge ...may... comment upon the evidence, call [the jury's] attention to parts of
it which he thinks important, and express his opinion upon the facts ...).
437. A number of commentators have addressed the desirability of judicial commentary on the
evidence. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, The UnnecessarilyExpandingRole of the American Trial
Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 28 (1978); Urbom, supra note 421, at 409; see also Philadelphia &
Reading R.R., 123 U.S. at 114 (stating that a judge may comment on the evidence when "in his
judgment the due administration ofjustice requires it"); Vicksburg &MeridianR.R., 118 U.S. at 553
(stating that a judge may comment on the evidence "whenever he thinks it necessary to assist [a
jury] in arriving at a just conclusion"). CompareRonald J. Allen, StructuringJury Decisionmaling
in Criminal Cases: A Unified ConstitutionalApproach to Evidentiay Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV.
321,331 (1980) (noting that the judge helps the jury recognize implications that otherwise may elude
them), with Charles R. Nesson, Rationality,Presumptions,and Judicial Comment: A Response to
ProfessorAllen, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1574, 1590 (1981) (noting that judicial commentary, in order to
be an effective guide for jury factfinding, should highlight the significant circumstantial facts, the
context in which the facts appear, and provide a standard for evaluating the significance of the facts).
438. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
439. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955); Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1238, 1244 (8th Cir. 1984); Peter David Blanck, What
EmpiricalResearch Tells Us: Studying Judges' and Juries' Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 776
n.1 (1991) [hereinafter Blanck, What EmpiricalResearch Tells Us]; Peter David Blanck et al., Note,
The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38
STAN. L. REV. 89, 89 & n.3 (1985) [hereinafter Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice].
440. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1946); State v. Larmond, 244
N.W.2d 233, 236 (Iowa 1976); Blanck et al., The Appearance ofJustice, supra note 439, at 89-90
& nn.4-5; Blanck, What EmpiricalResearch Tells Us, supra note 439, at 776.
441. See United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090, 1093 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Frazier,
584 F.2d 790, 794 (6th Cir. 1978) (stating that "the basic requirement [of a trial judge] is one of
impartiality in demeanor as well as in actions"); United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302, 310 (2d
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Furthermore, due process requires that a trial be "fair."442 Due process
violations, sufficient to reverse criminal convictions, have been found
where a trial judge's behavior appeared impartial." 3 A judge's nonverbal behavior in a criminal trial may even be problematic in terms of

unconstitutionally biasing the outcome of the trial.4'
Despite potential constitutional limitations placed on the judge's
ability to comment on the evidence, the general rule in the United States
is that federal judges may summarize and comment on the evidence, even
in a criminal trial, as long as their comments do not constitute advoca-

cy.445 The trial judge is merely prevented from assuming a "prosecuCir. 1973). One group of commentators has enumerated the following indicators that a judge has
impermissibly influenced the criminal trial process: (1) disparaging remarks toward the defendant;
(2) bias in rulings or comments; (3) consideration of matters not in evidence; (4) forming
expectations for trial outcome before the defense has presented its case; (5) inappropriate statements
of opinion to the jury during the trial; and (6) failing to control the misconduct of counsel. See
Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice, supra note 439, at 90-91 & n.8.
442. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 ('A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process.').
443. See Johnson v. Metz, 609 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979). But see United States v. Poland,
659 F.2d 884, 894 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that "an appearance of partisanship by the trial judge may
affect the attitude of the jury toward the defendants," but finding that "the evidence of guilt of these
appellants was far too strong to allow the verdict to be affected by any impatience, irritation, or
sarcasm of the trial judge").
444. See Blanck et al., The Appearance ofJustice, supra note 439, at 89; Peter David Blanck,
The Measureof the Judge: An Empirically-BasedFrameworkforExploring TrialJudges' Behavior,
75 IOWA L. REv. 653, 654 (1990); see also Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 401 (D.C. Cir.
1950) (reversing a criminal conviction based on the judge's subtle nonverbal cues, stating that a trial
judge "may not coerce, or attempt to coerce, a jury by gesture any more than [the judge] may do
so by words"); A.F.G., Note, Judges' Nonverbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to Judicial
Impartiality,61 VA. L. REV. 1266, 1268 (1975) (contending that a judge's subtle behavior during
a trial can influence a jury).
445. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466,470 (1933) ("In commenting upon testimony
[the judge] may not assume the role of a witness. He may analyze and dissect the evidence, but he
may not either distort it or add to it."); see also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930)
(observing that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury means that "the trial should be in
the presence and under the superintendence of a judge having power to ... advise them in respect
of the facts"). But see United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933) (stating that the judge
may not give his opinion that the defendant in a criminal case is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
although he may express an opinion as to his guilt); Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135,
140 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the judge invaded the jury's factfinding province
by commenting: "'I cannot tell you, in so many words, to find defendant guilty, but what I say
amounts to that"'); Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 422 (1896) (holding that it was error for
the trial judge to comment that defendant's flight created a legal presumption of guilt).
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of judicial commentary on the evidence
in a string of cases. See, e.g., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1899); Starr v. United
States, 153 U.S. 614, 624-26 (1894); Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553
(1886).
The Federal Rules of Evidence, as promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1972, contained
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torial role.' 6 Courts have looked at the following factors in assessing
the constitutionality of a trial judge's behavior: (1) the materiality or
relevance of the behavior or comment; 447 (2) the emphatic or overbearing nature of the behavior or comment;" (3) the efficacy of any
curative instruction used to correct the error;449 and (4) the prejudicial
effect of the behavior or comment in light of the trial as a whole.450 In
contrast to the federal rule, many state courts prohibit judicial summarizing and commenting on the evidence.45 '
Although it has been argued that judicial commentary on the
evidence similar to that allowed in England might violate certain
constitutional guarantees, 4 52 it certainly would be consistent with

a provision that permitted judicial commentary on the evidence, consistent with the practice in the
federal courts and common law practice. However, this proposed Rule 105 was rejected by Congress
in part because it was considered to be more of a procedural provision than an evidentiary one. See
21 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH w. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5081 (1977).
446. United States v. Bland, 697 F.2d 262, 265-66 (8th Cir. 1983) ("The trial judge's attitude
may have unconsciously driven him to assume a prosecutorial role in the trial, a role which
destroyed fair process for the accused."); see also Beaty, 722 F.2d at 1095 ("The court's vigorous
participation in examining the defendant's witnesses, especially when contrasted with the complete
freedom from hostile interruption of the prosecution's witnesses, must certainly have conveyed the
judge's skepticism about [the defendant's] alibi to the jury."); United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d
931, 935 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting that the trial judge's "brilliant redirect examination would have been
entirely proper had it been done by the prosecutor"); United States v. Hill, 332 F.2d 105, 106 (7th
Cir. 1964) (stating that "the court should be careful to preserve an attitude of impartiality and guard
against giving the jury any impression that the court was of the opinion that defendant was guilty");
Jackson v. United States, 329 F.2d 893, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (stating that a "claim of undue
intervention in the trial by the judge in a manner prejudicial to the defendant" is grounds for
reversal). But see United States v. Tilton, 714 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1983) (the trial judge's
interruption of counsel 28 times did not have a prejudicial effect on the jury).
447. See United States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 263, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Anton,
597 F.2d 371, 374-75 (3d Cir. 1979) (utilizing the judge's comment on the defendant's credibility
as a factor in reversing the conviction).
448. See Stevens v. United States, 306 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the following
statement of the trial judge was prejudicial: "'All right. I don't believe I want to hear any more
testimony from this witness. I want to certify in the record that the Court wouldn't believe him on
oath, and I don't want to waste the jury's time taking any more testimony from him."),
449. See id. (stating that "[a] comment by the judge that a witness is not to be believed is
prejudicial error unless instructions are given which make it clear that the court's observation is not
binding on the jury").
450. See Olgin, 745 F.2d at 269.
451. See KALvEN & ZEISEL, supra note 2, at 420.
452. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470-72 (1933); United States v. Spock, 416
F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969) (stating that in the criminal context "not only must the jury be free
from direct control in its verdict, but it must be free from judicial pressure, both contemporaneous
and subsequent"); Blanck et al., TheAppearanceofJustice,supranote 439, at 89; Van Kessel, supra
note 6, at 491. For a federal decision discussing the limits of the trial judge's power to comment on
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traditional constitutional notions of jury trial and due process. As
discussed above,453 there was not always a rigid distinction made
between the judge as trier of law and the jury as trier of fact in early
English or American practice. Thus, it would not be inconsistent with
traditional notions of jury trial to allow judicial commentary on the
evidence. As we have seen with respect to the power of juries to determine issues of law as well as issues of fact, this principle of division of
functions between judge and jury was not strongly rooted in traditional
notions of jury trial. Over time, there has been a fluctuation in the line
dividing the finder of fact from the finder of law. In particular, in early
American trials there was no clear division between the judge as finder
of law and the jury as finder of fact.
3. Complex and Truth-Defeating Rules of Evidence
As noted above,4" the modem American system, made up of
complex rules of evidence designed to prevent the jury from obtaining
information that it might misuse, stands in contrast to early English and
American practice. These rules have not been constitutionalized in the
United States.45 However, Justice Clarence Thomas recently warned
that, while the Supreme Court had disavowed an attempt to
"constitutionalize the hearsay rule and its exceptions," the Court's
decisions "have edged ever further in that direction. 456 Besides rules
against hearsay, character evidence, and evidence of past convictions,
modem American procedure is also characterized by a variety of
exclusionary rules "designed to serve collateral purposes, such as policing
the police, which hide reliable evidence from the jury and undercut
reliable fact-finding., 45 7 Eliminating some of these rules would serve
to increase the efficiency and accuracy of the trial.
4. Other Mechanisms of Judicial Control
There are a number of procedural devices used to restrict the power
of the civil jury, which the Supreme Court has approved. Among these
procedural devices are summary judgment, the directed verdict, special

the evidence after Quercia, see Anton, 597 F.2d at 375.
453. See supra notes 138-43, 298-333 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 129-37, 287-91 and accompanying text.

455. One commentator has noted the danger that "[c]onstitutionalizing the hearsay rules deters,
if not forecloses, development of flexible, Continental-style admissibility rules that might reduce the
importance of technical rules of evidence." Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 496.
456. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
457. Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 465.
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questions to the jury, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.45
However, in the criminal context, the Court has been more careful in
restricting the powers of the jury.45 9 In general, the Court has been
more concerned with maintaining the jury's role as a finder of fact than
with maintaining the jury's overall power in the process of adjudication.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the jury's role as factfinder
in both the civil and criminal contexts. 40

458. See Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government
Appeals ofCriminalSentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1013-15 (1980). Although civil and criminal
juries "have inviolate constitutional authority to find facts, the civil jury can be confined to the
province of fact-finding." Id. at 1013; see also Henderson, supra note 15, at 336 (noting that even
though the Supreme Court has cut back on the civil jury's power to decide questions of law, the
Court has "preserv[ed] the substance of the common law trial by jury and particularly the jury's
power to decide serious questions of fact"). As the Supreme Court stated in Patton v. United States:
[T]he maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in criminal cases is of such
importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become
effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had,
in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant.
281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930).
459. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (noting that "[t]he absence of these
remedial [jury control] procedures in criminal cases permits juries to acquit out of compassion");
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 573 (1977) (stating that neither trial nor
appellate judges may attempt "to override or interfere with the jurors' independent judgment in a
manner contrary to the interests of the accused"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 n.50 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (stating that it would be unconstitutional to prevent juries from engaging in
"discretionary act[s] of jury nullification" through the use of jury control procedures). Some
commentators have lamented the deference paid to criminal jury verdicts and the wider degree of
independence allowed the criminal jury.
Our adversary system's absolutist approach toward jury independence reflects the
low respect we hold for the accuracy of verdicts. In contrast to Continental systems, our
courts reject any requirement that the fact-finder explain or otherwise provide the basis
for its decision. We prohibit both special verdicts and interrogatories to the jury on the
ground that their use would allow the judge to intrude upon the independence of the jury.
Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 454.
460. See, e.g., MartinLinen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 572 (noting that "in a [criminal] jury trial
the primary finders of fact are the jurors"); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (noting that
the role of the criminal jury is "assur[ing] a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues"); United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 77 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) ("It has always been recognized that
the guaranty of trial by jury in criminal cases means that the jury is to be the factfinder."); Berry v.
United States, 312 U.S. 450, 453 (1941) (noting that the jury has exclusive power to weigh evidence
and determine contested factual issues); Barney v. Schmeider, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 248, 253 (1869)
(acknowledging the jury's role in weighing and balancing testimony); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1, 41-42 (1849) (noting that the Seventh Amendment requires the jury to assess credibility
of witnesses and weight of testimony in common-law actions).
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a. Special Interrogatories
Because of their tendency to unduly control the jury's factfinding
power, special verdicts and special interrogatories are generally not used
to determine issues of guilt in criminal cases.4 6 However, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 49 allows a judge to require the jury to answer written
interrogatories on issues of fact, in addition to returning a general
verdict.462 If the jury's responses to the special interrogatories are
consistent with one another, but inconsistent with the jury's general
verdict, the judge can ignore the general verdict and enter judgment in
accordance with the jury's specific findings.463
Although one could argue that this practice does not tread upon the
jury's factflnding power,46' it does not have a common-law analogue.
At common law, a judge could not disregard the jury's general verdict

and enter judgment based on the jury's responses to special interrogatories. The judge could merely set aside the general verdict and order a
new trial before a new jury if the jury's specific findings were inconsis-

461. See 3 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 512 (2d ed. 1982);
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1047, 1065
(1991). As the court stated in United States v. Ogull:
To ask the jury special questions might be said to infringe on its power to deliberate free
from legal fetters; on its power to arrive at a general verdict without having to support
it by reasons or by a report of its deliberations; and on its power to follow or not to
follow the instructions of the court. Moreover, any abridgment or modification of this
institution would partly restrict its historic function, that of tempering rules of law by
common sense brought to bear upon the facts of a specific case.
149 F. Supp. 272, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (footnote omitted). However, special interrogatories are
sometimes used in sentencing. See United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Buishas, 791 F.2d 1310, 1317 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d
1029, 1038 (1lth Cir. 1986).
462. "The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict,
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a
verdict." FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b); see also Kotler, supra note 317, at 130-31 (noting that the use of
special interrogatories and special verdicts is increasingly common).
463. Under Rule 49(b), the judge may enter judgment consistent with the jury's responses to
the special interrogatories or "return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or
may order a new trial.' FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
464. See 5A JArMS MOORE & Jo DESHA LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 49.04 (2d ed.
1994).
The power to enter judgment on findings consistent with each other but inconsistent with
the general verdict is a constitutional one and does not violate the Seventh Amendment
since the jury's findings of fact are not being reexamined. Rather, as a reasonable
regulation of practice, the jury's more specific findings of fact are allowed to control their
general conclusion embodied in the general verdict.
Id. 49.04, at 58.
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tent with its general verdict.465 Thus, the jury as an institution retained
the power to determine factual issues. Even though this practice was not
known at common law, the Supreme Court upheld a similar procedural
466
provision in Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad.
The Court reasoned that the "aim [of the Seventh Amendment] is not to
preserve mere matters of form and procedure but substance of right'4 67
and emphasized the utility of the procedure and the fact that the
factfinding ability of the jury was not impaired under this new procedure.4 s Thus, the Court's decision appears to have cut back on the
jury's power while disregarding historical jury practices. The use of
69
special interrogatories serves to check the power of the jury.
b. Special Verdict
A second practice authorized by Rule 49 is the special verdict,
where a jury is requested to answer only certain specific questions on the
material factual issues in the case.470 The court then applies the law to
the jury's factual determinations. As noted above, 47' this practice was
accepted under English common law in civil cases. There is evidence that
it was also available in America during the early colonial period.472
Because this practice was known at common law, the Supreme Court has
not explicitly addressed its constitutionality.47 3
However, this practice removes from the jury, to a certain extent,
the power to determine issues of law. As a practical matter, many of the
"questions of fact" submitted to the jury may be in reality mixed

465. See Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897); Scott, supra note
12, at 688.

466. 165 U.S. at 593.
467. Id. at 596.
468. See id. at 598 ("[T]he very thought and value of special interrogatories is... to end the
controversy so far as the trial court is concerned upon that single response from the jury.").
469. See Kotler, supra note 317, at 130-31 (discussing the effect of special interrogatories and
the special verdict on the jury's power).

470. Rule 49 provides in relevant part that "[tihe court may require a jury to return only a
special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact." FED. R. Civ. P.
49(a).
471. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
472. See MANN, supra note 170, at 74.
473. See Brodin, supra note 122, at 56-57 (noting that Supreme Court decisions strongly

indicate that the special verdict is consistent with the Seventh Amendment jury trial guarantee);
Stephens, supra note 122, at 109-10 (advocating that the special verdict violates the Seventh
Amendment because it impairs the power of the jury to render a general verdict and "the compulsory
nature of Rule 49 limits the jury-trial right as it existed at common law").
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questions of fact and law. 74 However, it is unlikely that purely legal
questions will be submitted to the jury under this procedure. For
example, when the issue is whether a defendant acted negligently, the
question may be submitted to the jury."'
Under both Rule 49 procedures, courts have stressed that the jury's
factfinding power remains intact. For example, the Supreme Court has
held that the Seventh Amendment requires that a judge attempt to
reconcile seemingly inconsistent answers in special verdicts476 and in
jury responses to special interrogatories accompanying a general
verdict.477 The jury's factfinding power must be preserved in the face
of inconsistencies in special findings of fact by either resubmitting the
facts to the original jury or by ordering a new trial before a new jury.
Rule 49 has been criticized as being "but another means utilized by

courts to weaken the constitutional power of juries and to vest judges
47
with more power to decide cases according to their own judgments."

474. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2506, at 179 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that in such cases, there must be an accompanying
instruction by the court explaining the legal standards to be applied by the jury); see also Westen,
supra note 458, at 1013-14 n.44 (noting that if the jury may determine mixed questions of law and
fact, the jury arguably has 'Just as much authority to find facts, and to apply the law to the facts,
as juries enjoy under a general verdict procedure"). As Professor Broeder has noted:
The determination of whether certain conduct falls within a particular legal
category has frequently been left to the jury on the theory that such a determination
involves a "mixed question of law and fact." In one sense, at least, all such questions are
"mixed questions of law and fact." Yet in a very large number of cases, the fitting of
facts into a legal rule is held to involve a "pure question of law." Thus, the question
raised by a demurrer to an indictment in an ordinary criminal case on the ground that the
facts alleged do not charge an offense is the same type of question as that involved in
determining whether a book is obscene or whether a defendant acted as a reasonably
prudent man. On demurrer, all three cases raise the issue of whether certain conceded
facts fall within a general rule of law. Yet the first of these issues is everywhere held to
be a "pure question of law," while the latter two issues are denominated "mixed questions
of law and fact." It is apparent that the use of such labels is merely a convenient method
of characterizing which of such questions are for the court and which are for the jury.
Broeder, supra note 357, at 405 (footnotes omitted).
475. See, e.g., Carmel v. Clapp & Eisenberg, P.C., 960 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 1992);
Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676, 678-79 (10th Cir. 1991).
476. See Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963) (holding that the state
appellate court improperly invaded the jury's factfnding function by reading answers as
inconsistent).
477. See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)
(finding that "a search for one possible view of the case which will make the jury's [answers to
special interrogatories] inconsistent results in a collision with the Seventh Amendment").
478. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. 865, 868 (1963)
[hereinafter Order] (statement by Justices Black and Douglas urging repeal of Rule 49 and opposing
the adoption of certain 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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As Justices Black and Douglas noted in opposing Rule 49, "[o]ne of the
ancient, fundamental reasons for having general jury verdicts was to
preserve the right of trial by jury as an indispensable part of a free
'
government."479
Thus, maintaining the ability of the jury to return a
general verdict is consistent with maintaining the jury's role in the
adjudicatory process. The special verdict erodes the power of the jury
and places greater power in the hands of the judge.
c.

Summary Judgment

Another mechanism allowing for judicial control of the jury in the
civil context is the summary judgment procedure, codified in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of summary judgment in the context of civil jury
trials.48 However, there appears to have been no analogue to the
summary judgment procedure at common law prior to 1791 .481 The
rationale for upholding the constitutionality of this procedure has instead
been that it does not interfere significantly with the jury's role as finder
483
of fact.4 However, this rationale is not entirely without criticism.
It is the judge who makes the determination of whether or not there is a
material factual issue that must go to the jury for resolution. Therefore,
the power of judge over jury is increased under the summary judgment
procedure.M The procedure represents a further erosion of the jury's

479. Id. at 867-68.
480. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1902); see also Poller
v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962) (upholding the constitutionality of the summary judgment
procedure under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 so long as it did not ."cut litigants off from their
right of trial by jury if they really have [factual] issues to try"' (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Natural
Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944))).
481. See 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2711, at 364 (1973) (stating that "[a] device with some of the characteristics of the
contemporary summary judgment first was introduced in England in the Bills of Exchange Act of

1855').
482. See Fidelity & Deposit Co., 187 U.S. at 320; FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C.

HAZARD, JR., CIrM PROCEDURE § 5.19, at 273 (3d ed. 1985) (arguing that summary judgment "is
not intended to resolve issues that are within the traditional province of the trier of fact, but rather
to see whether there are such issues").

483. See Order, supra note 478, at 867 (statements in opposition by Justices Black and
Douglas); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 304 (1968) (Black, J.,

dissenting) (arguing that summary judgment "tempts judges to take over the jury trial of cases, thus
depriving parties of their constitutional right to trial by jury").
484. See Dooley, supra note 292, at 334 n.44 (noting that "[t]he strengthening of the summary
judgment device as a method of case resolution... decreases the impact ofjury participation in civil
cases").
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power, with a concomitant increase in that of the judge.
d. Directed Verdict
Another mechanism by which the judge may control the jury is
through the directed verdict provided for in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a). However, a trial judge may not direct a verdict against
a defendant in a criminal trial under the Sixth Amendment even if there
is overwhelming evidence of guilt.4 85 The Supreme Court has upheld
the constitutionality of the directed verdict in the context of civil jury

trials as not unconstitutionally abridging the factfinding power of juries.486

However, the directed verdict did not exist in its modem form prior
to 179 1.487 If a party wanted to challenge the sufficiency of its
opponent's evidence, it could move for a new trial after the jury returned
its verdict488 or file a demurrer to the evidence and argue that its

485. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986) (asserting that the prohibition against
directing a verdict against the defendant in a criminal trial "stems from the Sixth Amendment's clear
command to afford jury trials in serious criminal cases"); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) (recognizing that because the criminal jury's "overriding responsibility is
to stand between the accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government... a trial judge is
prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such
a verdict"); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947)
(noting that "a judge may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence");
Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105 (1895) (stating that "it is not competent for the
court, in a criminal case, to instruct the jury peremptorily to find the accused guilty of the offence
charged or of any criminal offence less than that charged").
486. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395-96 (1943); see also Hepner v. United
States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (noting that the right to civil jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment is "subject to the condition, fundamental in the conduct of civil actions, that the court
may withdraw a case from the jury and direct a verdict, according to the law if the evidence is
uncontradicted and raises only a question of law"); Commissioners of Marion County v. Clark, 94
U.S. 278, 284 (1877) (a judge is allowed to question, before evidence is left to the jury, whether
there is any evidence "upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party
producing it, upon whom the burden of proof is imposed'); Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.)
116, 120-21 (1875) (same); Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1872)
(same); Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 373 (1850) (noting that "a jury has no right to
assume the truth of any material fact, without some evidence legally sufficient to establish it").
487. At common law, an English judge could "direct" the jury to find for one of the parties, but
if they did not, the only remedy was a new trial before a different jury. See Edward H. Cooper,
DirectionsforDirected Verdicts: A CompassforFederal Courts,55 MINN. L. REv. 903, 910 (1971)
(noting, however, that "obedience [to the judge's charge] was expected and ordinarily must have
followed"). The Supreme Court has noted that this practice bears little similarity to the modem
directed verdict. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 391-92 n.23 (remarking that this eighteenth-century
practice of directing a verdict did not "even approximate[] in character the present directed verdict").
488. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390-94.
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law.489

Thus, the
power to determine issues of fact remained with the jury as an institution

under traditional procedures. Despite this historical evidence, the
Supreme Court has reasoned that the directed verdict does not impair the
jury's factfinding function.490
e. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) authorizes a
"judgment as a matter of law," made by the judge after the jury has
returned its verdict.491 However, in the criminal context, a trial judge
may not, under the Sixth Amendment or the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, set aside or reverse a jury's verdict of acquittal.492 The power of the judge was traditionally limited to granting a
new trial in situations where the jury returned a verdict that was against
all the evidence or against the law.493

489. See Cooper, supra note 487, at 911.
490. See Galloway, 319 U.S. at 395 (reasoning that the "essential requirement is that mere
speculation be not allowed to do duty for probative facts, after making due allowance for all
reasonably possible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked"); see also 5A MOORE &
LUCAS, supra note 464, 50.02[1], at 50-29 to -30 (noting that lower courts have held that
"substantial evidence must be in conflict to create a jury question").
491. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
492. See, e.g., Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 227 n.8 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Not
only would it offend the Double Jeopardy Clause for a jury's verdict of acquittal to be set
aside ... but it would also dilute the constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal cases.'); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The suggestion that a jury's verdict
of acquittal could be overturned and a defendant retried would run afoul of the Sixth Amendment
jury-trial guarantee and the'Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment."); Capital Traction Co.
v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 14 (1899) ("[E]xcept on acquittal of a criminal charge," a trial judge may set
aside the jury's verdict if it is "against the law or the evidence."); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979) (stating that the factfinder's ability "to enter an unassailable but
unreasonable verdict of 'not guilty' . . . is the logical corollary of the rule that there can be no appeal
from ajudgment of acquittal, even if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming"); Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895) (stating that "if the court can direct a verdict of guilty, it can do indirectly
that which it has no power to do directly").
493. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497 (1931) (remarking that
at common law "[i]f the verdict was erroneous with respect to any issue, a new trial was directed
as to all"); Capital Traction Co., 174 U.S. at 13 (holding that under the Seventh Amendment "no
other mode of reexamination [of the jury's factfinding] is allowed than upon a new trial'); Walker
v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.RL, 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (discussing a court's authority to grant
a new trial if the jury misinterpreted or misapplied instructions on the law); Parsons v. Bedford, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448 (1830) (recounting the two methods under the common law by which jury
factfinding could be reexamined: "the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried,
or to which the record was properly returnable; or the award of a venire facias de novo, by an
appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings"); see also Henderson,
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Despite the lack of a historical analogue to the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Supreme Court has approved the constitutionality of this procedure.4 94 Under this procedure, the judge must determine
as a matter of law that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's
verdict4 95 or that a "reasonable jury" could not have rendered the
verdict on the facts presented. 496 Like the directed verdict, in finding
that the judgment notwithstanding the verdict is constitutional, the Court
has argued that it does not give judges "any part of the exclusive power
of juries to weigh evidence and determine contested issues of fact. 497
Despite this determination, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict does
indeed represent an erosion of the jury's factflnding power, much like the
directed verdict and summary judgment procedures.
C. Role of the Jury
From the foregoing discussion of early English and American
juries,4 98 it is evident that the modem jury is far more passive than its
historical antecedents. The passivity of the modem American jury has
been argued to impede its ability to discover the truth and arrive at just
outcomes. It has been suggested that, in general, a more active jury
would have the following advantages: (1) the jury would better serve as
a check on the power of judges and lawyers; (2) the accuracy of the
decisionmaking process would be improved; (3) jury credibility would
be increased; (4) jury decisions would be perceived as being more
legitimate; and (5) jurors would possess a better understanding of the
importance of their responsibility.49 9 Thus, commentators have recognized the potential advantages that can be derived by allowing the jury
to take a more active role during the trial.

supra note 15, at 311 ("In eighteenth-century England a general verdict found 'against all the
evidence' or 'against law' could be set aside and a new trial awarded."). But see Oldham, supranote
57, at 146-47 (concluding that "the freehold requirements were, if not a complete failure as a method
to ensure honest and intelligent jurymen, of very limited value').

494. See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967); Berry v. United States,
312 U.S. 450,452-53 (1941); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 660 (1935)

(reasoning that the practice of taking jury verdicts subject to a ruling on questions of law "was well
established when the Seventh Amendment was adopted, and therefore must be regarded as a part of

the common-law rules to which resort must be had in testing and measuring the right of trial by
jury').
495. See Baltimore & CarolinaLine, Inc., 295 U.S. at 659.
496. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513-14 (1988).
497. Berry, 312 U.S. at 453.

498. See supra notes 137-69, 295-342 and accompanying text.
499.

See Friedland, supranote 4, at 192, 206-20.
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The current passivity of the modem American jury does not seem
to be justified by constitutional concerns of due process. As noted above,
traditionally, both American and English juries played a more active role
in the adjudicatory process."' Thus, a more active jury could not be
inconsistent with due process or trial by jury as traditionally understood.
Consequently, this passivity does not appear to be mandated by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The current Federal Rules of Evidence do not
seem to preclude a more active role for the jury in certain areas. For
example, Federal Rule 611(a) provides that "[t]he court shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to ...make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth." '' Federal
Rule 102 provides that the "rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." 0 2
Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence emphasize the goal of ascertainment
of truth through the trial process and do not explicitly preclude a more
active role for the jury through questioning of witnesses or taldng
notes.503
1. The Authority of American Juries Concerning Issues of Fact
and Issues of Law
Formally, at least, the Supreme Court has in recent times suggested
that the civil jury has the constitutional authority to find facts and that
judges possess the authority to decide questions of law.5" Similarly, in

500. See supra notes 137-69, 295-342 and accompanying text.
501. FED. R. EviD. 611(a). The advisory committee's note to this rule states that detailed rules
governing the interrogation of witnesses were neither desirable nor feasible, but instead left such
questions up to the 'Judge's common sense and fairness in view of the particular circumstances."

Id. (advisory committee's notes); see also United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 483 (E.D.N.Y.
1940) ("There is no legal reason why... notes should not be made by jurors. Judges and lawyers
make notes, why not jurors?"); Dudley v. State, 263 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Ind. 1970) ("Judges and
lawyers alike ...consistently take notes during trial proceedings ....We see no reason why,
normally, a juror should be deprived of this assist or help in arriving at his verdict.").

502. FED. R. EvID. 102.
503. See id.; see also DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512,515 (4th Cir.

1985) (stating that "[tihe Federal Rules of Evidence neither explicitly allow nor disallow the practice
of permitting jurors to question witnesses").

504. See, e.g., Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (stating
that "issues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be determined by the jury
under appropriate instructions by the court"); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 387-

88 (1913) (noting that juries decide questions of fact).
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the criminal context, the Supreme Court has indicated that the criminal
jury should follow judicial instructions on the law in rendering its general
verdict. 5 According to the Court, "it is the duty of juries in criminal
cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as
they find them to be from the evidence."50 6 The Court has argued that
this is consistent with common law tradition 0 7 and that it furthers the
goal of certainty in the law.50 s However, the Court has also stated that
the criminal jury may disregard legal rules and rule in favor of the
defendant in a criminal trial.509
As legal realists have noted, the distinction between issues of fact

505. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
506. Id.

507. See id.
508. See id. at 101 ("Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the principle be

established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by
the court and become a law unto themselves.").
509. See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339,346 (1981) (per curiam) (discussing the "unreviewable
power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons"); Standefer v. United
States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (stating that the criminal jury may "acquit out of compassion or
compromise"); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979) (stating that the jury may enter
an "unreasonable verdict of 'not guilty"'); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 n.50 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (implying that the criminal jury may engage in "discretionary act[s] of jury
nullification"); Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925) (stating that juries in criminal
cases may acquit because of "their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but
to which they were disposed through lenity"); see also Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury
Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 25, 25 (1985) (noting that one model ofjury functioning suggests that a 'jury can... acquit
defendants who are legally guilty but morally upright"); Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The
Impact of JudicialInstructions,Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW &
HUM. BEHAv. 439,439 (1988) (stating that juries have the implicit power, embedded in the doctrine
ofjury nullification, "to acquit defendants despite evidence and judicial instructions to the contrary");
Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience ofJury Nullification, 48
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 165 (1991) ("The power of ajury to soften the harsh commands of the
law and return a verdict that corresponds to the community's sense of moral justice has long been
recognized.'); Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullificationin the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 488, 489 (1976) (noting that various defense lawyers and legal commentators have urged
that the jury has a common law right "to be informed by the judge ... that it may acquit a
defendant who, though guilty under a strict application of the law laid down by the judge, has done
nothing in the jury's view that is morally wrong"); Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification
and Jury-Control Procedures,65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 828 (1990) (discussing methods through
which jury nullification is prevented). Professor Poulin offers the following observation:
It is clear in our criminal justice system that the jury has the power to
nullify---that is, the power to acquit or to convict on reduced charges despite overwhelming evidence against the defendant. It has been argued that our system authorizes jury
nullification, in other words, that the jury has dejure authority to acquit against the law.
Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REv.
1377, 1399 (1994).
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and issues of law is a tenuous one at best."' The distinction certainly
was not rigorously observed in early American jury trials. As noted
above,5 ' juries often possessed the power to determine issues of law
as well as issues of fact. This power of the jury to determine issues of
law was gradually eroded during the nineteenth century.5" 2 Placing the
power to determine issues of law within the purview of the judiciary,
rather than an ever-changing group of laypersons, served to increase the
certainty of legal rules while eroding the power of the jury to function
as a channel for the expression of popular sovereignty.1 3 As

Blackstone stated in his Commentaries,"[i]f the power ofjudicature were
placed at random in the hands of the multitude, their decisions would be
wild and capricious, and a new rule of action would be every day
established in our courts."5" 4 Blackstone reasoned that determination of
issues of law should be left to judges because "the law is well known,"

510. See Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J.
667, 668 n.4 (1949); see also MANN, supranote 170, at 73 ("The hoary distinction between fact and
law is, at bottom, artificial, although often invoked"). One commonly-cited example of a question
that is difficult to characterize is that of negligence. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 126-27 (Dover Publications 1991) (1881) (arguing that the determination of
negligence is a question of law); Henderson, supra note 15, at 299 (stating that negligence is an
example "of what used to be called 'mixed questions of law and fact"'; Antonin Scalia, The Rule
ofLaw as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 1175, 1181 (1989) (arguing that reasonable care is
a question of fact when "legal rules have been exhausted and have yielded no answer").
511. See supra notes 298-333 and accompanying text.
512. Professor Nelson attributes the removal of the power to decide issues of law from the juror
to an increasing concern with certainty in the law necessitated by an increasingly industrialized
society. According to Professor Nelson:
[A] jury system in which juries have power to find law can function only in a society
with substantial ethical unity and economic and social stability. As unity and stability
broke down near the turn of the century, the jury system began to function less efficiently
and with less certainty and predictability. Certainty and predictability, however, were the
very qualities that business entrepreneurs needed most in order to rationally allocate
resources for economic growth, and they accordingly began to complain about the jury
system's inefficiencies. As a result juries lost their power to find law. By 1830 law was
stated to juries by the court, and their verdicts were set aside if they failed to follow the
court's instructions. Although judges themselves made much law, they looked whenever
possible to the legislature as the ultimate lawmaker, and interest groups freely competed
to gain control of the legislature so that law would be framed in their own interest.
NELSON, supra note 170, at 8.
513. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 736 ("[Jjudicial application of legal rules is a check on
excesses of the popular will-for example, community sentiments might favor finding an
unsympathetic defendant liable, regardless of the legal rules. In this sense, the judge is more likely
to be an impartial decisionmaker."). The author further notes that "[p]articipating only in the single
case before it, the jury is unable to achieve consistency in law declaration." Id. at 739.
514. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *379-80.
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and is "not accommodated to times or to men."5 5 Similarly, Thomas
Jefferson argued that juries "are not qualified to judge questions of
law." '16 However, the fact that juries could still enter a general verdict
that juries would always retain some power to
ensured, to some extent, 17
determine issues of law
Similarly, not every issue of fact was left to the jury. As Professor
Thayer noted before the turn of the century, "the allotment of fact to the
jury, even in the strict sense of fact, is not exact. The judges have always
answered a multitude of questions of ultimate fact involved in the issue.
It is true that this has often been disguised by calling them questions of
law. 5 18 Thus, some issues that could be characterized as factual were
left to the judge, while some issues that could be characterized as legal
were left to the jury.
Some modem commentators argue that juries should be vested with
the authority to determine issues of law as well as issues of fact.519 The

515. Id. at 380.
516. Amoux Letter, supra note 299, at 283.
517. As Jefferson noted:

It is left.., to the juries, if they think the permanent judges are under any bias[]
whatever in any cause, to take upon themselves to judge the law as well as the fact. They
never exercise this power but when they suspect partiality in the judges, and by the
exercise of this power they have been the firmest bulwarks of English liberty.
Id. Professor Murphy has noted the following:
As a practical matter, the civil jury often has the power to apply legal rules
through the device of the general verdict.... [A]lthough judges may ask juries in civil
cases to render a general verdict, the Constitution should not be interpreted to require
such jury involvement in determining the legal consequences of the facts or of any
qualitative assessment about the facts.
Murphy, supra note 1, at 736; see also Kotler, supra note 317, at 130 (arguing that when a jury
renders a general verdict "gross speculation, prejudice, or numerous other forms of juror misconduct
that may form the basis of a jury verdict are hidden from view, and essentially, the verdict is
unassailable").
518. Thayer, supranote 138, at 159. According to Thayer, the reason that certain questions of
fact were assigned to judges rather than to juries was out of concern for the greater certainty that
would be accorded through judicial determination.
Such things, so important, so long enduring, should have a fixed meaning; should not be
subject to varying interpretations; should be interpreted by whatever tribunal is most
permanent, best instructed, most likely to adhere to precedents.
It is on this ground of policy, or on like legislative considerations, and above all,
for fear the jury should decide some question of law that was complicated with the
fact,--that many other questions of fact have at one time or another been taken
possession of by the judges.
Id. at 161.
519. See, e.g., Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a
Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 52-54 (1980) (noting that in recent years, many
defense lawyers and scholars have tried to maintain a portion of the tradition of the seventeenth,
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reason for relaxing this barrier is that such a move would increase the
jury's ability to function as an organ of popular sovereignty and
contribute to the legitimacy of court decisions. The common objec-

tion to increasing the power of the modem jury in this fashion is that it

is fundamentally antidemocratic and countermajoritarian 2 t However,
the jury, like the legislature, is an organ of representative democracy. It
is merely selected in a different fashion.
2. Juror Questioning of Witnesses
Several commentators have advocated allowing the jury to question
witnesses, much as the judge might."z Commentators have argued that
allowing jurors to question witnesses would result in greater clarification

eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, when jurors were "told frequently that they had the right and
power to reject the judge's view of the law'); Jack B. Weinstein, ConsideringJury "Nullification":
When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 240 (1993)
("Nullification is but one legitimate result in an appropriate constitutional process safeguarded by
judges and the judicial system.'); Weinberg-Brodt, supra note 509, at 827-28 (proposing that jury
nullification be analyzed under a "defendant-centered" framework, focusing on the "defendant's right
to be tried before an independent jury" and viewing jury control procedures "from the standpoint of
their impact on the defendant's sixth amendment right" ).
520. However, there is the potential danger in a heterogeneous society that jury decisions may
lose some of their legitimacy due to inconsistency depending upon the composition of the jury. See
NELSON, supranote 170, at 8 ("[A] jury system in which juries have power to find law can function
only in a society with substantial ethical unity and economic and social stability.").
521. As one commentator has stated:
[There is tension between the function of the jury and the function of the legislature. As
the jury's power is increased to encompass a greater degree of policymaking, essentially
a legislative function, the tension increases and raises questions about our fundamental
notions of the allocation of power in a democracy. The reasons for this are obvious. A
legislature's popular election clothes its decisions with legitimacy. A jury is not elected
and may well return decisions that do not reflect the popular will. Although such
decisionmaking is tolerated because of popular respect for the jury as an institution and
because juries have traditionally had this power, the conflict raises a number of
conceptual problems.
Kotler, supra note 317, at 134.
522. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOcIETY, supra note 8; AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 102-03;
GUNHE, supranote 8, at 68-69; KAssrN & WRIGHTSMAN, supranote 8, at 129-31; Amar, supra
note 187, at 1185; Dann, supra note 419, at 1253 ("Studies verify that the advantages to jurors and
the trial as a whole outweigh the feared risks, and that questioning by jurors is an important device
for permitting more.., juror participation in the factfinding process.'); Mark A. Frankel, A Trial
Judge'sPerspective on ProvidingToolsfor RationalJury Decisionmaking, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 221,
222-23 (1990); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, IncreasingJurors' Participationin Trials: A Field
Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 251-57
(1988); William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 139-42; see
also Friedland, supra note 4, at 204-05; Harms, supra note 335, at 128 ("Because both judge and
jury are charged with finding the truth and reaching a just decision, jury questioning, like judge
interrogation, should be allowed.").
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of evidence and would elicit necessary information that might not be
provided were the jury to remain silent.5' These commentators have
concluded that the absence of questioning by jurors hinders their ability
to function as factfinders 24
Similarly, several courts have acknowledged the potential benefits
of juror questioning of witnesses.525 For example, the Fifth Circuit in
526 stated:
United States v. Callahan
There is nothing improper about the practice of allowing
occasional questions from jurors to be asked of witnesses. If a juror is
unclear as to a point in the proof, it makes good common sense to
allow a question to be asked about it. If nothing else, the question
should alert trial counsel that a particular factual issue may need more
extensive development. Trials exist to develop truth. It may sometimes
be that counsel are so familiar with a case that they fail to see
problems that would naturally bother a juror who is presented with the
facts for the first time. 27
Such a practice may be authorized under Federal Rule of Evidence
614(b), which empowers the court to call and interrogate witnesses.528
Thus, at the federal level, there appears to be no rigid legal barrier to
allowing jurors to question witnesses during trial. Furthermore, jurors
have been allowed to question witnesses during different periods in the
history of both the English and American juries. 529 Although ques-

523. See Harms, supra note 335, at 148-49.
524. See Edward W. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating,5 VAND. L. REV. 277,
289 (1952). The problem may be summarized as follows:
It is old hat in experimental psychology that people display different cognitive needs;
they try to reach knowledge and understanding along different paths. It therefore stands
to reason that decisionmakers may sometimes require a different method of presentation
than that of the clash of two one-sided versions, and that, at a psychologically crucial
point, they would sometimes like to ask a specific question of a witness, which in their
passivity they cannot do.
Mirian Darnaka, Presentationof Evidence and FactfindingPrecision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083,
1094-95 (1975); see also Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975
B.Y.U. L. REv. 601, 606 (stating that the jury cannot be expected to perform its function
competently if jurors are "unsure about the evidence, unclear on the meaning of the law, confused
by legal jargon, bewildered by trial procedure, or uncertain of the role they are to play").
525. See generally DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir.
1985); United States v. Witt, 215 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1954).
526. 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1979).
527. Id. at 1086.
528. See, e.g., DeBenedetto,754 F.2d at 515 (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence is silent
on the issue).
529. See supra notes 155-56, 503 and accompanying text.
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tioning of witnesses by jurors may already be allowed in most jurisdictions, it is often discouraged.131 This is somewhat surprising since
empirical studies indicate that judges remain open to the idea of jurorquestioning of witnesses.5 3' As with many of the reforms advocated in
this Article, the lack of reform efforts may be due to professional inertia.
3. Juror Questioning of the Judge
Some courts have allowed jurors to question the judge concerning
the law and legal instructions that they are to apply to the facts of the
case. 32 Like the practice of allowing judicial commentary on the
evidence, allowing jurors to question the judge concerning the applicable

legal principles in a case would facilitate communication between the
judge and jury, and arguably result in more accurate outcomes. Furthermore, as noted in the context of the judicial comment power, historically,

communications between judge and jury were much more informal. 33
Thus, relaxation of rigid procedural formalism in this area would be
consistent with historical practices.
4. Communication Among the Jurors
Jurors have been forbidden to communicate with each other prior to

deliberations out of a fear that jurors might prematurely make up their
minds if allowed to communicate amongst themselves. 34 However,
commentators have argued that the restraints placed upon juror communi-

cation with each other prior to deliberation are unwarranted.5 35 These

530. See Harms, supra note 335, at 132; Michael A. McLaughlin, Note, Questions to Witnesses
and Notetaking by the Jury as Aids in Understanding Complex Litigation, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV.
687, 699 (1983).
531. See Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Some Suggestionsfor the CriticalAppraisal of a
More Active Jury, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 226, 230-31 (1990).
532. See Dann, supra note 419, at 1261 (concluding that "[c]ase law allows trial judges
discretion to decide how to respond to questions from a deliberating jury"); David U. Strawn & G.
Thomas Munsterman, Helping Juries Handle Complex Cases, 65 JUDIcATURE 444, 447 (1982).
533. See supra notes 106-16, 271-81 and accompanying text.
534. See Dann, supra note 419, at 1262.
535. Several commentators have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., AUSTIN, supra note
8, at 103 ("The restriction on intragroup discussion should be terminated so that jurors can discuss
the details of the trial as it unfolds. Group discussion is a logical adjunct to note-taking and two-way
communication.'); Dann, supra note 419, at 1262-64; Friedland, supra note 4, at 199; Schwarzer,
supra note 522, at 142 (stating that in long or complex trials "it defies reason to expect jurors, who
may be confused, troubled, and perhaps overwhelmed by the unaccustomed responsibility, not to
share their concerns and look to their colleagues for help and mutual support"). William Schwarzer,
Director of the Federal Judicial Center, enumerated the following advantages of allowing jurors to
communicate with each other prior to deliberations:
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commentators argue that overall juror comprehension of the evidence
may be enhanced through group discussion536 and that juror discussions
prior to deliberation may serve to dispel any prejudgments that certain
jurors may have made.537
There should be no constitutional objections to jurors communicat-

ing with each other prior to deliberation. Traditionally, jurors were
allowed to communicate relevant knowledge to each other, which might
have been known only to certain jurors, since outside knowledge was
allowed when jurors acted more as witnesses than as triers of fact. 538
Therefore, such a procedure seems to be consistent with traditional
notions of due process and trial by jury. Despite this historical pedigree,
it appears that jurisdictions are divided on the question of whether a
judge may permissibly instruct jurors that539
they may discuss the evidence
among themselves prior to deliberations.

Discussion among jurors may reveal areas of misunderstanding or confusion that jurors
could then clarify by questioning the witnesses or the judge. It may also help ease the
tension that jurors experience sitting on a long and complicated case. That such
discussions may influence the views of some jurors before the trial is over is not
objectionable, since any tentative opinion so formed must still stand the test of full debate
among the entire jury during the deliberations. In any event, the lonely juror who, unable
to talk to the others, remains confused during the trial is not likely to be an effective
participant in the verdict deliberations.
Permitting jurors to talk to each other about the case during the trial may have
other positive effects. There is evidence that the opinions jurors form early in the trial
often become their decisions later. It is possible that a juror may be less prone to form
and hold to an early opinion if he or she hears that others view the evidence differently.
Discussions with other jurors may suggest to a juror different perspectives and
interpretations that will lead to more thoughtful and open-minded consideration of the
case. Although the benefits of relaxing the traditional rule are not provable, the rule's
disadvantages seem sufficiently clear to justify jettisoning this unnatural and burdensome
restriction.
Id. at 142-43 (citation omitted).
536. See AUSTN, supra note 8, at 104.
537. See id.
538. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
539. See United States v. Lemus, 542 F.2d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 1976) (upholding instructions);
Wilson v. State, 242 A.2d 194, 199-200 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (same); cf.Meggs v. Fair, 621
F.2d 460,463-64 (lst Cir. 1980) (declining to rule on whether ajudge may instruct jurors to discuss
evidence prior to deliberation, but effectively upholding such instructions by finding that the judge's
admonition to the jury, requiring that they not commit themselves until all evidence was heard,
minimized any danger to the defendant). But see Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 329
(8th Cir. 1945) (holding instructions to be reversible error); Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 343 N.E.2d
402,404 (Mass. 1976) (disapproving of instructions); People v. Hunter, 121 N.W.2d 442,446 (Mich.
1963) (same).
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5. Juror Note-Taking
Several commentators have advocated that jurors should be allowed
to take notes during the course of trial.540 Of the reforms discussed in

this Article, this is perhaps the most widely supported. For example, in
1960, the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System made the following recommendation:
Trial jurors should, in the discretion of the trial judge, be
permitted to take notes for use in their deliberations regarding the
evidence presented to them and to take these notes with them when
they retire for their deliberations. When permitted to be taken, they
should be treated as confidential between the juror making them and his
fellow jurors."

Arguments advanced in favor ofjuror note-taking include: (1) note-taking
aids in juror recollection of the evidence,542 especially in complex or
lengthy trials;543 (2) note-taking focuses the attention of the juror on
the trial proceedings; 5' (3) judges and lawyers are already permitted
to take notes;545 and (4) juror note-taking lessens the time for deliberation by reducing the number of times a jury feels compelled to seek
instructions or additional information from the court.546
Historically, there appears to have been no barrier to allowing jurors

540. See, e.g., Complex Cases,supra note 8, at 34-37 (recommending the use of multipurpose
notebooks for jurors in complex cases); see also AMIUCAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 8, at
8; GUINTHE, supra note 8,at 68-69; KASSIN & WIGHTSMAN, supranote 8, at 128-29; Amar, supra
note 187, at 1185; Sand & Reiss, supra note 8, at 423; Shrallow, supra note 356, at 214-15. As
Kassin and Wrightsman have argued:
There is an element of arrogance and hypocrisy to the notion that jurors would
be so adversely affected by taking notes. As Judge Urbom noted, "if there are reasons for
note-taking by lawyers and judges during a trial, there are at least the same reasons for
note-taking by jurors." The reasons, we think, are self evident to all of us who kept
notebooks in school.
KAssiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 8, at 129 (endnote omitted).
541. The Jury System in the Federal Courts: Report of the JudicialConference Committee on
the Operation of the Jury System, 26 F.R.D. 409, 424 (1960).
542. See Petroff, supra note 155, at 130.
543. See McLaughlin, supra note 530, at 709.
544. See Frankel, supra note 522, at 225; Shrallow, supra note 356, at 215-16.
545. See United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1940) ("There is no legal
reason why ... notes should not be made by jurors. Judges and lawyers make notes, why not
jurors?'D; Dudley v. State, 263 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Ind. 1970) ("Judges and lawyers
alke... consistently take notes during trial proceedings .... We see no reason why, normally, a
juror should be deprived of this assist or help in arriving at his verdict").
546. See Frankel, supra note 522, at 224; see also Sand & Reiss, supra note 8, at 450.
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to take notes during trial. 47 Initially, the practice might not have been
widespread due to the illiteracy of the general population. This does not
mean, however, that it was impermissible. Certainly, once more of the
population became literate, the practice of juror note-taking was allowed
and became increasingly widespread.
Furthermore, the practice of allowing jurors to take notes is clearly
within the scope of permissible procedures acknowledged by a variety of
courts. The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the permissibility
of juror note-taking. 4 However, the majority of state and federal
courts leave the decision of whether or not to allow note-taking to the
discretion of the trial judge.54 9 Despite this fact, most judges do not

547. See supra notes 158, 340 and accompanying text.
548. See Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36,45 (1897) (disposing of the issue on procedural
grounds and failing to reach the merits of note-taking).
549. Many federal cases have sanctioned this procedure. See, eg., United States v. Polowichak,
783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1980)
(emphasizing the need to instruct the jury on the proper use of notes); United States v. Johnson, 584
F.2d 148, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Maclean, 578 F.2d 64, 65 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating
that "the unanimous view of federal appellate courts... [is that w]hether or not to allow note-taking
by jurors is a matter committed to the sound discretion of trial judges"); United States v. Anthony,
565 F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697,705-06 (10th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 159-60 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Braverman, 522
F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Marquez, 449 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1971); Toles v.
United States, 308 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1962); Goodloe v. United States, 188 F.2d 621, 621-22
(D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that the trial
court's refusal to allow note-taking was not an abuse of discretion); see also United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 897 (7th Cir. 1963) (explaining that compulsory note-taking is
permissible under certain circumstances). Similarly, many state courts have sanctioned this procedure.
See, e.g., People v. Cline, 35 Cal. Rptr. 420,422-23 (Ct. App. 1963); Cahill v. Mayor of Baltimore,
98 A. 235, 238 (Md. 1916); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 76 N.E. 127, 142 (Mass. 1905); Watkins v.
State, 393 S.W.2d 141, 145-46 (Tenn. 1965) (stating that the general rule in the United States is that
allowing note-taking by jurors is within the discretion of the trial judge); see also Denson v. Stanley,
84 So. 770, 771 (Ala. Ct. App. 1918), rev'don other groundssub nom. Exparte Stanley, 84 So. 773
(Ala. 1919) (jury may take notes, but it is not required); Thomas v. State, 16 S.E. 94, 94 (Ga. 1892)
(a juror may take notes); Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Miller, 71111. 463, 472 (1874) (a juror
may take notes on own motion but not on motion of counsel); Van Sickle v. Kokomo Water Works
Co., 158 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Ind. 1959) (note-taking is not prejudicial); State v. Keehn, 118 P. 851,
855 (Kan. 1911) (sketch of homicide scene did not constitute misconduct by juror); Martin v.
Atherton, 116 A.2d 629, 632 (Me. 1955) (note-taking is not prohibited); Cowles v. Hayes, 71 N.C.
194, 195 (1874) (note-taking is commendable); State v. Cottrell, 37 A. 947, 947 (RI. 1886) (juror
submitting notes for a newspaper article was not grounds for new trial). But see Corbin v. City of
Cleveland, 56 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ohio 1944) (trial court erred in suggesting that jurors take notes);
Thornton v. Weaber, 112 A.2d 344, 347-48 (Pa. 1955) (note-taking generally forbidden); see also
Batterson v. State, 63 Ind. 531,536-37 (1878) (no misbehavior when the trial judge instructed ajuror
to stop taking notes); Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492, 494-95 (1871) (persistent note-taking, after being
instructed not to, would entitle the defendant to a new trial); State v. Johnson, 632 S.W.2d 43, 45
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Fisher v. Strader, 160 A.2d 203, 204 (Pa. 1960) (notes were not prejudicial
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exercise this discretion and allow jurors to take notes during trial.5

°

This is surprising considering that under the common law the propriety
of note-taking was not problematic. 5 ' It is also surprising because
empirical data indicates that judges remain open to allowing juror notetaking during trial. 52 Once again, professional inertia may be to blame
for the lack of reform in this area.
6. Authority to Determine Sanction in Criminal Cases
In the criminal context, under the Sixth Amendment, it is constitutionally permissible for the jury to have a role in determining the
sentence of a criminal defendant." 3 However, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that there is no constitutional right to have the jury
undertake a role in determining the sentence." The Court stated in
555 that the "Sixth Amendment never has been
Spaziano v. Florida
thought to guarantee" a right to sentencing by a jury. 6 In holding that
there is no constitutional right to have the jury determine sentence as
well as guilt, the Court has baldly asserted that historically there was no

if not taken into the jury room and relied on).
550. See Forston, supra note 8, at 633; see also Heuer & Penrod, supra note 531, at 229
(reporting results of a survey ofjudges indicating the allowance of note-taking in approximately onethird of trials, but that 37% of judges never allowed note-taking).
551. See Petroff, supra note 155, at 127.
552. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 531, at 226.
553. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967) (recognizing the wide leeway given to
states in dividing responsibility between the judge and jury in criminal cases). In fact, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the value of employing juries in making capital sentencing decisions. See,
e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (remarking that a jury, in determining whether
to impose a capital sentence, can make "the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy
codification and that 'buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system" ' (quoting KALVEN
& ZEISEL, supranote 2, at 498)); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (noting the
jury's important function in making capital sentencing decisions).
554. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-48 (1990); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638,
639-40 (1989) (per curian); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,93 (1986); Cabana v. Bullock,
474 U.S. 376, 385-86 (1986); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459, 463 n.8 (1984) ("What we
do not accept is that, because juries may sentence, they constitutionally must do so."). However,
some state legislatures have conferred the right to have ajury sentence in noncapital cases. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-103 (Michie Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055(2) (Michie Supp.
1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 353 (Vest 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-20-104 (1990); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04(d) (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (Michie 1995). Furthermore,
at least twenty-nine states have conferred a right to sentencing by the jury in capital cases. See
Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The UnconstitutionalityofCapitalStatutes
That Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REV. 283, 284 & n. I
(1989) (listing jurisdictions that allow the death penalty only if the jury votes for death).
555. 468 U.S. at 447.
556. Id. at 459.
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such right. 5 7 However, this certainly does not mean that such procedures are not constitutionally permissible. Historically, the particular facts
found by the jury often determined the particular sentence in a case. 58
Thus, the jury had an indirect role in determining the sentence in the case
through its factfinding power.
In most modem criminal cases in the United States, the jury does
not participate in sentencing.5 59 However, the exception is the capital
case. The vast majority of states vest the jury with the power to
determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.5 6 However, in
seven states, the judge has the power to impose the death penalty. 6 '
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment does not require
that a jury determine whether or not there are sufficient "aggravating
factors" under these statutes to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty.5 62 The Court has stated that "the Sixth Amendment does not
require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the
sentence of death be made by the jury."'63 Even when these statutory
"aggravating factors" relate to the circumstances of the accused's offense,
the Court has found that it is constitutionally permissible to leave the
determination of sentencing to the judge alone. 64 Therefore, there is

557. See id.; see also Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385 (stating that "[the decision whether a particular
punishment--even the death penalty-is appropriate in any given case is not one that we have ever
required to be made by a jury").
558. See supra Parts II.D.3, III.D.3.
559. See Kotler, supra note 317, at 139.
Under the traditional view, the punishment that the accused will receive if convicted is
a question for the judge, not the jury. Thus, counsel is normally prohibited from
commenting on punishment in the presence of the jury, and the trial judge is precluded
from advising the jury, directly or indirectly, of the sentence to be imposed in the event
of conviction.
Id. (footnote omitted).
560. See Mello, supra note 554, at 284 & n.l.
561. The judge has exclusive authority to impose the death penalty under the following statutes:
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (west 1995); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(a) (Michie 1996); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1989). Under the following statutes,
the jury may make a sentencing recommendation to the judge, which the judge can then accept or
reject: ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West 1996); IND. CODE § 3550-2-9 (West 1986).
562. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990).
563. Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam).
564. See id. at 639 (holding that the trial judge could make a determination concerning the
imposition of the death penalty when aggravating factors involved whether "the killing was
committed for pecuniary gain, and the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel"); see also
Walton, 497 U.S. at 645-46 (holding that a judge may find aggravating circumstances when murder
was committed in an "especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner" or for "pecuniary gain"). But
see id. at 713 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court had "encroached upon the factfinding
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room to expand or contract the role of the jury in sentencing.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although some commentators have argued that procedural reform

in the United States may be hampered by Supreme Court decisions
constitutionalizing or federalizing the rules of procedure, 565 professional
inertia among lawyers and judges, 566 and a distrust of centralized authority,5 67 the reforms discussed in this Article fall within the scope of

traditional understandings of trial by jury and due process in the United
States. Therefore, meaningful reform of jury procedures should not run
afoul of federal constitutional norms, and should enjoy some degree of
success. For example, the Supreme Court has itself gone so far as to state

that
[a] criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is
easy to imagine. It would make use of alternative guarantees and
protections which would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the
English and American systems.
Yet no American State has undertaken
5 68
system.
a
such
construct
to
Furthermore, recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of due process
have arguably evidenced a "subtle devolution of political authority from

function that has so long been entrusted to the jury").
565. See, e.g., Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 487.
Supreme Court constitutionalizing ofthe rules of criminal procedure, which began

with Warren Court decisions in the 1960s, narrowed the scope of possible reforms at state
as well as federal levels. In the name of creating a minimum floor of federal standards
to which all states must conform, the Court significantly restricted states in experimenting
with different procedural models.
Id. However, one commentator has argued that Supreme Court precedent is not inconsistent with
experimentation with the jury system. See Alschuler, supra note 14, at 996-97.
566. See, e.g., Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 487.
Lawyers have a strong interest in maintaining the present system, which allows
them to be the central figures in the great drama of the criminal trial. They will not easily
yield their power to influence the outcome of trials while often being regarded as heroes
in doing so. Furthermore, any interest they may have in expediting the trial process, such
that there could be more trials and fewer guilty pleas, is diminished by their strong
interest in maintaining the present plea bargaining system. Lawyer dominance over the
disposition of cases through the plea bargaining process is even greater than lawyer
control of the trial process.
Id. at 501.
567. See id. at 505.
568. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
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the central government to the states, ' 69 which might allow for increased procedural experimentation on the part of the state governments.
The reforms discussed in this Article: (1) allowing the knowledge
and experience of potential jurors to be a factor that worksfor instead of
againsttheir being placed on the jury; (2) eliminating or cutting back on
peremptory challenges and extensive lawyer-conducted voir dire; (3)
retaining the rule of unanimity and the twelve member jury; (4) drafting
jury instructions in plain English and preinstructing the jury; (5) requiring
the judge to comment on the evidence and the credibility of witnesses;
(6) relaxing the rules of evidence to allow hearsay, character, and past
conviction evidence to be heard by the jury; (7) giving jurors the right
to communicate with each other, ask questions of the witnesses as well
as the judge, and take notes during trial; (8) allowing for greater jury
participation in the determination of sanctions in criminal cases; and (9)
requiring the jury to give reasons for its verdict in a written decision will
result in increasing the speed and accuracy of trials in the United States.
As the foregoing historical and constitutional analysis demonstrates, these
reforms are, for the most part, consistent with traditionalnotions of trial
by jury and due process in the United States. Thus, legal reformers,
judges, and lawyers should feel no reservations in experimenting with
these jury procedures in order to increase the speed, efficiency, and
justice of both criminal and civil trials in the United States.

569. RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 122
(2d ed. 1991).
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